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Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification

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- 12 This document's normative language is English. Translation into other languages is permitted.

13

CONTENTS

1 Foreword
1.1 Acknowledgments
2 Introduction
2.1 Advice
2.2 Conventions
2.2.1 Document conventions
2.2.2 Reserved and unassigned values
2.2.3 Byte ordering
2.2.4 Sizes and lengths
2.2.5 SPDM data types
2.2.6 Version encoding
2.2.7 Notations
2.2.8 Text or string encoding
2.2.9 Deprecated material
2.2.10 Other conventions
3 Scope
4 Normative references
5 Terms and definitions
6 Symbols and abbreviated terms
7 SPDM message exchanges
7.1 Security capability discovery and negotiation
7.2 Identity authentication
7.2.1 Identity provisioning
7.2.2 Raw public keys
7.2.3 Runtime authentication
7.3 Firmware and configuration measurement
7.4 Secure sessions
7.5 Mutual authentication overview
7.6 Custom environments
8 SPDM messaging protocol
8.1 SPDM connection model
8.2 SPDM bits-to-bytes mapping
8.3 Generic SPDM message format
8.3.1 SPDM version
8.4 SPDM request codes
8.5 SPDM response codes
8.6 SPDM request and response code issuance allowance
8.7 Concurrent SPDM message processing
8.8 Requirements for Requesters
8.9 Requirements for Responders
9 Timing requirements

	9.1 Timing measurements	41
	9.2 Timing specification table	41
10	SPDM messages	49
	10.1 Capability discovery and negotiation	49
	10.1.1 Negotiated state preamble	49
	10.2 GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages	50
	10.3 GET_CAPABILITIES request and CAPABILITIES response messages	53
	10.4 NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request and ALGORITHMS response messages	62
	10.4.1 Connection Behavior after VCA	76
	10.5 Responder identity authentication	77
	10.6 Requester identity authentication	
	10.6.1 Certificates and certificate chains	
	10.7 GET_DIGESTS request and DIGESTS response messages	
	10.8 GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages	
	10.8.1 Mutual authentication requirements for GET_CERTIFICATE and CERTIFICATE messages.	
	10.8.2 SPDM certificate requirements and recommendations	
	10.9 CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages	
	10.9.1 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation	
	10.9.2 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification.	
	10.9.3 Basic mutual authentication	
	10.10 Firmware and other measurements.	
	10.11 GET_MEASUREMENTS request and MEASUREMENTS response messages.	
	10.11.1 Measurement block	
	10.11.2 MEASUREMENTS signature generation	
	10.11.3 MEASUREMENTS signature verification	
	10.12 ERROR response message	
	10.12.1 Standard body or vendor-defined header	
	10.13 RESPOND_IF_READY request message format 1 10.14 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message 1	
	10.15 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message	
	10.15.1 VendorDefinedReqPayload and VendorDefinedRespPayload defined by DMTF	110
	specifications	110
	10.16 KEY_EXCHANGE request and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages	
	10.16.1 Session-based mutual authentication	
	10.17 FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages	
	10.17.1 Transcript and transcript hash calculation rules	
	10.18 PSK EXCHANGE request and PSK EXCHANGE RSP response messages	
	10.19 PSK_FINISH request and PSK_FINISH_RSP response messages	
	10.20 HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response messages	
	10.20.1 Heartbeat additional information	
	10.21 KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages	
	10.21.1 Session key update synchronization	144
	10.21.2 KEY_UPDATE transport allowances 1	

	10.22 GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response	
	messages	150
	10.22.1 Encapsulated request flow	
	10.22.2 Optimized encapsulated request flow	150
	10.22.3 Triggering GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	154
	10.22.4 Additional constraints	155
	10.23 DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK	
	response messages	
	10.23.1 Additional information	157
	10.23.2 Allowance for encapsulated requests	158
	10.23.3 Certain error handling in encapsulated flows	158
	10.24 END_SESSION request and END_SESSION_ACK response messages	159
	10.25 Certificate provisioning	
	10.25.1 GET_CSR request and CSR response messages	161
	10.25.2 SET_CERTIFICATE request and SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response messages	162
	10.26 Large SPDM message transfer mechanism	
	10.26.1 CHUNK_SEND request and CHUNK_SEND_ACK response message	
	10.26.2 CHUNK_GET request and CHUNK_RESPONSE response message	
	10.26.3 Additional chunk transfer requirements	
11	Session.	
	11.1 Session handshake phase.	
	11.2 Application phase.	
	11.3 Session termination phase.	
	11.4 Simultaneous active sessions	
	11.5 Records and session ID.	
12	Key schedule	
	12.1 DHE secret computation	
	12.2 Transcript hash in key derivation	
	12.3 TH1 definition	
	12.4 TH2 definition	
	12.5 Key schedule major secrets	
	12.5.1 Request-direction handshake secret.	
	12.5.2 Response-direction handshake secret	
	12.5.3 Request-direction data secret	
	12.5.4 Response-direction data secret	
	12.6 Encryption key and IV derivation	
	12.7 finished_key derivation	
	12.8 Deriving additional keys from the Export Master Secret	
	12.9 Major secrets update	
13	Application data	
	13.1 Nonce derivation	
	General opaque data format	
15	Signature generation	186

15.1 Signing algorithms in extensions
15.2 RSA and ECDSA signing algorithms
15.3 EdDSA signing algorithms
15.3.1 Ed25519 sign
15.3.2 Ed448 sign
15.4 SM2 signing algorithm
15.5 Signature algorithm references
16 Signature verification
16.1 Signature verification algorithms in extensions
16.2 RSA and ECDSA signature verification algorithms
16.3 EdDSA signature verification algorithms
16.3.1 Ed25519 verify
16.3.2 Ed448 verify
16.4 SM2 signature verification algorithm
17 General ordering rules
18 ANNEX A (informative) TLS 1.3
19 ANNEX B (informative) Device certificate example
20 ANNEX C (informative) OID reference
21 ANNEX D (informative) variable name reference
22 ANNEX E (informative) change log
22.1 Version 1.0.0 (2019-10-16)
22.2 Version 1.1.0 (2020-07-15)
22.3 Version 1.2.0 (2021-11-01)
22.4 Version 1.2.1 (2022-05-11)
22.5 Version 1.2.2 (2023-10-08)
22.6 Version 1.2.3 (2024-08-19)
23 Bibliography

¹⁴ **1** Foreword

- 15 The Security Protocols and Data Models (SPDM) Working Group of DMTF prepared the Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification (DSP0274). DMTF is a not-for-profit association of industry members that promotes enterprise and systems management and interoperability. For information about DMTF, see https://www.dmtf.org.
- 16 This version supersedes version 1.2.2 and its errata versions. For a list of the changes, see ANNEX E (informative) change log.

¹⁷ **1.1 Acknowledgments**

18 DMTF acknowledges the following individuals for their contributions to this document:

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²⁰ 2 Introduction

21 The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification defines messages, data objects, and sequences for performing message exchanges between *devices* over a variety of transport and physical media. The description of message exchanges includes *authentication* and provisioning of hardware identities, measurement for firmware identities, session key exchange protocols to enable confidentiality with integrity protected data communication, and other related capabilities. The SPDM enables efficient access to low-level security capabilities and operations. Other mechanisms, including non-SPDM- and DMTF-defined mechanisms, can use the SPDM.

²² **2.1 Advice**

23 The authors recommend that readers visit tutorial and education materials at the Security Protocols and Data Models (SPDM) section of the DMTF website before or while reading this specification to help understand this specification.

²⁴ 2.2 Conventions

25 The following conventions apply to all SPDM specifications.

26 2.2.1 Document conventions

- Document titles appear in *italics*.
- The first occurrence of each important term appears in *italics* with a link to its definition.
- ABNF rules appear in a monospaced font.

27 2.2.2 Reserved and unassigned values

- 28 Unless otherwise specified, any reserved, unspecified, or unassigned values in enumerations or other numeric ranges are reserved for future definition by DMTF.
- 29 Unless otherwise specified, field values marked as Reserved shall be written as zero (0), ignored when read, not modified and not interpreted as an error if not zero, and used in transcript hash calculations as is.

30 2.2.3 Byte ordering

31 Unless otherwise specified, for all SPDM specifications *byte* ordering of multibyte numeric fields or multibyte bit fields is "little endian" (that is, the lowest byte offset holds the least significant byte, and higher offsets hold the more significant bytes).

32 2.2.3.1 Hash byte order

- 33 For fields or values containing a digest or hash, SPDM preserves the byte order of the digest as the specification of a given hash algorithm defines. SPDM views these digests, simply, as a string of octets where the first byte is the leftmost byte of the digest, the second byte is the second leftmost byte, the third byte is the third leftmost byte, and this pattern continues until the last byte of the digest. Thus, the byte order for SPDM digests or hashes is the first byte is placed at the lowest offset in the field or value, the second byte is placed at the second-lowest offset, the third byte is placed at the third-lowest offset in the field or value, and this pattern continues until the last byte.
- For example, in FIPS 180-4, a SHA-256 hash is the concatenation of eight 32-bit words where each word is in big endian order but the order of words does not have any endianness associated with it. SPDM simply views this 256-bit digest as a string of octets that is 32 bytes in size where the first byte is the value at H₀[31:24] of the final digest, the second byte is the value at H₀[23:16], the third byte is the value at H₀[15:8], the fourth byte is the value at H₀[7:0], the fifth byte is the value at H₁[31:24], and this pattern continues until the last byte, which is the value at H₇[7:0], where the FIPS 180-4 specification defines H₀, H₁, and H₇.

35 2.2.3.2 Encoded ASN.1 byte order

36 For fields or values containing DER, CER, or BER encoded data, SPDM preserves the byte order as described in the X.690 specification. SPDM views a DER, CER or BER encoded data as simply a string of octets where the first byte is the leftmost byte of Figure 1 or Figure 2 in the X.690 specification, the second byte is the second leftmost byte, the third byte is the third leftmost byte, and this pattern continues until the last byte. The first byte is also called either the Identifier octet or the Leading identifier octet. The X.690 specification defines Figure 1, Figure 2, and identifier octets. When populating a DER, CER, or BER encoded data in SPDM fields, the first byte is placed in the lowest address, the second byte is placed in the second-lowest offset, the third byte is placed in the field or value, and this pattern continues until the last byte.

37 2.2.3.3 Octet string byte order

- A string of octets is conventionally written from left to right. Also by convention, byte zero of the octet string shall be the leftmost byte of the octet, byte 1 of the octet string shall be the second leftmost byte of the octet, and this pattern shall continue until the very last byte. When placing a octet string into an SPDM field, the ith byte of the octet string shall be placed in the ith offset of that field.
- 39 For example, if placing an octet stream consisting of " 0xAA 0xCB 0x9F 0xD8 " into DMTFSpecMeasurementValue field, then offset 0 (the lowest offset) of DMTFSpecMeasurementValue will contain 0xAA, offset 1 of DMTFSpecMeasurementValue will contain 0xCB, offset 2 of DMTFSpecMeasurementValue will contain 0x9F and offset 3 of DMTFSpecMeasurementValue will contain 0xD8.

40 2.2.3.4 Signature byte order

41 For fields or values containing a signature, SPDM attempts to preserve the byte order of the signature as the specification of a given signature algorithm defines. Most signature specifications define a string of octets as the format of the signature, and others may explicitly state the endianness, such as in the specification for the Edwards-

Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, the byte order of a signature for a given signature algorithm shall be the same as the octet string byte order.

42 2.2.3.4.1 ECDSA signatures byte order

FIPS PUB 186-4 defines r, s, and ECDSA signatures to be (r, s), where r and s are integers. For ECDSA signatures, excluding SM2, in SPDM, the signature shall be the concatenation of r and s. The size of r shall be the size of the selected curve. Likewise, the size of s shall be the size of the selected curve. See BaseAsymAlgo in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS for the size of r and s. The byte order for r and s shall be big endian order. When placing ECDSA signatures into an SPDM signature field, r shall come first, followed by s.

44 2.2.3.4.2 SM2 signatures byte order

45 GB/T 32918.2-2016 defines r, s, and SM2 signatures to be (r, s), where r and s are integers. The size of r and s shall each be 32 bytes. To form an SM2 signature, r and s shall be converted to an octet stream according to GB/T 32918.2-2016 and GB/T 32918.1-2016 with a target length of 32 bytes. Let the resulting octet string of r and s be called SM2_R and SM2_S respectively. The final SM2 signature shall be the concatenation of SM2_R and SM2_S. When placing SM2 signatures into an SPDM signature field, the SM2 signature byte order shall be octet string byte order.

46 2.2.4 Sizes and lengths

47 Unless otherwise specified, all sizes and lengths are in units of bytes.

48 2.2.5 SPDM data types

49 Table 1 — SPDM data types lists the abbreviations and descriptions for common data types that SPDM message fields and data structure definitions use. These definitions follow DSP0240.

50 Table 1 — SPDM data types

Data type	Interpretation	
ver8	Eight-bit encoding of the SPDM version number. Version encoding defines the encoding of the version number.	
bitfield8	Byte with eight bit fields.	
bitfield16	Two-byte word with 16-bit fields.	

51 2.2.6 Version encoding

52 The SPDMVersion field represents the version of the specification through a combination of *Major* and *Minor* nibbles, encoded as follows:

Version	Matches	Incremented when
Major	Major version field in the SPDMversion field in the SPDM message header.	Protocol modification breaks backward compatibility.
Minor	Minor version field in the SPDMVersion field in the SPDM message header.	Protocol modification maintains backward compatibility.

- 53 EXAMPLE:
- 54 Version $3.7 \rightarrow 0x37$
- 55 Version $1.0 \rightarrow 0 \times 10$
- 56 Version $1.2 \rightarrow 0x12$
- 57 An *endpoint* that supports Version 1.2 can interoperate with an older endpoint that supports Version 1.0 or other previous minor versions. Whether an endpoint supports interoperation with previous minor versions of the SPDM specification is an implementation-specific decision.
- 58 An endpoint that supports Version 1.2 only and an endpoint that supports Version 3.7 only are not interoperable and shall not attempt to communicate beyond GET_VERSION.
- 59 This specification considers two minor versions to be interoperable when it is possible for an implementation that is conformant to a higher minor version number to also communicate with an implementation that is conformant to a lower minor version number with minimal differences in operation. In such a case, the following rules apply:
 - · Both endpoints shall use the same lower version number in the SPDMVersion field for all messages.
 - · Functionality shall be limited to what the lower minor version of the SPDM specification defines.
 - Computations and other operations between different minor versions of the Secured Messages using SPDM specification should remain the same, unless security issues of lower minor versions are fixed in higher minor versions and the fixes require change in computations or other operations. These differences are dependent on the value in the SPDMVersion field in the message.
 - In a newer minor version of the SPDM specification, a given message can be longer, bit fields and enumerations can contain new values, and reserved fields can gain functionality. Existing numeric and bit fields retain their existing definitions.
 - Errata versions (indicated by a non-zero value in the UpdateVersionNumber field for the GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages) clarify existing behaviors in the SPDM specification. They maintain bitwise compatibility with the base version, except as required to fix security vulnerabilities or to correct mistakes from the base version.
- 60 For details on the version agreement process, see GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages. The detailed version encoding that the VERSION response message returns contains an additional byte that indicates specification bug fixes or development versions. See Table 9 Successful VERSION response message format.

61 2.2.7 Notations

62 SPDM specifications use the following notations:

Notation	Description
M : N	In field descriptions, this notation typically represents a range of byte offsets starting from byte M and continuing to and including byte N ($M \le N$). The lowest offset is on the left. The highest offset is on the
	right.
[4]	Square brackets around a number typically indicate a bit offset.
	Bit offsets are zero-based values. That is, the least significant bit ([LSb]) offset = 0.
	A range of bit offsets where M is greater than or equal to N.
[M:N]	The most significant bit is on the left, and the least significant bit is on the right.
1b	A lowercase b after a number consisting of 0 s and 1 s indicates that the number is in binary format.
0x12A	Hexadecimal, indicated by the leading ω_x .
N+	Variable-length byte range that starts at byte offset N.
{ Payload }	Used mostly in figures, this notation indicates the payload specified in the enclosing curly brackets is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from one or more major secrets. The specific secret used is described throughout this specification. For example, { HEARTBEAT } shows that the Heartbeat message is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from one or more major secrets.
	Used mostly in figures, this notation indicates the payload specified in the enclosing curly brackets is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from major Secret X.
ayload }::[[Sx]]	For example, { <code>HEARTBEAT</code> }::[[S_2]] shows that the Heartbeat message is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from major secret S_2 .

63 2.2.8 Text or string encoding

64 When a value is indicated as a text or string data type, the encoding for the text or string shall be an array of

contiguous *bytes* whose values are ordered. The first byte of the array resides at the lowest offset and the last byte of the array is at the highest offset. The order of characters in the array shall be where the leftmost character of the string is placed at the first byte in the array, the second leftmost character is placed in the second byte, and so on until the last character is placed in the last byte.

- 65 Each byte in the array shall be the numeric value that represents that character, as ASCII ISO/IEC 646:1991 defines.
- 66 Table 2 "spdm" encoding example shows an encoding example of the "spdm" string:

67 **Table 2 — "spdm" encoding example**

Offset	Character	Value
0	S	0x73
1	p	0x70
2	d	0x64
3	m	0x6D

68 2.2.9 Deprecated material

- 69 Deprecated material is not recommended for use in new development efforts. Existing and new implementations can use this material, but they shall move to the favored approach as soon as possible. Implementations can implement any deprecated elements as required by this document to achieve backwards compatibility. Although implementations can use deprecated elements, they are directed to use the favored elements instead.
- 70 The following typographical convention indicates deprecated material:

71 DEPRECATED

- 72 Deprecated material appears here.
- 73 DEPRECATED
- 74 In places where this typographical convention cannot be used (for example, in tables or figures), the "DEPRECATED" label is used alone.

75 2.2.10 Other conventions

76 Unless otherwise specified, all figures are informative.

⁷⁷ **3 Scope**

- 78 This specification describes how to use messages, data objects, and sequences to exchange messages between two devices over a variety of transports and physical media. This specification contains the message exchanges, sequence diagrams, message formats, and other relevant semantics for such message exchanges, including authentication of hardware identities and firmware measurement.
- 79 Other specifications define the mapping of these messages to different transports and physical media. This specification provides information to enable security policy enforcement but does not specify individual policy decisions.

⁸⁰ 4 Normative references

- 81 The following documents are indispensable for the application of this specification. For dated or versioned references, only the edition cited, including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions, applies. For references without a date or version, the latest published edition of the referenced document (including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions) applies.
 - ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents 2018 (8th edition)
 - DMTF DSP0004, Common Information Model (CIM) Metamodel, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/ standards/documents/DSP0004_3.0.1.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0223, Generic Operations, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/ DSP0223_1.0.1.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0236, MCTP Base Specification 1.3.0, https://dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/ DSP0236_1.3.0.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0239, MCTP IDs and Codes 1.6.0, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/ DSP0239_1.6.0.pdf
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 - DMTF DSP0275, Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) over MCTP Binding Specification, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0275
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Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007

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- GB/T 32918.3-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 3: Key exchange protocol, August 2016
- GB/T 32918.4-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 4: Public key encryption algorithm, August 2016
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- GB/T 32905-2016, Information security technology—SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm, August 2016
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- ASN.1 ISO-822-1-4, DER ISO-8825-1
 - ITU-T X.680, X.681, X.682, X.683, X.690, 08/2015
- ASCII ISO/IEC 646:1991, 09/1991
- ECDSA
 - Section 6, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 - Appendix D: Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use in FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
- ANSI X9.62, 2005
- SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512
 - FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
- SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512
 - FIPS PUB 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions

⁸² 5 Terms and definitions

- 83 In this document, some terms have a specific meaning beyond the normal English meaning. This clause defines those terms.
- 84 The terms "shall" ("required"), "shall not", "should" ("recommended"), "should not" ("not recommended"), "may", "need not" ("not required"), "can" and "cannot" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 7. The terms in parenthesis are alternatives for the preceding term, for use in exceptional cases when the preceding term cannot be used for linguistic reasons. Note that ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 7 specifies additional alternatives. Occurrences of such additional alternatives shall be interpreted in their normal English meaning.
- 85 The terms "clause", "subclause", "paragraph", and "annex" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 6.
- 86 The terms "normative" and "informative" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 3. In this document, clauses, subclauses, or annexes labeled "(informative)" do not contain normative content. Notes and examples are always informative elements.
- 87 The terms that DSP0004, DSP0223, DSP0236, DSP0239, DSP0275, and DSP1001 define also apply to this document.

Term	Definition
alias certificate	Certificate that is dynamically generated by the <i>component</i> or component firmware.
application data	Data that is specific to the application and whose definition and format is outside the scope of this specification. Application data usually exist at the application layer, which is, in general, the layer above SPDM and the transport layer. Examples of data that could be application data include: messages carried as DMTF MCTP payloads; Internet traffic (PCIe transaction layer packets (TLPs)); camera images and video (MIPI CSI-2 packets); video display stream (MIPI DSI-2 packets) and touchscreen data (MIPI I3C Touch).
authentication initiator	Endpoint that initiates the authentication process by challenging another endpoint.
authentication	Process of determining whether an entity is who or what it claims to be.
byte	Eight-bit quantity. Also known as an octet.
certificate authority (CA)	Trusted entity that issues certificates.
certificate chain	Typically, a series of two or more certificates. Each certificate is signed by the preceding certificate in the chain.
certificate	Digital form of identification that provides information about an entity and certifies ownership of a particular asymmetric key-pair.
component	Physical device, contained in a single package.

88 This specification uses these terms:

Term	Definition
device certificate	Certificate that contains information that identifies the component. Can be a leaf certificate or an <i>intermediate certificate</i> .
device	Physical entity such as a network controller or a fan.
DMTF	Formerly known as the Distributed Management Task Force, DMTF creates open manageability standards that span diverse emerging and traditional information technology (IT) infrastructures, including cloud, virtualization, network, servers, and storage. Member companies and alliance partners worldwide collaborate on standards to improve the interoperable management of IT.
encapsulated request	A request embedded into an ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST OF ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message to allow the Responder to issue a request to a Requester. See GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages.
endpoint	Logical entity that communicates with other endpoints over one or more transport protocols.
intermediate certificate	Certificate that is neither a root certificate nor a leaf certificate.
invasive debug mode	A device mode that enables debug access that might expose or allow modification of security-critical firmware, hardware, or settings. Invasive debug mode might include access to the device TCB.
large SPDM message	An SPDM message that is greater than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint or greater than the transmit buffer size of the sending SPDM endpoint.
large SPDM request message	A large SPDM message that is an SPDM request.
large SPDM response message	A large SPDM message that is an SPDM response.
leaf certificate	Last certificate in a certificate chain.
measurement	Representation of firmware/software or configuration data on an endpoint.
message	See SPDM message.
message body	Portion of an SPDM message that carries additional data.
message transcript	The concatenation of a sequence of messages in the order in which they are sent and received by an endpoint. The final message included in the message transcript may be truncated to allow inclusion of a signature in that message which is computed over the message transcript. If an endpoint is communicating with multiple peer endpoints concurrently, the message transcripts for the peers are accumulated separately and independently.
most significant byte (MSB)	Highest order <i>byte</i> in a number consisting of multiple bytes.

Term	Definition
	Set of parameters that represent the state of the communication between a corresponding pair of Requester and Responder at the successful completion of the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS messages.
Negotiated State	These parameters may include values provided in $\ensuremath{VERSION}$, $\ensuremath{CAPABILITIES}$ and $\ensuremath{ALGORITHMS}$ messages.
	Additionally, they may include parameters associated with the transport layer.
	They may include other values deemed necessary by the Requester or Responder to continue or preserve communication with each other.
nibble	Computer term for a four-bit aggregation, or half of a byte.
non-invasive debug mode	A device mode that enables debug access that does not expose or allow modification of security-critical firmware, hardware, or settings.
nonce	Number that is unpredictable to entities other than its generator. The probability of the same number occurring more than once is negligible. Nonce may be generated by combining a pseudo random number of at least 64 bits, optionally concatenated with a monotonic counter of size suitable for the application.
opaque data	Opaque data fields transfer data that is outside the scope of this specification. The semantics and usage of this data are implementation specific and also outside the scope of this specification.
payload	Information-bearing fields of a message. These fields are separate from the transport fields and elements, such as address fields, framing bits, and checksums, that transport the message from one point to another. In some instances, a field can be both a payload field and a transport field.
physical transport binding	Specifications that define how a base messaging protocol is implemented on a particular physical transport type and medium, such as SMBus/I ² C or PCI Express [™] Vendor Defined Messaging.
record	A unit or chunk of data that is either encrypted and/or authenticated.
Requester	Original transmitter, or source, of an SPDM request message. It is also the ultimate receiver, or destination, of an SPDM response message. A Requester is the sender of the GET_VERSION request and remains the requester for the remainder of that connection.
Reset	This term is used to denote a reset or restart of a device that runs the Requester or Responder code, which typically leads to loss of all volatile state on the device.
Responder	Ultimate receiver, or destination, of an SPDM request message. It is also the original transmitter, or source of an SPDM response message.
root certificate	First certificate in a certificate chain, which acts as the trust anchor, typically self-signed.
secure session	Provides either or both of encryption or message authentication for communicating data over a transport.

Term	Definition
Security Protocols and Data Models (SPDM)	Working group under DMTF that is responsible for the <i>SPDM Specification</i> , which focuses on enabling authentication, attestation, and key exchange to enhance infrastructure security. In addition to developing the core <i>SPDM Specification</i> , the group collaborates with other standards organizations and developers to support alignment across the industry in the areas of component authentication, confidentiality, and integrity.
session keys	Any secrets, derived cryptographic keys, or any cryptographic information bound to a session.
Session-Secrets-Exchange	Any SPDM request and its corresponding response that initiates a session and provides initial cryptographic exchange. Examples of such requests are KEY_EXCHANGE and PSK_EXCHANGE .
Session-Secrets-Finish	This term denotes any SPDM request and its corresponding response that finalizes a session setup and provides the final exchange of cryptographic or other information before application data can be securely transmitted. Examples of such requests are FINISH and PSK_FINISH.
SPDM message payload	Portion of the message body of an SPDM message. This portion of the message is separate from those fields and elements that identify the SPDM version, the SPDM request and response codes, and the two parameters.
SPDM message	Unit of communication in SPDM communications. See Generic SPDM message format.
SPDM request message	Message that is sent to an endpoint to request a specific SPDM operation. A corresponding SPDM response message acknowledges receipt of an SPDM request message.
SPDM response message	Message that is sent in response to a specific SPDM request message. This message includes a Response Code field that indicates whether the request completed normally.
trusted computing base (TCB)	Set of all hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its security, in the sense that bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside the TCB might jeopardize the security properties of the entire system. By contrast, parts of a computer system outside the TCB shall not be able to misbehave in a way that would leak any more privileges than are granted to them in accordance to the security policy. Reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base

⁸⁹ 6 Symbols and abbreviated terms

90 The abbreviations that DSP0004, DSP0223, and DSP1001 define apply to this document.

91 The following additional abbreviations are used in this document.

Abbreviation	Definition
AEAD	Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
СА	certificate authority
DMTF	Formerly the Distributed Management Task Force
ECC	Elliptic-curve cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
KDF	Key Derivation Function
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MSB	most significant byte
OID	Object identifier
RMA	Return Merchandise Authorization
RSA	Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SPDM	Security Protocol and Data Model
тсв	trusted computing base
VCA	Version-Capabilities-Algorithms

⁹² **7 SPDM message exchanges**

- 93 The message exchanges that this specification defines are between two endpoints and are performed and exchanged through sending and receiving of *SPDM* messages that *SPDM messages* defines. The SPDM message exchanges are defined in a generic fashion that allows the messages to be communicated across different physical mediums and over different transport protocols.
- 94 The specification-defined message exchanges enable Requesters to:
 - Discover and negotiate the security capabilities of a Responder.
 - · Authenticate or provision an identity of a Responder.
 - Retrieve the measurements of a Responder.
 - Securely establish cryptographic *session keys* to construct a secure communication channel for the transmission or reception of *application data*.
- 95 These message exchange capabilities are built on top of well-known and established security practices across the computing industry. The following clauses provide a brief overview of each message exchange capability. Some message exchange capabilities are based on the security model that the USB Authentication Specification Rev 1.0 with ECN and Errata through January 7, 2019 defines.

⁹⁶ 7.1 Security capability discovery and negotiation

97 This specification defines a mechanism for a Requester to discover the security capabilities of a Responder. For example, an endpoint could support multiple cryptographic hash functions that this specification defines. Furthermore, the specification defines a mechanism for a Requester and Responder to select a common set of cryptographic algorithms to use for all subsequent message exchanges before another negotiation is initiated by the Requester, if an overlapping set of cryptographic algorithms exists that both endpoints support.

⁹⁸ **7.2 Identity authentication**

- 99 In this specification, the authenticity of a Responder is determined by digital signatures using well-established techniques based on public key cryptography. A Responder proves its identity by generating digital signatures using a private key, and the signatures can be cryptographically verified by the Requester using the public key associated with that private key.
- 100 At a high-level, the authentication of the identity of a Responder involves these processes:
 - Identity provisioning
 - Runtime authentication

101 7.2.1 Identity provisioning

102 Identity provisioning is the process that device vendors follow during or after hardware manufacturing to equip a device with a secure identifier. In the context of this specification, this secure identifier consists of an asymmetric key pair and, optionally, a device certificate (DeviceCert) to bind the key pair to a particular instance of a device and associate it with additional metadata. The specifics of key generation and provisioning are outside the scope of this specification, however, as the security of the SPDM protocol depends on device identities that cannot be easily modified, removed or copied, it is strongly recommended that identity keys are unique per device and generated using cryptographically-strong random seeds.


103 7.2.1.1 Device certificate models

- 104 If trust in a device public key is established through certificates, typically the device certificate (DeviceCert) is part of a certificate chain. The certificate chain has a root certificate (RootCert) as its root and a leaf certificate as the last certificate in it. The RootCert is generated by a trusted root certificate authority (CA) and certifies the DeviceCert either directly or indirectly through a number of intermediate CAs. Authentication initiators use the RootCert to verify the validity of device certificate chains.
- 105 The certificate chain may be built according to one of two models, both of which are shown in the *Figure 1 SPDM certificate chain models*. In one model, shown on the left in the following figure, the leaf certificate is a *DeviceCert*, which contains the public key that corresponds to the device private key. In the other model, shown on the right in the following figure, the leaf certificate is an alias certificate (AliasCert), in which case there may be one or more intermediate AliasCert certificates between the *DeviceCert* and the leaf AliasCert. In the AliasCert model, the device private key signs the next level AliasCert, and then the private key associated with the public key in each AliasCert signs the AliasCert below it. When the AliasCert model is in use, the Device Certificate is referred to as a Device Certificate CA, indicating that the certificate both contains device hardware identity information and functions as a certificate authority to sign an additional certificate.
- 106 A device that implements the AliasCert model might factor some mutable information, such as the measurement of a firmware image, into the derivation of the public/private key pairs for the intermediate and leaf alias certificates. Therefore, the asymmetric public/private key pairs for each AliasCert should be treated as mutable.
- 107 Through the certificate chain, the root CA indirectly endorses the device public key in the DeviceCert . When the AliasCert model is in use, the AliasCert s are endorsed by the device private key, meaning that the AliasCert s are also indirectly endorsed by the root CA.
- 108 The certificate chain should contain at least one certificate that includes hardware identity information, and the hardware identity information should be present in the device certificate, whether the DeviceCert or AliasCert model is in use. Though existing deployments cannot include the hardware identity information in a certificate, it is strongly recommended that new deployments include this information. The public/private key pair associated with a hardware identity certificate is constant on the instance of the device, regardless of version of firmware running on the device. The Hardware identity OID should be used to indicate hardware identity certificates.
- 109 When the AliasCert model is used, the device creates and endorses one or more certificates. The certificates from the root certificate to the device certificate are immutable, and can only be changed through the SET_CERTIFICATE

command or an equivalent capability. The certificates below the device certificate can be created on the device and are mutable certificates in that they can change when the device state changes, such as a device *reset*. The Mutable certificate OID should be used to indicate mutable certificates.

- 110 In addition, when the AliasCert model is used, one or more AliasCert s can contain firmware identity information. Other standards bodies might define the format of the firmware identity information. That definition is outside the scope of this specification.
- 111 Note that a signature algorithm used with a mutable alias certificate can insert random data during signing, which would cause the digest of the certificate chain to change each time it is regenerated. An implementer can use a mechanism that is outside the scope of this specification to ensure that such a signature does not change between reads of the certificate chain.
- 112 A Responder can use the DeviceCert model or the AliasCert model. A Requester should be capable of performing Runtime authentication on a certificate chain that conforms to either model.
- 113 Figure 1 SPDM certificate chain models shows the SPDM certificate chain models:
- 114 Figure 1 SPDM certificate chain models

115



116 7.2.2 Raw public keys

- 117 As an alternative to certificate chains, the vendor can provision the raw public key of the Responder to the Requester in a trusted environment; for example, during the secure manufacturing process. In this case, trust of the public key of the Responder is established without the need for a certificate-based public key infrastructure. The definition of a trusted environment is outside the scope of this specification.
- 118 The format of the provisioned public key is out of scope of this specification. Vendors can use proprietary formats or public key formats that other standards define, such as RFC7250 and RFC4716.

119 7.2.3 Runtime authentication

- 120 Runtime authentication is the process by which an authentication initiator, or Requester, interacts with a Responder in a running system. The authentication initiator can retrieve the certificate chains from the Responder and send a unique challenge to the Responder. The Responder uses the private key associated with the leaf certificate to sign the challenge. The authentication initiator verifies the signature by using the public key associated with the leaf certificate as the trusted anchor.
- 121 If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment, the authentication initiator sends a unique challenge to the Responder. The Responder signs the challenge with the private key. The authentication initiator verifies the signature by using the public key of the Responder. The transport layer should handle device identification, which is outside the scope of this specification.

¹²² 7.3 Firmware and configuration measurement

123 A measurement is a representation of firmware/software or configuration data on an endpoint. A measurement is typically a cryptographic hash value of the data, or the raw data itself. The endpoint optionally binds a measurement with the endpoint identity through the use of digital signatures. This binding enables an authentication initiator to establish the identity and measurement of the firmware/software or configuration running on the endpoint.

¹²⁴ **7.4 Secure sessions**

- 125 Many devices exchange data with other devices that might require protection. In this specification, the device-specific data that is communicated is generically referred to as application data. The protocol of the application data usually exists at a higher layer and it is outside the scope of this specification. The protocol of the application data usually allows for encrypted and/or authenticated data transfer.
- 126 This specification provides a method to perform a cryptographic key exchange such that the protocol of the application data can use the exchanged keys to provide a secure channel of communication by using encryption and message authentication. This cryptographic key exchange provides either Responder-only authentication or mutual authentication, which can be considered equivalent to Runtime authentication. For more details, see the Session clause.
- 127 Finally, many SPDM requests and their corresponding responses can also be afforded the same protection. For more details, see Table 6 SPDM request and response messages validity and the SPDM request and response code issuance allowance clause.
- 128 Figure 2 SPDM messaging protocol flow gives a very high-level view of when the *secure session* actually starts.

¹²⁹ **7.5 Mutual authentication overview**

130 The ability for a Responder to verify the authenticity of the Requester is called mutual authentication. Several

mechanisms in this specification are detailed to provide mutual authentication capabilities. The cryptographic means to verify the identity of the Requester is the same as verifying the identity of the Responder. The Identity provisioning clause discusses identity in regard to the Responder but the details also apply to the Requester.


131 In general, when this specification states requirements or recommendations for Responders in the context of identity, those same rules also apply to Requesters in the context of mutual authentication. The various clauses in this specification provide more details.

¹³² **7.6 Custom environments**

133 A fixed or predetermined environment is an environment where certain characteristics of the environment are fixed or known before the SPDM endpoints communicate with each other. In many cases, these characteristics are determined even before the environment can operate, such as during the design phase. An example of a such an environment is when two specific endpoints can only communicate with each other. These environments may also forfeit certain SPDM features such as interoperability. However, the security posture and guarantees of these environments are out of scope of this specification.

¹³⁴ 8 SPDM messaging protocol

- 135 The SPDM messaging protocol defines a request-response messaging model between two endpoints to perform the message exchanges outlined in SPDM message exchanges. Each *SPDM request message* shall be responded to with an SPDM response message as this specification defines unless this specification states otherwise.
- 136 Figure 2 SPDM messaging protocol flow is an example of a high-level request-response flow diagram for SPDM. An endpoint that acts as the *Requester* sends an SPDM request message to another endpoint that acts as the *Responder*, and the Responder returns an SPDM response message to the Requester.
- 137 Figure 2 SPDM messaging protocol flow



- 139 All SPDM request-response messages share a common data format that consists of a four-*byte* message header and zero or more bytes message *payload* that is message-dependent. The following clauses describe the common message format and SPDM messages' details for each of the request and response messages.
- 140 The Requester shall issue GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request messages before issuing any other request messages. The responses to GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS can be saved by the Requester so that after Reset the Requester can skip these requests.

¹⁴¹ 8.1 SPDM connection model

- 142 In SPDM, communication between a pair of SPDM endpoints starts when one endpoint sends a GET_VERSION request to another SPDM endpoint. The SPDM endpoint that starts the communication is called the Requester. The endpoint receiving the GET_VERSION and providing the VERSION response is called a Responder. The communication between a Requester-Responder pair is called a connection. One or more connections can exist between a Requester and Responder. Different connections might exist over the same transport or over different transports. When there are multiple connections over the same transport, the transport is responsible for providing mechanisms for SPDM endpoints to distinguish between one or more connections. When the transport does not provide such a mechanism, there shall be one connection between the Requester and Responder over that transport.
- 143 SPDM endpoints can be both a Requester and Responder. As a Requester, an SPDM endpoint can communicate with one or more Responders. Likewise, as a Responder, an SPDM endpoint can respond to multiple Requesters. The SPDM connection model considers each of these communications to be separate connections. For example, a pair of SPDM endpoints can be both Requester and Responder to each other. Thus, the SPDM connection model considers this to be two separate connections.
- 144 Within a connection, the Requester remains the Requester for the remainder of the connection. Likewise, the Responder remains the Responder for the remainder of the connection. However, under certain scenarios allowed by SPDM, a Responder can send a request to a Requester and likewise, a Requester might provide a response to a Responder. These cases are limited and this specification explicitly defines these cases. In such scenarios, when a Requester provides a response, the Requester shall abide by all requirements in this specification as if they are a Responder for that request. Similarly, when a Responder sends a request, the Responder shall abide by all requirements in this specification as if they are a Requester for that request.
- 145 Within a connection, the Requester can establish one or more secure sessions. These secure sessions are considered to be a part of the same connection. Secure sessions can terminate or additional sessions can be established at any time. A GET_VERSION can reset the connection and all context associated with that connection including, but not limited to, information such as session keys and session IDs. However, this is not considered a termination of the connection. A connection can terminate due to external events such as a device reset or an error-handling strategy implemented on an SPDM endpoint but such scenarios are outside the scope of this specification. Connections can be terminated using mechanisms outside the scope of this specification.

¹⁴⁶ 8.2 SPDM bits-to-bytes mapping

- 147 All SPDM fields, regardless of size or endianness, map the highest numeric bits to the highest numerically assigned byte in monotonically decreasing order until the least numerically assigned byte of that field. The following two figures illustrate this mapping.
- 148 Figure 3 One-byte field bit map shows the one-byte field bit map:
- 149 Figure 3 One-byte field bit map

Example:
A One-Byte Field Starting at Byte Offset 3

	Byte Offset 3										
Bit	Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit										
7	7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0										

151 Figure 4 — Two-byte field bit map shows the two-byte field bit map:

152 Figure 4 — Two-byte field bit map

153

150

Example: A Two-Byte Field Starting at Byte Offset 5

Byte Offset 6							B	yte C	Offse	t 5					
Bit		Bit	Bit					Bit				Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit
15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

¹⁵⁴ 8.3 Generic SPDM message format

155 Table 3 — Generic SPDM message field definitions defines the fields that constitute a generic SPDM message, including the message header and payload:

156 Table 3 — Generic SPDM message field definitions

Byte offset	Bit offset	Size (bits)	Field	Description
0	[7:4]	4	SPDM Major Version	The major version of the SPDM Specification. An endpoint shall not communicate by using an incompatible SPDM version value. See Version encoding.
0	[3:0]	4	SPDM Minor Version	The minor version of the SPDM Specification. A specification with a given minor version extends a specification with a lower minor version as long as they share the major version. See Version encoding.

Byte offset	Bit offset	Size (bits)	Field	Description
1	[7:0]	8	Request Response Code	The request message code or response code, which Table 4 — SPDM request codes and Table 5 — SPDM response codes enumerate. 0x00 through 0x7F represent response codes and 0x80 through 0xFF represent request codes. In request messages, this field is considered the request code. In response messages, this field is considered the response code.
2	[7:0]	8	Param1	The first one-byte parameter. The contents of the parameter is specific to the Request Response Code .
3	[7:0]	8	Param2	The second one-byte parameter. The contents of the parameter is specific to the Request Response Code .
4	See the description.	Variable	SPDM message payload	Zero or more bytes that are specific to the Request Response Code .

157 8.3.1 SPDM version

- 158 The sponversion field, present as the first field in all SPDM messages, indicates the version of the SPDM specification that the format of an SPDM message adheres to. The format of this field shall be the same as byte 0 in Table 3 Generic SPDM message field definitions. The value of this field shall be the same value as the version of this specification except for GET_VERSION and VERSION messages.
- 159 For example, if the version of this specification is 1.2, the value of SPDMVersion is 0x12, which also corresponds to an SPDM Major Version of 1 and an SPDM Minor Version of 2. See Version encoding for more examples.
- 160 The version of this specification can be found on the title page or the header or footer of each page in this document.
- 161 The SPDMVersion for the version of this specification shall be 0x12.
- 162 The SPDMversionString shall be a string formed by concatenating the major version, "." (a period), and the minor version. For example, if the version of this specification is 1.2.3, then SPDMversionString is "1.2".

¹⁶³ 8.4 SPDM request codes

- 164 Table 4 SPDM request codes defines the SPDM request codes. The **Implementation requirement** column indicates requirements on the Requester.
- 165 All SPDM-compatible implementations shall use SPDM request codes.

166 If an ERROR response is sent for unsupported request codes, the ErrorCode shall be UnsupportedRequest .

167 **Table 4 — SPDM request codes**

Request	Code value	Implementation requirement	Message format
GET_DIGESTS	0x81	Optional	Table 27 — GET_DIGESTS request message format
GET_CERTIFICATE	0x82	Optional	Table 29 — GET_CERTIFICATE request message format
CHALLENGE	0x83	Optional	Table 33 — CHALLENGE request message format
GET_VERSION	0x84	Required	Table 8 — GET_VERSION request message format
CHUNK_SEND	0x85	Optional	Table 81 — CHUNK_SEND request format table
CHUNK_GET	0x86	Optional	Table 85 — CHUNK_GET request format
GET_MEASUREMENTS	0xE0	Optional	Table 38 — GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format
GET_CAPABILITIES	0xE1	Required	Table 11 — GET_CAPABILITIES request message format
NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS	0xE3	Required	Table 13 — NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format
KEY_EXCHANGE	0xE4	Optional	Table 56 — KEY_EXCHANGE request message format
FINISH	0xE5	Optional	Table 59 — FINISH request message format
PSK_EXCHANGE	0xE6	Optional	Table 61 — PSK_EXCHANGE request message format
PSK_FINISH	0xE7	Optional	Table 63 — PSK_FINISH request message format
HEARTBEAT	0xE8	Optional	Table 65 — HEARTBEAT request message format
KEY_UPDATE	0xE9	Optional	Table 67 — KEY_UPDATE request message format
GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	ØxEA	Optional	Table 70 — GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request message format

Request	Code value	Implementation requirement	Message format
DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE	ØxEB	Optional	Table 72 — DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request message format
END_SESSION	ØxEC	Optional	Table 74 — END_SESSION request message format
GET_CSR	ØxED	Optional	Table 77 — GET_CSR request message format
SET_CERTIFICATE	ØxEE	Optional	Table 79 — SET_CERTIFICATE request message format
VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST	ØxFE	Optional	Table 53 — VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format
RESPOND_IF_READY	ØxFF	Required	Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format
Reserved	All other values		SPDM implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved request codes.

¹⁶⁸ 8.5 SPDM response codes

- 169 The Request Response Code field in the SPDM response message shall specify the appropriate response code for a request. All SPDM-compatible implementations shall use Table 5 SPDM response codes.
- 170 On a successful completion of an SPDM operation, the specified response message shall be returned. Upon an unsuccessful completion of an SPDM operation, the **ERROR** response message should be returned.
- 171 Table 5 SPDM response codes defines the response codes for SPDM. The **Implementation requirement** column indicates requirements on the Responder.

172 Table 5 — SPDM response codes

Response	Value	Implementation requirement	Message format
DIGESTS	0x01	Optional	Table 28 — Successful DIGESTS response message format
CERTIFICATE	0x02	Optional	Table 30 — Successful CERTIFICATE response message format
CHALLENGE_AUTH	0x03	Optional	Table 34 — Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format

Response	Value	Implementation requirement	Message format
VERSION	0x04	Required	Table 9 — Successful VERSION response message format
CHUNK_SEND_ACK	0x05	Optional	Table 83 — CHUNK_SEND_ACK response message format
CHUNK_RESPONSE	0x06	Optional	Table 86 — CHUNK_RESPONSE response format
MEASUREMENTS	0x60	Optional	Table 41 — Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format
CAPABILITIES	0x61	Required	Table 12 — Successful CAPABILITIES response message format
ALGORITHMS	0x63	Required	Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format
KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP	0x64	Optional	Table 58 — Successful KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format
FINISH_RSP	0x65	Optional	Table 60 — Successful FINISH_RSP response message format
PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP	0x66	Optional	Table 62 — PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format
PSK_FINISH_RSP	0x67	Optional	Table 64 — Successful PSK_FINISH_RSP response message format
HEARTBEAT_ACK	0x68	Optional	Table 66 — HEARTBEAT_ACK response message format
KEY_UPDATE_ACK	0x69	Optional	Table 68 — KEY_UPDATE_ACK response message format
ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	0x6A	Optional	Table 71 — ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response message format
ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK	0x6B	Optional	Table 73 — ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message format
END_SESSION_ACK	0x6C	Optional	Table 76 — END_SESSION_ACK response message format

Response	Value	Implementation requirement	Message format
CSR	0x6D	Optional	Table 78 — CSR response message format
SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP	0x6E	Optional	Table 80 — Successful SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response message format
VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE	0x7E	Optional	Table 54 — VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format
ERROR	0x7F	Required	Table 44 — ERROR response message format
Reserved	All other values		SPDM implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved response codes.

¹⁷³ 8.6 SPDM request and response code issuance allowance

- 174 Table 6 SPDM request and response messages validity describes the conditions under which a request and response can be issued.
- 175 The **Session** column describes whether the respective request and response can be sent in a session. If the value is *"Allowed"*, the issuer of the request and response shall be able to send it in a secure session; thereby, affording them the protection of a secure session. If the **Session** column value is **Prohibited**, the issuer shall be prohibited from sending the respective request and response in a secure session.
- 176 The **Outside of a session** column indicates which requests and responses are allowed to be sent free and independent of a session; thereby lacking the protection of a secure session. An *"Allowed"* in this column indicates that the respective request and response shall be able to be sent outside the context of a secure session. Likewise, a *"Prohibited"* in this column shall prohibit the issuer from sending the respective request or response outside the context of a session.
- 177 A request and its corresponding response can have the Allowed value in both the **Session** and **Outside of a session** columns, in which case they can be sent and received in both scenarios but might have additional restrictions. For details, see the respective request and response clauses.
- 178 A request and its corresponding response that has Allowed value in the **Session** and **Prohibited** in the **Outside of a session** columns are commands used by the session. These commands only operate on the session that they were sent under, which is outside the scope of this specification. The session ID is implicit from the session used to transmit the commands.
- 179 Finally, the **Session phases** column describes which phases of a session the respective request and response shall be issued when they are allowed to be issued in a session.
- 180 For details, see the Session clause.

181 Table 6 — SPDM request and response messages validity

Request	Response	Session	Outside of a session	Session phases
GET_MEASUREMENTS	MEASUREMENTS	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
FINISH	FINISH_RSP	Allowed	Conditional (*)	Session Handshake
PSK_FINISH	PSK_FINISH_RSP	Allowed	Prohibited	Session Handshake
HEARTBEAT	HEARTBEAT_ACK	Allowed	Prohibited	Application Phase
KEY_UPDATE	KEY_UPDATE_ACK	Allowed	Prohibited	Application Phase
END_SESSION	END_SESSION_ACK	Allowed	Prohibited	Application Phase
Not Applicable	ERROR	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE	ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST	VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
CHUNK_SEND	CHUNK_SEND_ACK	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
CHUNK_GET	CHUNK_RESPONSE	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
GET_CSR	CSR	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
SET_CERTIFICATE	SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
GET_DIGESTS	DIGESTS	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
GET_CERTIFICATE	CERTIFICATE	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
All others	All others	Prohibited	Allowed	Not Applicable

182 (*) Prohibited when HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP = 0, Allowed when HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP = 1.

183 For ERROR response in the session handshake or application phase of a session, the Requester is only allowed in certain situations to send the ERROR response.

¹⁸⁴ 8.7 Concurrent SPDM message processing

- 185 This clause describes the specifications and requirements for handling concurrent overlapping SPDM request messages.
- 186 If an endpoint can act as both a Responder and Requester, it shall be able to send request messages and response messages independently.

¹⁸⁷ 8.8 Requirements for Requesters

- 188 A Requester shall not have multiple outstanding requests to the same Responder, within a connection, with the following exceptions:
 - As the GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages clause describes, a Requester can issue a GET_VERSION to a Responder to reset the connection at any time, even if the Requester has existing outstanding requests to the same Responder.
 - In the large SPDM messages transfer mechanism, a single large SPDM request message and a single CHUNK_SEND request can be outstanding at the same time.
- 189 An outstanding request is a request where the request message has begun transmission, the corresponding response has not been fully received and the request is not a retry as described in Timing Requirements.
- 190 If the Requester has sent a request to a Responder and wants to send a subsequent request to the same Responder, then the Requester shall wait to send the subsequent request until after the Requester completes one of the following actions:
 - · Receives the response from the Responder for the outstanding request.
 - · Times out waiting for a response.
 - Receives an indication, from the transport layer, that transmission of the request message failed.
 - The Requester encounters an internal error or Reset.
- 191 A Requester might send simultaneous request messages to different Responders.

¹⁹² 8.9 Requirements for Responders

- 193 A Responder is not required to process more than one request message at a time, even across connections, with the following exceptions:
 - As the GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages clause describes, a Requester can issue a GET_VERSION to a Responder to reset a connection at any time, even if the Requester has existing outstanding requests to the same Responder.
 - In the large SPDM messages transfer mechanism, a single large SPDM request message and a single CHUNK_SEND request can be outstanding at the same time.
 - Retries can be issued multiple times to the same Responder, as Timing requirements defines.
- 194 A Responder that is not ready to accept a new request message or process more than one outstanding request at a time from the same Requester shall either respond with an ERROR response message with ErrorCode=Busy or silently discard the request message.
- 195 If a Responder is working on a request message from a Requester, the Responder can respond with ErrorCode=Busy.

196 If a Responder enables simultaneous communications with multiple Requesters, the Responder is expected to distinguish the Requesters by using mechanisms that are outside the scope of this specification.

¹⁹⁷ 9 Timing requirements

- 198 Table 7 Timing specification for SPDM messages shows the timing specifications for Requesters and Responders.
- 199 If the Requester does not receive a response within T1 or T2 time accordingly, the Requester can retry a request message. A retry of a request message shall be a complete retransmission of the original SPDM request message. From the perspective of a Requester, a retry of a request message is the retransmission of the original SPDM request one or more times in succession directly following the transmission of the original SPDM request. From the perspective of a Responder, a retry of a request message is the reception of the same SPDM request one or more times in succession assuming the transport receives messages in order. Successive SPDM requests are different if the values of any bits differ between them, in which case the Responder will process them differently.
- 200 If the transport is not reliable, then the Responder should support retry by identifying whether a received request is a retried one or a new one. If the Responder supports retry, then the response to a retried request shall be identical to the original response. If the transport is reliable, then the Responder may support retry.
- 201 The Responder shall not retry SPDM response messages. It is understood that the transport protocol(s) can retry but that is outside the scope of this specification.

²⁰² 9.1 Timing measurements

203 Unless otherwise stated, a Requester shall measure timing parameters, applicable to it, from the end of a successful transmission of an SPDM request to the beginning of the reception of the corresponding SPDM response. With the exception of RDT, a Responder shall measure timing parameters, applicable to it, from the end of the reception of the SPDM request to the beginning of transmission of the response. The requirement assumes that the Responder has immediate access to the transport.

²⁰⁴ 9.2 Timing specification table

- 205 The **Ownership** column in Table 7 Timing specification for SPDM messages specifies whether the timing parameter applies to the Responder or Requester. For *encapsulated requests*, the Requester shall comply with the timing parameters where the **Ownership** indicates a Responder.
- 206 Table 7 Timing specification for SPDM messages

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	μs	Worst case round-trip transport timing. The maximum value shall be the worst case total time for the complete transmission and delivery of an SPDM message round trip at the transport layer(s). The actual value for this parameter is transport- or media-specific. Both the actual value and how an endpoint obtains this value are outside the scope of this specification. A Requester shall measure this timing parameter from the end of a successful
				transmission of an SPDM request to the beginning of the reception of the
				corresponding SPDM
				response less st1 or ct depending on the Request.

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
ST1	Responder	100,000	μs	Shall be the maximum amount of time the Responder has to provide a response to requests that do not require cryptographic processing, including the GET_CAPABILITIES, GET_VERSION, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request messages. If the Responder cannot respond within ST1 for a non- cryptographic request other than GET_VERSION, the Responder shall respond with an ERROR response with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady to request more time. See Table 11 — GET_CAPABILITIES request message format, Table 8 — GET_VERSION request message format, and Table 13 — NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format.
Τ1	Requester	RTT + ST1	μs	Shall be the minimum amount of time the Requester shall wait before issuing a retry for requests that do not require cryptographic processing. For details, see the ST1 timing parameter.

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
CT	Requester and Responder	2 CTExponent	μs	CTExponent is reported in the GET_CAPABILITIES request message and CAPABILITIES response message. This timing parameter shall be the maximum amount of time the endpoint has to provide any response requiring cryptographic processing, including the GET_MEASUREMENTS , CHALLENGE , and SET_CERTIFICATE request messages. If the Responder cannot respond within CT , the Responder shall respond with an ERROR response with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady to request more time. This parameter is applicable to both a Responder and Requester as the Ownership columns shows. Specifically for a Requester, this field is applicable when the Requester provides a response that requires cryptographic processing such as in the mutual authentication portion of a KEY_EXCHANGE flow. When the Requester provides a response that requires cryptographic processing, the Requester shall measure timing just as a Responder would. See Table 11 — GET_CAPABILITIES request message format, Table 12 — Successful CAPABILITIES response message format, Table 38 — GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format, Table 33 — CHALLENGE

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
				request message format, and Table 79 — SET_CERTIFICATE request message format.
T2	Requester	RTT + CT	μs	Shall be the minimum amount of time the Requester shall wait before issuing a retry for requests that require cryptographic processing. For details, see the ct timing parameter.
RDT	Responder	2 RDTExponent	μs	Recommended additional amount of time, in microseconds that the Responder needs to complete the requested cryptographic operation. When the Responder cannot complete cryptographic processing response within the cT time, it shall provide RDTExponent as part of the ERROR response as Table 44 — ERROR response message format shows. See Table 46 — ResponseNotReady extended error data for the RDTExponent value. For details, see ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady in Table 46 — ResponseNotReady extended error data. An SPDM Responder measures the RDT value from the end of the transmission of the ERROR message of ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady , to the beginning of the reception of the next RESPOND_IF_READY request message.

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
WT	Requester	RDT	μs	Amount of time that the Requester should wait before issuing the RESPOND_IF_READY request message as Table 52 RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows. The Requester shall measure this timing parameter from the reception of the ERROR response to the transmission of RESPOND_IF_READY request. The Requester can include the transmission time of the ERROR from the Responder to Requester as time spent waiting for wT to expire. For example, if a Responder indicates wT is two seconds and the ERROR response takes one second to transport to the Requester, the Requester only needs to wait an additional one second upon reception of the ERROR response. For details, see the RDT timing parameter.

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
WTMax	Requester	(RDT*RDTM)-RTT	hε	Maximum wait time the Requester has to issue the RESPOND_IF_READY request message, as Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows, unless the Requester issued a successful RESPOND_IF_READY request message, as Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows, earlier. The RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows, earlier. The RESPOND_IF_READY message follows the most recently received ERROR message with ErrorCode = ResponseNotReady, which shall specify the wait time for that cycle. The Requester shall start measuring time from the reception of the first ERROR message with ErrorCode = ResponseNotReady with the same Token until WT Max µS elapses or the corresponding Response is successfully received. After this time the Responder is allowed to drop the response. The Requester shall take into account the transmission time of the ERROR response, as Table 44 — ERROR response message format shows, from the Responder to Requester when calculating WT Max . The RDTM value appears in Table 46 — ResponseNotReady extended error data. The Responder should ensure that WT Max does not result in less than WT in determination of RDTM.

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
				See ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady in Table 46 — ResponseNotReady extended error data.
HeartbeatPeriod	Requester and Responder	Variable	S	See the HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response clause.

²⁰⁷ **10 SPDM messages**

208 SPDM messages can be divided into the following categories, supporting different aspects of security exchanges between a Requester and Responder:


- Capability discovery and negotiation
- · Responder identity authentication
- Measurement
- · Key agreement for secure channel establishment

²⁰⁹ **10.1 Capability discovery and negotiation**

- 210 All Requesters and Responders shall support GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS.
- 211 Figure 5 Capability discovery and negotiation flow shows the high-level request-response flow and sequence for the capability discovery and negotiation:

212 Figure 5 — Capability discovery and negotiation flow

213



214 **10.1.1 Negotiated state preamble**

215 The vca (Version-Capabilities-Algorithms) shall be the concatenation of messages GET_VERSION, VERSION,

GET_CAPABILITIES, CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, and ALGORITHMS last exchanged between the Requester and the Responder.

- 216 If the two endpoints do not support session key establishment with the PSK (Pre-Shared Key) option, or the two endpoints support PSK but the negotiated capabilities and algorithms are not provisioned to both endpoints alongside the PSK, then the Requester shall issue GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS to construct vca. If the Responder supports caching the negotiated state (CACHE_CAP=1), the Requester might not issue GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS. In this case, the Requester and the Responder shall store the most recent vca as part of the Negotiated State.
- 217 If the two endpoints support session key establishment with the PSK and the negotiated capabilities and algorithms (the c and A of the vcA) are provisioned to both endpoints alongside the PSK, then the Requester shall not issue GET_CAPABILITIES and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS.

²¹⁸ **10.2 GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages**

- 219 This request message shall retrieve the SPDM version of an endpoint. Table 8 GET_VERSION request message format shows the GET_VERSION request message format and Table 9 Successful VERSION response message format shows the VERSION response message format.
- 220 In all future SPDM versions, the GET_VERSION and VERSION response messages will be backward compatible with all earlier versions.
- 221 The Requester shall begin the discovery process by sending a GET_VERSION request message with the value of the SPDMVersion field set to 0x10. All Responders shall always support the GET_VERSION request message with major version 0x1 and provide a VERSION response containing all supported versions, as Table 8 — GET_VERSION request message format describes.
- 222 The Requester shall consult the VERSION response to select a common supported version, which should be the latest supported common version. The Requester shall use the selected version in all future communication of other requests. A Requester shall not issue other requests until it receives a successful VERSION response and identifies a common version that both sides support. A Responder shall not respond to the GET_VERSION request message with an ERROR message except for ErrorCode s specified in this clause. The selected version shall be the version in the SPDMVersion field of the Request (other than GET_VERSION) immediately following the GET_VERSION request. If the Requester uses a different version than the selected version in other Requests, the Responder should return an ERROR message with ErrorCode = VersionMismatch or the Responder can silently discard the Request.
- 223 A Requester can issue a GET_VERSION request message to a Responder at any time, which is as an exception to Requirements for Requesters to allow for scenarios where a Requester shall restart the protocol due to an internal error or Reset.
- After receiving a valid GET_VERSION request, the Responder shall invalidate state and data associated with all previous requests from the same Requester. All active sessions between the Requester and the Responder are terminated and information (such as session keys, session IDs) for those sessions should not be used anymore. Additionally, this message shall clear the previously *Negotiated State*, if any, in both the Requester and its corresponding Responder. An invalid GET_VERSION request that results in the Responder returning an error to the


Requester shall not affect the session state. The ERROR message resulting from an invalid GET_VERSION request shall have the value of the SPDMVersion field set to 0x10.

- After sending the VERSION response for a GET_VERSION request, if the Responder completes a runtime code or configuration change for its hardware or firmware measurement and the change has taken effect, then the Responder shall silently discard any request received outside of a session, or respond with ErrorCode=RequestResynch to any request received outside of a session, until a GET_VERSION request is received. For requests received within a session, the Responder shall follow the selected session policy that the Requester selects in Table 57 — Session Policy at the time of session establishment.
- 226 Figure 6 Discovering the common major version shows the process:

227 Figure 6 — Discovering the common major version







229 Table 8 — GET_VERSION request message format shows the GET_VERSION request message format:

230 **Table 8 — GET_VERSION request message format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be 0x10 (V1.0).
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x84 = GET_VERSION . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

231 Table 9 — Successful VERSION response message format shows the successful VERSION response message format:

232 Table 9 — Successful VERSION response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be 0x10 (V1.0).
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x04 = VERSION . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	Reserved	1	Reserved.
5	VersionNumberEntryCount	1	Number of version entries present in this table (=n).
6	VersionNumberEntry1:n	2*n	16-bit version entry. See Table 10 — VersionNumberEntry definition.

233 Table 10 — VersionNumberEntry definition shows the VersionNumberEntry definition. See Version encoding for more details.

234 Table 10 — VersionNumberEntry definition

Bit offset	Field	Description
[15:12]	MajorVersion	Version of the specification with changes that are incompatible with one or more functions in earlier major versions of the specification.
[11:8]	MinorVersion	Version of the specification with changes that are compatible with functions in earlier minor versions of this major version specification.
[7:4]	UpdateVersionNumber	Version of the specification with editorial updates and errata fixes. Informational; ignore when checking versions for interoperability.
[3:0]	Alpha	Pre-release work-in-progress version of the specification. Backward compatible with earlier minor versions of this major version specification. However, because the Alpha value represents an in-development version of the specification, versions that share the same major and minor version numbers but have different Alpha versions might not be fully interoperable. Released versions shall have an Alpha value of zero (0).

²³⁵ **10.3 GET_CAPABILITIES request and CAPABILITIES response messages**

- 236 This request message shall retrieve the SPDM capabilities of an endpoint.
- 237 Table 11 GET_CAPABILITIES request message format shows the GET_CAPABILITIES request message format.
- 238 Table 12 Successful CAPABILITIES response message format shows the CAPABILITIES response message format.
- 239 Table 11 Flag fields definitions for the Requester shows the flag fields definitions for the Requester.
- 240 Likewise, Table 12 Flag fields definitions for the Responder shows the flag fields definitions for the Responder.
- 241 To properly support transferring of SPDM messages, the Requester and Responder shall indicate two buffer sizes:
 - One for receiving a single SPDM message called DataTransferSize .
 - One for indicating their maximum internal buffer size for processing a single received SPDM message called MaxSPDMmsgSize.
- Additionally, the Requester and Responder can have a transmit buffer. The transmit buffer size is not communicated to the other SPDM endpoint but can be less than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint.
- 243 Both the Requester and Responder shall support a minimum size for both the transmit and receive buffer to successfully transfer SPDM messages. The minimum size, referred to as MinDataTransferSize, shall be the size, in bytes, of the SPDM message with the largest size in this list:
 - GET_VERSION
 - VERSION assuming no versions returned contain 'Alpha' versions in 'VersionNumberEntry' and version entries are not duplicated.
 - GET_CAPABILITIES
 - CAPABILITIES
 - CHUNK_SEND using the size of the SPDM Header for the size of the SPDMchunk field.
 - CHUNK_SEND_ACK using the maximum size of ERROR message for the size of the ResponseToLargeRequest field.
 - CHUNK_GET
 - CHUNK_RESPONSE using the size of SPDM Header for the size of the SPDMchunk field.
 - ERROR using the maximum size for the ExtendedErrorData
- 244 The calculation of MinDataTransferSize shall assume all fields are present. For this version of the specification, the MinDataTransferSize shall be 42.

245 GET_CAPABILITIES request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.

Byte offset	Field Size (bytes)		Description
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE1 = GET_CAPABILITIES . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	Reserved	1	Reserved.
5	CTExponent	1	Shall be exponent of base 2, which is used to calculate ct . See Table 7 — Timing specification for SPDM messages. The equation for ct shall be 2 ^{CTExponent} microseconds (μ s). For example, if CTExponent is 10, ct is 2 ¹⁰ =1024 μ s.
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	Flags	4	See Table 11 — Flag fields definitions for the Requester.
12	DataTransferSize	4	This field shall indicate the maximum buffer size, in bytes, of the Requester for receiving a single and complete SPDM message whose message size is less than or equal to the value in this field. The value of this field shall be equal to or greater than MinDataTransferSize. The DataTransferSize shall exclude transport headers, encryption headers, and MAC. This field helps the sender of the SPDM message know whether or not it needs to utilize the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism.
16	MaxSPDMmsgSize	4	If the Requester supports the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism this field shall indicate the maximum size, in bytes, of the internal buffer used to reassemble a single and complete Large SPDM message. This field shall be greater than or equal to DataTransferSize . This buffer size is most helpful when transferring a Large SPDM message in multiple chunks because it tells the sender whether or not there is enough memory for the fully reassembled SPDM message. If the Requester does not support the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism, this field shall be equal to the DataTransferSize of the Requester.

246 Successful CAPABILITIES response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x61 = CAPABILITIES . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	Reserved	1	Reserved.
5	CTExponent	1	Shall be the exponent of base 2, which used to calculate ct . See Table 7 — Timing specification for SPDM messages. The equation for ct shall be 2 ^{CTExponent} microseconds (μ s). For example, if CTExponent is 10, ct is 2 ¹⁰ =1024 μ s.
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	Flags	4	See Table 12 — Flag fields definitions for the Responder.
12	2 DataTransferSize		This field shall indicate the maximum buffer size, in bytes, of the Responder for receiving a single and complete SPDM message whose message size is less than or equal to the value in this field. The value of this field shall be equal to or greater than MinDataTransferSize . The DataTransferSize shall exclude transport headers, encryption headers, and MAC. This field helps the sender of the SPDM message know whether or not it needs to utilize the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
16	MaxSPDMmsgSize	4	If the Responder supports the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism this field shall indicate the maximum size, in bytes, of the internal buffer used to reassemble a single and complete Large SPDM message. This field shall be greater than or equal to DataTransferSize . This buffer size is most helpful when transferring a Large SPDM message in multiple chunks because it tells the sender whether or not there is enough memory for the fully reassembled SPDM message. If the Responder does not support the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism, this field shall be equal to the DataTransferSize of the Responder.

- As described in other parts of this specification, a Requester or Responder can reverse roles or be both roles for certain SPDM messages and flows. Thus, in general, an SPDM endpoint cannot send a Large SPDM message that exceeds the MaxSPDMmsgSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint. Specifically, a requesting SPDM endpoint shall not send a request that exceeds the size of MaxSPDMmsgSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint. Likewise, a responding SPDM endpoint shall not send a response that exceeds the size of MaxSPDMmsgSize of the requesting SPDM endpoint. If the size of a response message exceeds the size of the MaxSPDMmsgSize of the requesting SPDM endpoint, the responding SPDM endpoint shall respond with ErrorCode=ResponseTooLarge . Likewise, if the size of a request message exceeds the size of the MaxSPDMmsgSize of the request. Additionally, an SPDM endpoint is expected to provide graceful error handling (for example, buffer overflow/underflow protection) in the event they receive an SPDM messages that exceed their MaxSPDMmsgSize .
- 248 Table 11 Flag fields definitions for the Requester shows the flag fields definitions for the Requester.
- 249 Unless otherwise stated, if a Requester indicates support of a capability associated with an SPDM request or response message, it means the Requester can receive the corresponding request and produce a successful response. In other words, the Requester is acting as a Responder to that SPDM request associated with that capability. For example, if a Requester sets CERT_CAP bit to 1, the Requester can receive a GET_CERTIFICATE request and send back a successful CERTIFICATE response message.

250 Table 11 — Flag fields definitions for the Requester

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
0	0	Reserved	Reserved.
0	1	CERT_CAP	If set, Requester shall support DIGESTS and CERTIFICATE response messages.
0	2	CHAL_CAP	DEPRECATED: If set, Requester shall support CHALLENGE_AUTH response message.
0	[5:3]	Reserved	Reserved.

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
0	6	ENCRYPT_CAP	If set, Requester shall support message encryption in a secure session. If set, when the Requester chooses to start a secure session, the Requester shall send one of the Session-Secrets-Exchange request messages supported by the Responder.
0	7	MAC_CAP	If set, Requester shall support message authentication in a secure session. If set, when the Requester chooses to start a secure session, the Requester shall send one of the Session-Secrets- Exchange request messages supported by the Responder. MAC_CAP is not the same as the HMAC in the RequesterVerifyData or ResponderVerifyData fields of Session-Secrets-Exchange and Session- Secrets-Finish messages.
1	0	MUT_AUTH_CAP	If set, Requester shall support mutual authentication.
1	1	KEY_EX_CAP	If set, Requester shall support KEY_EXCHANGE request message. If set, ENCRYPT_CAP or MAC_CAP shall be set.
1	[3:2]	PSK_CAP	 Pre-shared key capabilities of the Requester. 00b . Requester shall not support pre-shared key capabilities. 01b . Requester shall support pre-shared key 10b and 11b . Reserved. If supported, ENCRYPT_CAP or MAC_CAP shall be set.
1	4	ENCAP_CAP	If set, Requester shall support GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST, ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST, DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK messages. Additionally, the transport may require the Requester to support these messages. ENCAP_CAP was previously deprecated because Basic mutual authentication is deprecated. Deprecation is removed since other messages may require ENCAP_CAP such as KEY_UPDATE which does not require mutual authentication.
1	5	HBEAT_CAP	If set, Requester shall support HEARTBEAT messages.
1	6	KEY_UPD_CAP	If set, Requester shall support KEY_UPDATE messages.

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
1	7	HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP	If set, the Requester can support a Responder that can only send and receive all SPDM messages exchanged during the Session Handshake Phase in the clear (such as without encryption and message authentication). Application data is encrypted and/or authenticated using the negotiated cryptographic algorithms as normal. Setting this bit leads to changes in the contents of certain SPDM messages, discussed in other parts of this specification. If this bit is cleared, the Requester signals that it requires encryption and/or message authentication of SPDM messages exchanged during the Session Handshake Phase. If the Requester does not support encryption and message authentication, then this bit shall be zero. In other words, this bit indicates whether MAC_CAP and ENCRYPT_CAP is involved accordingly in the handshake phase of a secure session or both encryption and message authentication capabilities are disabled in the session handshake phase of a secure session.
2	0	PUB_KEY_ID_CAP	If set, the public key of the Requester was provisioned to the Responder. The transport layer is responsible for identifying the Responder. In this case, the CERT_CAP of the Requester shall be 0.
2	1	CHUNK_CAP	If set, Requester shall support Large SPDM message transfer mechanism messages.
2	[7:2]	Reserved	Reserved.
3	[7:0]	Reserved	Reserved.

251 Table 12 — Flag fields definitions for the Responder shows the flag fields definitions for the Responder.

252 Unless otherwise stated, if a Responder indicates support of a capability associated with an SPDM request or response message, it means the Responder can receive the corresponding request and produce a successful response. For example, if a Responder sets CERT_CAP bit to 1, the Responder can receive a GET_CERTIFICATE request and send back a successful CERTIFICATE response message.

253 Table 12 — Flag fields definitions for the Responder

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
0	0	CACHE_CAP	If set, the Responder shall support the ability to cache the <i>Negotiated State</i> across a Reset. This allows the Requester to skip reissuing the GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS requests after a Reset. The Responder shall cache the selected cryptographic algorithms as one of the parameters of the Negotiated State. If the Requester chooses to skip issuing these requests after the Reset, the Requester shall also cache the same selected cryptographic algorithms.
0	1	CERT_CAP	If set, Responder shall support DIGESTS and CERTIFICATE response messages.
0	2	CHAL_CAP	If set, Responder shall support CHALLENGE_AUTH response message.
0	[4:3]	MEAS_CAP	 MEASUREMENTS response capabilities of the Responder. 00b . The Responder shall not support MEASUREMENTS response capabilities. 01b . The Responder shall support MEASUREMENTS response but cannot perform signature generation. 10b . The Responder shall support MEASUREMENTS response and can generate signatures. 11b . Reserved. Note that, apart from affecting MEASUREMENTS , this capability also affects Param2 of CHALLENGE , Param1 of KEY_EXCHANGE , Param1 of PSK_EXCHANGE , MeasurementSummaryHash field of KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP , CHALLENGE_AUTH , PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP . See the respective request and response clauses for further details.
0	5	MEAS_FRESH_CAP	 Ø . As part of MEASUREMENTS response message, the Responder may return MEASUREMENTS that were computed during the last Responder's Reset. I . The Responder shall support recomputing all MEASUREMENTS without requiring a Reset, and shall always return fresh MEASUREMENTS as part of MEASUREMENTS response message.

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
0	6	ENCRYPT_CAP	If set, Responder shall support message encryption in a secure session. If set, PSK_CAP or KEY_EX_CAP shall be set accordingly to indicate support.
0	7	MAC_CAP	If set, Responder shall support message authentication in a secure session. If set, PSK_CAP or KEY_EX_CAP shall be set accordingly to indicate support. MAC_CAP is not the same as the HMAC in the RequesterVerifyData or ResponderVerifyData fields of Session- Secrets-Exchange and Session-Secrets- Finish messages.
1	0	MUT_AUTH_CAP	If set, Responder shall support mutual authentication.
1	1	KEY_EX_CAP	If set, Responder shall support KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message. If set, ENCRYPT_CAP or MAC_CAP shall be set.
1	[3:2]	PSK_CAP	 Pre-Shared Key capabilities of the Responder. 00b . Responder shall not support Pre- Shared Key capabilities. 01b . Responder shall support Pre- Shared Key without ResponderContext for session key derivation. 10b . Responder shall support Pre- Shared Key with ResponderContext for session key derivation. 11b . Reserved. If supported, ENCRYPT_CAP or MAC_CAP shall be set.
1	4	ENCAP_CAP	If set, Responder shall support GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST , ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST , DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE , and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK messages. Additionally, the transport may require the Responder to support these messages. ENCAP_CAP was previously deprecated because Basic mutual authentication is deprecated. Deprecation is removed since other messages may require ENCAP_CAP such as KEY_UPDATE which does not require mutual authentication.

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
1	5	HBEAT_CAP	If set, Responder shall support HEARTBEAT messages.
1	6	KEY_UPD_CAP	If set, Responder shall support KEY_UPDATE messages.
1	7	HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP	If set, the Responder can only send and receive messages without encryption and message authentication during the Session Handshake Phase. If set, KEY_EX_CAP shall also be set. Setting this bit leads to changes in the contents of certain SPDM messages, discussed in other parts of this specification. If the Responder does not support encryption and message authentication, then this bit shall be zero.
			In other words, this bit indicates whether MAC_CAP and ENCRYPT_CAP is involved accordingly in the handshake phase of a secure session or both encryption and message authentication capabilities are disabled in the session handshake phase of a secure session.
2	0	PUB_KEY_ID_CAP	If set, the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester. The transport layer is responsible for identifying the Requester. In this case, CERT_CAP and ALIAS_CERT_CAP of the Responder shall both be 0.
2	1	CHUNK_CAP	If set, Responder shall support Large SPDM message transfer mechanism messages.
2	2	ALIAS_CERT_CAP	If set, the Responder uses the AliasCert model. See Identity provisioning for details.
2	3	SET_CERT_CAP	If set, Responder shall support SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response messages.
2	4	CSR_CAP	If set, Responder shall support CSR response messages. If this bit is set SET_CERT_CAP shall be set.
2	5	CERT_INSTALL_RESET_CAP	If set, Responder may return an ERROR message with ErrorCode = ResetRequired to complete a certificate provisioning request. If this bit is set, CSR_CAP and/or SET_CERT_CAP shall be set.

Byte offset	Bit offset	Field	Description
2	[7:6]	Reserved	Reserved.
3	[7:0]	Reserved	Reserved.

254

In the case where an SPDM implementation incorrectly returns an illegal combination of capability flags, as these are defined by this specification (for example ENCRYPT_CAP is set but both KEY_EX_CAP and PSK_CAP are cleared), the following guidance is provided: If a Responder detects an illegal capability flag combination reported by the Requester, it shall issue an ERROR message and should set the ErrorCode = InvalidRequest . If a Requester detects an illegal capability flag combination reported by the Responder it should retry once by issuing GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES . If the illegal combination is returned again it should cease communicating with this particular Responder over SPDM and log an error in an implementation-specific manner to assist with identifying the problem.

²⁵⁵ **10.4 NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request and ALGORITHMS response** messages

- 256 This request message shall negotiate cryptographic algorithms. A Requester shall not issue a NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message until it receives a successful CAPABILITIES response message.
- 257 After a Requester issues a NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request, it shall not issue any other SPDM requests, with the exception of GET_VERSION, until it receives a successful ALGORITHMS response message.
- 258 Table 13 NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format shows the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format.

259 Table 13 — NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE3 = NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Number of algorithms structure tables in this request using ReqAlgStruct
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	Length	2	Length of the entire request message, in bytes. Length shall be less than or equal to 128 bytes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
6	MeasurementSpecification	1	Bit mask. The measurement specification is used in the MEASUREMENTS response. The Requester can set zero or one bit to indicate the measurement specification support. Bit 0: This bit shall indicate support for the DMTF- defined measurement specification. See Table 43 — DMTF measurement specification format.
7	OtherParamsSupport	1	Selection Bit mask. Bits [3:0] - See Opaque Data Format Support and Selection Table Bits [7:4] - Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
8	BaseAsymAlgo	4	 Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purpose of signature verification. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero. Let SigLen be the size of the signature in bytes. Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048 where SigLen =256. Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048 where SigLen =256. Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048 where SigLen =384. Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072 where SigLen =384. Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 where SigLen =64 (32-byte r followed by 32-byte s). Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096 where SigLen =512. Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096 where SigLen =512. Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 where SigLen =96 (48-byte r followed by 48-byte s). Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521 where SigLen =132 (66-byte r followed by 66-byte s). Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521 where SigLen =132 (66-byte r followed by 66-byte s). Byte 1 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256 where SigLen =64 (32-byte SM2_R followed by 32-byte SM2_S). Byte 1 Bit 2. EdDSA ed25519 where SigLen =64 (32-byte R followed by 32-byte S). Byte 1 Bit 3. EdDSA ed448 where SigLen =114 (57-byte R followed by 57-byte S). All other values reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
12	BaseHashAlgo	4	Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated cryptographic hashing algorithms. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero. • Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_SHA_256 • Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SHA_384 • Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_SHA_512 • Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 • Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 • Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 • Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_SM3_256 • All other values reserved.
16	Reserved	12	Reserved.
28	ExtAsymCount	1	Number of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms (=A) for the purpose of signature verification. A + E + ExtAlgCount2 + ExtAlgCount3 + ExtAlgCount4 + ExtAlgCount5 shall be less than or equal to 20. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.
29	ExtHashCount	1	Number of Requester-supported extended hashing algorithms (=E). A + E + ExtAlgCount2 + ExtAlgCount3 + ExtAlgCount4 + ExtAlgCount5 shall be less than or equal to 20. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.
30	Reserved	2	Reserved.
32	ExtAsym	4 * A	List of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purpose of signature verification. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.
32 + 4 * A	ExtHash	4 * E	List of the extended hashing algorithms supported by Requester. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.
32 + 4 * A + 4 * E	ReqAlgStruct	AlgStructSize	See the AlgStructure request field.

AlgStructSize is the sum of the size of the following algorithm structure tables. The algorithm structure table shall be present only if the Requester supports that AlgType . AlgType shall monotonically increase for subsequent entries.

261 Table 14 — Algorithm request structure shows the Algorithm request structure:

262 Table 14 — Algorithm request structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	 Type of algorithm. 0 and 1. Reserved. 2. DHE. 3. AEADCipherSuite . 4. ReqBaseAsymAlg . 5. KeySchedule . All other values reserved.
1	AlgCount	1	 Requester supported fixed algorithms. Bit [7:4]. Number of bytes required to describe Requester supported SPDM-enumerated fixed algorithms (= FixedAlgCount). FixedAlgCount + 2 shall be a multiple of 4. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported extended algorithms (= ExtAlgCount).
2	AlgSupported	FixedAlgCount	Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated algorithms.
2 + FixedAlgCount	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount	List of Requester-supported extended algorithms. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

263

The following tables describe the Algorithm request structure mapped to their respective type:

- Table 15 DHE structure
- Table 16 AEAD structure
- Table 17 ReqBaseAsymAlg structure
- Table 18 KeySchedule structure

264 Table 15 — DHE structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	0x02 = DHE
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported extended DHE groups (= ExtAlgCount2).

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (DHE) groups. Values in parentheses specify the size of the corresponding public values associated with each group. Byte 0 Bit 0. ffdhe2048 (D = 256). Byte 0 Bit 1. ffdhe3072 (D = 384). Byte 0 Bit 2. ffdhe4096 (D = 512). Byte 0 Bit 3. secp256r1 (D = 64, C = 32). Byte 0 Bit 4. secp384r1 (D = 96, C = 48). Byte 0 Bit 5. secp521r1 (D = 132, C = 66). Byte 0 Bit 6. SM2_P256 (Part 3 and Part 5 of GB/T 32918 specification) (D = 64, C = 32). All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount2	List of Requester-supported extended DHE groups. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

265

Table 16 — AEAD structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	0x03 = AEAD
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester supported extended <i>AEAD</i> algorithms (= ExtAlgCount3).
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated AEAD algorithms. Byte 0 Bit 0. AES-128-GCM. 128-bit key; 96-bit IV (initialization vector); tag size is specified by transport layer. Byte 0 Bit 1. AES-256-GCM. 256-bit key; 96-bit IV; tag size is specified by transport layer. Byte 0 Bit 2. CHACHA20_POLY1305. 256-bit key; 96-bit IV; 128-bit tag. Byte 0 Bit 3. AEAD_SM4_GCM. 128-bit key; 96-bit IV; tag size is specified by transport layer. All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount3	List of Requester-supported extended AEAD algorithms. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

266

Table 17 — ReqBaseAsymAlg structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	АІдТуре	1	0x04 = ReqBaseAsymAlg
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purpose of signature generation (= ExtAlgCount4).
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purpose of signature generation. Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048. Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048. Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048. Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072. Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072. Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256. Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096. Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096. Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384. Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384. Byte 1 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256. Byte 1 Bit 2. EdDSA ed25519. Byte 1 Bit 3. EdDSA ed448. All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount4	List of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purpose of signature generation. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

267 **Table 18 — KeySchedule structure**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	0x05 = KeySchedule
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester supported extended key schedule algorithms (= ExtAlgCount5).

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	AlgSupported	2	Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM- enumerated Key Schedule algorithms.Byte 0 Bit 0. SPDM Key Schedule.All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount5	List of Requester-supported extended key schedule algorithms. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

Table 19 — ALGORITHMS response message format shows the ALGORITHMS response message format.

268

269

Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x63 = ALGORITHMS . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Number of algorithms structure tables in this response using RespAlgStruct.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	Length	2	Length of the response message, in bytes.
6	MeasurementSpecificationSel	1	Bit mask. The Responder shall select one of the measurement specifications supported by the Requester and Responder. Thus, no more than one bit shall be set. The MeasurementSpecification field in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS defines the format of this field.
7	OtherParamsSelection	1	 Selected Parameter Bit Mask. The Responder shall select one of the opaque data formats supported by the Requester. Thus, no more than one bit shall be set for the opaque data format. Bit [3:0]. See Opaque Data Format Support and Selection Table. Bit [7:4]. Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
8	MeasurementHashAlgo	4	 Bit mask indicating the SPDM-enumerated hashing algorithms used for measurements. Byte 0 Bit 0. Raw Bit Stream Only. Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SHA_256. Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_SHA_384. Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_SHA3_256. Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_SHA3_384. Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_SHA3_512. Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_SM3_256. If the Responder supports GET_MEASUREMENTS and MeasurementSpecificationSe1 is non-zero then exactly one bit in this bit field shall be set. Otherwise, the Responder shall set this field to 0. All other values reserved.
12	BaseAsymSel	4	Bit mask indicating the SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithm selected for the purpose of signature generation. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero. The Responder shall set no more than one bit.
16	BaseHashSel	4	Bit mask indicating the SPDM-enumerated hashing algorithm selected. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero. The Responder shall set no more than one bit.
20	Reserved	12	Reserved.
32	ExtAsymSelCount	1	Number of extended asymmetric key signature algorithms selected for the purpose of signature generation. Shall be either 0 or 1 (=A'). If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.
33	ExtHashSelCount	1	The number of extended hashing algorithms selected. Shall be either 0 or 1 (=E'). If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.
34	Reserved	2	Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
36	ExtAsymSel	4 * A'	The extended asymmetric key signature algorithm selected for the purpose of signature generation. The Responder shall use this asymmetric signature algorithm for all subsequent applicable response messages to the Requester. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.
36 + 4 * A'	ExtHashSel	4 * E'	Extended hashing algorithm selected. The Responder shall use this hashing algorithm during all subsequent response messages to the Requester. The Requester shall use this hashing algorithm during all subsequent applicable request messages to the Responder. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.
36 + 4 * A' + 4 * E'	RespAlgStruct	AlgStructSize	See Table 20 — Response AlgStructure field format.

270

AlgStructSize is the sum of the size of all Algorithm structure tables, as the following tables show. The algorithm structure table need be present only if the Responder supports that AlgType . AlgType shall monotonically increase for subsequent entries.

271 Table 20 — Response AlgStructure field format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	 Type of algorithm. 0x00 and 0x01. Reserved. 0x02. DHE. 0x03. AEADCipherSuite . 0x04. ReqBaseAsymAlg . 0x05. KeySchedule . All other values reserved.
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit mask listing Responder supported fixed algorithm requested by the Requester. Bit [7:4]. Number of bytes required to describe Requester-supported SPDM-enumerated fixed algorithms (= FixedAlgCount). FixedAlgCount + 2 shall be a multiple of 4. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended algorithms (= ExtAlgCount '). This value shall be either 0 or 1.
2	AlgSupported	FixedAlgCount	Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated algorithm. Responder shall set at most one bit to 1.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2 + FixedAlgCount	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount'	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder- selected, extended algorithm. Responder shall select at most one external algorithm. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

272 The following tables describe each individual type and their associated fixed fields:

- Table 21 DHE structure
- Table 22 AEAD structure
- Table 23 ReqBaseAsymAlg structure
- Table 24 KeySchedule structure
- Table 25 Extended Algorithm field format

273 Table 21 — DHE structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	АlgType	1	0×02 = DHE
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended DHE groups (= ExtAlgCount2'). This value shall be either 0 or 1.
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated DHE group. Values in parentheses specify the size of the corresponding public values associated with each group. Byte 0 Bit 0. ffdhe2048 (D = 256). Byte 0 Bit 1. ffdhe3072 (D = 384). Byte 0 Bit 2. ffdhe4096 (D = 512). Byte 0 Bit 3. secp256r1 (D = 64, C = 32) Byte 0 Bit 4. secp384r1 (D = 96, C = 48). Byte 0 Bit 5. secp521r1 (D = 132, C = 66). Byte 0 Bit 6. SM2_P256 (Part 3 and Part 5 of GB/T 32918) (D = 64, C = 32). All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount2'	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder- selected, extended DHE algorithm. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

274 Table 22 — AEAD structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	0x03 = AEAD
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended AEAD algorithms (= ExtAlgCount3'). This value shall be either 0 or 1.
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated AEAD algorithm. Byte 0 Bit 0. AES-128-GCM. Byte 0 Bit 1. AES-256-GCM. Byte 0 Bit 2. CHACHA20_POLY1305. Byte 0 Bit 3. AEAD_SM4_GCM. All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount3'	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder- selected, extended AEAD algorithm. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

275 Table 23 — ReqBaseAsymAlg structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	АlgType	1	0x04 = ReqBaseAsymAlg
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended asymmetric key signature algorithms (= ExtAlgCount4') for the purpose of signature verification. This value shall be either 0 or 1.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithm for the purpose of signature verification. Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048. Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048. Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048. Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048. Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072. Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072. Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256. Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096. Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096. Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384. Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521. Byte 1 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256. Byte 1 Bit 2. EdDSA ed25519. Byte 1 Bit 3 EdDSA ed448. All other values reserved.
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount4'	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder- selected extended asymmetric key signature algorithm for the purpose of signature verification. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

Table 24 — KeySchedule structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AlgType	1	0x05 = KeySchedule
1	AlgCount	1	 Bit [7:4]. Shall be a value of 2. Bit [3:0]. Number of Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended key schedule algorithms (= ExtAlgCount5'). This value shall be either 0 or 1.
2	AlgSupported	2	 Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated key schedule algorithm. Byte 0 Bit 0. SPDM key schedule. All other values are reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
4	AlgExternal	4* ExtAlgCount5'	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder- selected, extended key schedule algorithm. Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format describes the format of this field.

277 Table 25 — Extended Algorithm field format

278 Describes algorithms that are external to this specification.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	Registry ID	1	Shall represent the registry or standards body. The ID column in Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID describes the value of this field.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved.
2	Algorithm ID	2	Shall indicate the desired algorithm. The registry or standards body owns the value of this field. See Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID. At present, DMTF does not define any algorithms for use in extended algorithms fields.

279 Opaque Data Format Support and Selection Table


280 The Opaque Data Format Selection Table shows the bit definition for the format of the Opaque data fields. A Requester may set more than one bit in the table to indicate each supported format. A Responder shall select no more than one of the bits supported by the Requester in this table. If the Requester or the Responder does not set a bit, then all OpaqueData fields in this specification shall be absent by setting the respective OpaqueDataLen field to a value of zero.

Bit offset	Field	Description
0	OpaqueDataFmt0	If set, this bit shall indicate that the format for all <code>OpaqueData</code> fields in this specification is defined by the device vendor or other standards body.
1	OpaqueDataFmt1	If set, this bit shall indicate that the format for all <code>opaqueData</code> fields in this specification is defined by the General opaque data format.
[3:2]	Reserved	Reserved.

- 281 For each algorithm type, a Responder shall not select both an SPDM-enumerated algorithm and an extended algorithm.
- 282 Figure 7 Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1 illustrates how two endpoints negotiate a base hashing

algorithm. Endpoint A issues **NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS** request message and endpoint B selects an algorithm of which both endpoints are capable.

- 283 Figure 7 Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1
- 284



285 The SPDM protocol accounts for the possibility that both endpoints can issue **NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS** request messages independently of each other. In this case, the endpoint A Requester and endpoint B Responder communication pair might select a different algorithm compared to the endpoint B Requester and endpoint A Responder communication pair.

286 10.4.1 Connection Behavior after VCA


287 With the successful completion of the ALGORITHMS message, all of the parameters of the SPDM connection have been determined. Thus, all SPDM message exchanges after the VCA messages shall comply with the selected parameters in ALGORITHMS, with the exception of GET_VERSION and VERSION messages, or unless otherwise stated in

this specification. To explain this behavior, suppose a Responder supports both RSA and ECDSA asymmetric algorithms. For an SPDM connection, the Responder selects the TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048 asymmetric algorithm in BaseAsymSe1 and the TPM_ALG_SHA_256 hash algorithm in BaseHashSe1. If the Requester on that same connection issues a GET_DIGESTS, the Responder returns TPM_ALG_SHA_256 digests only for those populated slots that can provide a TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048 signature for a CHALLENGE_AUTH response. The Responder would violate this requirement if the Responder returns one or more digests of populated slots that perform ECDSA signatures or uses a different hash algorithm.

288 Unless otherwise stated in this specification and with the exception of GET_VERSION, if a Requester issues a request that violates one or more of the negotiated or selected parameters of a given connection, the Responder shall either silently discard the request or return an ERROR message with an appropriate error code.

²⁸⁹ **10.5 Responder identity authentication**

- 290 This clause describes request messages and response messages associated with the identity of the Responder authentication operations. The GET_DIGESTS and GET_CERTIFICATE messages shall be supported by a Responder that returns CERT_CAP =1 in the CAPABILITIES response message. The CHALLENGE message that this clause defines shall be supported by a Responder that returns CHAL_CAP =1 in the CAPABILITIES response message. The GET_DIGESTS and GET_CERTIFICATE messages are not applicable if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment.
- 291 Figure 8 Responder authentication: Example certificate retrieval flow shows the high-level request-response message flow and sequence for *certificate* retrieval.
- 292 Figure 8 Responder authentication: Example certificate retrieval flow



- 294 The <u>GET_DIGESTS</u> request message and <u>DIGESTS</u> response message can optimize the amount of data required to be transferred from the Responder to the Requester, due to the potentially large size of a certificate chain. The cryptographic hash values of each of the certificate chains stored on an endpoint is returned with the <u>DIGESTS</u> response message, such that the Requester can cache the previously retrieved certificate chain hash values to detect any change to the certificate chains stored on the device before issuing the <u>GET_CERTIFICATE</u> request message.
- 295 For the runtime challenge-response flow, the signature field in the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message payload shall contain the signature generated by using the private key associated with the leaf certificate over the hash of the message transcript. See Table 36 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2.
- 296 This ensures cryptographic binding between a specific request message from a specific Requester and a specific response message from a specific Responder and enables the Requester to detect the presence of an active adversary attempting to downgrade cryptographic algorithms or SPDM versions.
- 297 Furthermore, a Requester-generated *nonce* protects the challenge-response from replay attacks, whereas a Responder-generated nonce prevents the Responder from signing over arbitrary data that the Requester dictates.

The message transcript generation for the signature computation is restarted with the latest **GET_VERSION** request received.

²⁹⁸ **10.6 Requester identity authentication**

- 299 If a Requester supports mutual authentication, it shall comply with all requirements placed on a Responder as specified in Responder identity authentication.
- 300 If a Responder supports mutual authentication, it shall comply with all requirements placed on a Requester as specified in Responder identity authentication. These two statements essentially describe a role reversal.

301 10.6.1 Certificates and certificate chains

- 302 Each SPDM endpoint that supports identity authentication using certificates shall carry at least one *complete* certificate chain. A certificate chain contains an ordered list of certificates, presented as the binary (byte) concatenation of the fields that Table 26 Certificate chain format shows. In the context of this specification, a complete certificate chain is one where: (i) the first certificate is either signed by a Root Certificate (a certificate that specifies a trust anchor) or is a Root Certificate itself, (ii) each subsequent certificate is signed by the preceding certificate, and (iii) the final certificate contains the public key used to authenticate the SPDM endpoint. The final certificate is called the *leaf certificate*.
- 303 The SPDM endpoint shall contain a single public-private key pair per supported algorithm for its leaf certificate, regardless of how many certificate chains are stored on the device. The Responder selects a single asymmetric key signature algorithm per Requester. If a Responder sets both ALIAS_CERT_CAP and CSR_CAP, then the Responder shall contain a single public-private key pair per supported algorithm for its Device Certificate CA.
- 304 Certificate chains are stored in logical locations called *slots*. Each slot shall either be empty or contain one complete certificate chain. A device shall not contain more than eight slots. Slots are numbered zero through seven inclusively. Slot 0 is populated by default. If a Responder device uses the DeviceCert model (ALIAS_CERT_CAP=0b in CAPABILITIES response), then the certificate chain in every populated slot shall use DeviceCert s. If a Responder device uses the AliasCert model (ALIAS_CERT_CAP=1b in CAPABILITIES response), then the certificate chain in every populated through the supply chain such as by a platform integrator or by an end user such as the IT administrator. A slot mask identifies the certificate chains from the eight slots. Similarly, if the Requester supports mutual authentication, it shall use the same model. Note that a Requester does not have capability flags to indicate the certificate model.
- 305 Each certificate in a chain shall be in ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 format. The ASN.1 DER encoding of each individual certificate can be analyzed to determine its length.
- 306 To allow for flexibility in supporting multiple certification models, the minimum number of certificates within a chain compliant with this specification shall be one, in which case the single certificate shall be the <u>DeviceCert</u> leaf certificate.
- 307 Table 26 Certificate chain format describes the certificate chain format:
- 308 Table 26 Certificate chain format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	Length	2	Total length of the certificate chain, in bytes, including all fields in this table. This field is little endian.
2	Reserved	2	Reserved.
4	RootHash	н	Digest of the Root Certificate. Note that Root Certificate is ASN.1 DER-encoded for this digest. This field shall be in Hash byte order. H is the output size, in bytes, of the hash algorithm selected by the most recent ALGORITHMS response.
4 + H	Certificates	Length - (4 + H)	A complete certificate chain, consisting of one or more ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 certificates. This field shall be in Encoded ASN.1 byte order.

³⁰⁹ **10.7 GET_DIGESTS request and DIGESTS response messages**

- 310 This request message shall retrieve the certificate chain digests.
- 311 Table 27 GET_DIGESTS request message format shows the GET_DIGESTS request message format.
- 312 The digests in Table 28 Successful DIGESTS response message format shall be computed over the certificate chain as Table 26 Certificate chain format shows.

313 Table 27 — GET_DIGESTS request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x81 = GET_DIGESTS . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

314 Table 28 — Successful DIGESTS response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x01 = DIGESTS . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	Param2	1	Slot mask. The bit in position K of this byte shall be set to 1b if and only if slot number K contains a certificate chain for the protocol version in the SPDMVersion field. (Bit 0 is the least significant bit of the byte.) The number of digests returned shall be equal to the number of bits set in this byte. The digests shall be returned in order of increasing slot number.
4	Digest[0]	н	Digest of the first certificate chain. This field shall be in Hash byte order.
4 + (H * (n -1))	Digest[n-1]	н	Digest of the last (n th) certificate chain. This field shall be in Hash byte order.

³¹⁵ **10.8 GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages**

- 316 This request message shall retrieve the certificate chain from the specified slot number.
- 317 Table 29 GET_CERTIFICATE request message format shows the GET_CERTIFICATE request message format.
- 318 Table 30 Successful CERTIFICATE response message format shows the CERTIFICATE response message format.
- 319 The Requester should, at a minimum, save the public key of the leaf certificate and associate it with each of the digests returned by DIGESTS message response. The Requester sends one or more GET_CERTIFICATE requests to retrieve the certificate chain of the Responder.

320 Table 29 — GET_CERTIFICATE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x82 = GET_CERTIFICATE . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Bit [7:4]. Reserved. Bit [3:0]. SlotID . Slot number of the Responder certificate chain to read. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
4	Offset	2	Offset in bytes from the start of the certificate chain to where the read request message begins. The Responder shall send its certificate chain starting from this offset. For the first GET_CERTIFICATE request for a given slot, the Requester shall set this field to 0. For subsequent requests, Offset is set to the next portion of the certificate in that slot.
6	Length	2	Length of certificate chain data, in bytes, to be returned in the corresponding response. This field is an unsigned 16-bit integer.


Table 30 — Successful CERTIFICATE response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x02 = CERTIFICATE . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Bit [7:4]. Reserved. Bit [3:0]. <pre>SlotID</pre> . Slot number of the certificate chain returned.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	PortionLength	2	Number of bytes of this portion of certificate chain. This should be less than or equal to Length received as part of the request. For example, the Responder might set this field to a value less than Length received as part of the request due to limitations on the transmit buffer of the Responder.
6	RemainderLength	2	Number of bytes of the certificate chain that have not been sent yet, after the current response. For the last response, this field shall be 0 as an indication to the Requester that the entire certificate chain has been sent.
8	CertChain	PortionLength	Requested contents of target certificate chain, as described in Certificates and certificate chains.

322

Figure 9 — Responder cannot return full length data flow shows the high-level request-response message flow for Responder response when it cannot return the entire data requested by the Requester in the first response.

323 Figure 9 — Responder cannot return full length data flow



- 325 Endpoints that support the large SPDM message transfer mechanism message set, shall use the large SPDM message transfer mechanism messages to manage the transfer of the requested certificate chain when the CERTIFICATE response is larger than the DataTransferSize of the Requester or the transmit buffer of the Responder. Specifically:
 - If the Requester sets Offset to 0 and Length to 0xFFFF in the GET_CERTIFICATE request, the Responder shall set PortionLength equal to the size of the complete certificate chain stored in the requested slot,
 RemainderLength to 0 and store the contents of the complete certificate chain in CertChain in the CERTIFICATE response. The Responder shall then fragment and serve this response message in chunks, as per the clauses presented in CHUNK_GET request and CHUNK_RESPONSE response message. In this case, the Responder shall not return a partial certificate chain.

³²⁶ 10.8.1 Mutual authentication requirements for GET_CERTIFICATE and CERTIFICATE messages

327 If the Requester supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Responder in GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages clause shall also apply to the Requester. If the Responder supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Requester in GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages clause shall also apply to the Responder. These two statements essentially describe a role reversal.

328 10.8.2 SPDM certificate requirements and recommendations

329 This specification defines a number of X.509 v3 required and optional fields for compliant SPDM certificates. Unless stated otherwise, the following clauses apply to those certificates in the chain that are specific to a device instance, that is, the leaf certificate in the DeviceCert model or the DeviceCert, all intermediate AliasCert s and the leaf certificate in the AliasCert model. See identity provisioning. 330 In addition, the Subject Alternative Name certificate extension otherName field is recommended for providing device information. See the Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID.

331 Table 31 — Required fields

Field	Description	
Version	Version of the encoded certificate shall be present and shall be 3 (encoded as value 2).	
Serial Number	CA-assigned serial number shall be present with a positive integer value.	
Signature Algorithm	Signature algorithm that CA uses shall be present.	
Issuer	CA distinguished name shall be specified.	
Subject Name	Subject name shall be present and shall represent the distinguished name associated with the leaf certificate.	
Validity	See Certificate validity details, and RFC5280.	
Subject Public Key Info	Device public key and the algorithm shall be present.	
Key Usage	Shall be present and key usage bit for digital signature shall be set.	

332 Table 32 — Optional fields

Field	Description
Basic Constraints	If present, the CA value shall be FALSE in the leaf certificate.
Subject Alternative Name otherName	In some cases, it might be desirable to provide device specific information as part of the leaf certificate. DMTF chose the otherName field with a specific format to represent the device information. The use of the otherName field also provides flexibility for other alliances to provide device specific information as part of the leaf certificate. See the Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID. Note that otherName field formats specified by other standards are permissible in the certificate.
Extended Key Usage (EKU)	If present in a certificate, the Extended Key Usage extension indicates one or more purposes for which the public key should be used. See Extended Key Usage authentication OIDs.
SPDM Non-critical Certificate Extension	If present in a certificate, the SPDM Non-critical Certificate Extension indicates one or more non-critical OIDs associated with the certificate. See SPDM Non-Critical Certificate Extension OID.

333 Certificate validity details

As per RFC5280, the certificate validity period is the time interval during which the CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the certificate. The field is represented as an ASN.1-encoded SEQUENCE of two dates: the date when the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) and the date when the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) and the date when the certificate validity period ends (notAfter).

- 335 For a leaf certificate whose chain is stored in Slot 0, the notBefore date should be the date of certificate creation, and the notAfter date should be set to GeneralizedTime value 99991231235959Z. In general, immutable leaf certificates' notAfter dates should be set appropriately to ensure that the leaf certificate will not expire during the practical lifetime of the device.
- 336 For leaf certificates whose chains are stored in Slots 1-7, the notBefore date should be the date of certificate creation. The notAfter date can be set according to end user requirements, including values that will cause certificate expiration and necessitate certificate renewal, and thus device re-certification, during the lifetime of the device.
- 337 Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID shows the definition of otherName using the DMTF OID:

338 Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID

```
id-DMTF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 4 1 412 }
id-DMTF-spdm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-DMTF 274 }
DMTFOtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
   type-id DMTF-oid
   value [0] EXPLICIT ub-DMTF-device-info
}
-- OID for DMTF device info --
id-DMTF-device-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 4 1 412 274 1 }
DMTF-oid
                                     ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER (id-DMTF-device-info)
-- All printable characters except ":" --
DMTF-device-string
                                     ::= UTF8String (ALL EXCEPT ":")
-- Device Manufacturer --
DMTF-manufacturer
                                     ::= DMTF-device-string
-- Device Product --
DMTF-product
                                     ::= DMTF-device-string
-- Device Serial Number --
DMTF-serialNumber
                                     ::= DMTF-device-string
-- Device information string --
ub-DMTF-device-info
                                      ::= UTF8String({DMTF-manufacturer":"DMTF-product":"DMTF-
        serialNumber})
```

339 The Leaf certificate example shows an example leaf certificate.

340 10.8.2.1 Extended Key Usage authentication OIDs

- 341 The following Extended Key Usage purposes are defined for SPDM certificate authentication:
 - SPDM Responder Authentication { id-DMTF-spdm 3 }: The presence of this OID shall indicate that a leaf

certificate can be used for Responder authentication purposes.

- SPDM Requester Authentication { id-DMTF-spdm 4 }: The presence of this OID shall indicate that a leaf certificate can be used for Requester authentication purposes.
- 342 The presence of both OIDs shall indicate that the leaf certificate can be used for both Requester and Responder authentication purposes. If present, these OIDs shall appear in the leaf certificate.
- 343 A Responder device that supports mutual authentication should include the SPDM Responder Authentication OID in the Extended Key Usage field of its leaf certificate. A Requester device that supports mutual authentication should include the SPDM Requester Authentication OID in the Extended Key Usage field of its leaf certificate. Note that alternate OIDs specified by other standards are permissible in the certificate.

344 10.8.2.2 SPDM Non-Critical Certificate Extension OID

345 The id-DMTF-spdm-extension OID is a container of non-critical SPDM OIDs and their corresponding values. The OID value for id-DMTF-spdm-extension shall be { id-DMTF-spdm 6 }. Furthermore, this OID is a Certificate Extension as defined in RFC5280 and its encoding shall follow the Extension syntax also defined in RFC5280. The Extension syntax defines three parameters: extnID, critical and extnValue. The values of these three parameters for id-DMTF-spdm-extension shall be the DER encoding of the ASN.1 value as the DMTF SPDM Extension Format defines.

346 Definition of DMTF SPDM Extension Format

```
id-DMTF-spdm-extension Extension ::=
{
    extnID { id-DMTF-spdm 6 }
    critical FALSE
    extnValue id-spdm-cert-oids
}
id-spdm-cert-oids ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF id-spdm-cert-oid
id-spdm-cert-oid ::= SEQUENCE
{
    spdmOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    spdmOIDdefinition OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
```

- 347 The spdmOID field shall contain an OID defined in this specification. Only designated OIDs, permitted by this specification, shall be allowed in spdmOID. The spdmOIDdefinition field shall be a DER encoding of the ASN.1 value of the definition indicated by spdmOID.
- 348 These clauses describe the definitions and formats of the SPDM OIDs contained in id-DMTF-spdm-extension. If present, these OIDs shall only be contained in id-DMTF-spdm-extension.

349 10.8.2.2.1 Hardware identity OID

350 The id-DMTF-hardware-identity OID is defined to help identify the hardware identity certificate in a chain regardless

of the certificate chain model used (DeviceCert or AliasCert). If the AliasCert model is used, this OID shall not be present in any alias certificates in the chain. The id-DMTF-hardware-identity OID shall have a format as Hardware identity OID format defines.

351 Hardware identity OID format

352 10.8.2.2.2 Mutable certificate OID

353 Mutable certificates may include the id-DMTF-mutable-certificate OID to identify them as mutable. If used, this OID shall be present in all mutable certificates in the chain. The id-DMTF-mutable-certificate OID shall have a format as Mutable certificate OID format defines.

354 Mutable certificate OID format

³⁵⁵ 10.9 CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages

- 356 This request message shall authenticate a Responder through the challenge-response protocol.
- 357 Table 33 CHALLENGE request message format shows the CHALLENGE request message format.
- 358 Table 34 Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format shows the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format.
- 359 Table 35 Table 37 CHALLENGE_AUTH response attribute shows the CHALLENGE_AUTH response attribute.

360 Table 33 — CHALLENGE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x83 = CHALLENGE . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	Param1	1	SlotID . Slot number of the Responder certificate chain that shall be used for authentication. It shall be $0 \times FF$ if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment, otherwise the value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive.
3	Param2	1	 Type of measurement summary hash requested: ØxØ. No measurement summary hash requested. Øx1. <i>TCB</i> measurements only. ØxFF. All measurements. All other values reserved. If a Responder does not support measurements (MEAS_CAP=00b in CAPABILITIES response), the Requester shall set this value to 0x0.
4	Nonce	32	The Requester should choose a random value.

Table 34 — Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x03 = CHALLENGE_AUTH . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Response Attribute Field. See Table 35 — CHALLENGE_AUTH response attribute.
3	Param2	1	Slot mask. The bit in position K of this byte shall be set to 1b if and only if slot number K contains a certificate chain for the protocol version in the SPDMversion field. Bit 0 is the least significant bit of the byte. This field is reserved if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment.
4	CertChainHash	Н	Hash of the certificate chain, as Table 26 — Certificate chain format describes or public key (if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment) used for authentication. The Requester can use this value to check that the certificate chain or public key matches the one requested. This field shall be in Hash byte order.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
4 + H	Nonce	32	Responder-selected random value.
36 + H	MeasurementSummaryHash	Н	If the Responder does not support measurements (MEAS_CAP=00b in CAPABILITIES response) or requested Param2 = 0x0, this field shall be absent. If the requested Param2 = 0x1, this field shall be the combined hash of measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response, computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],)) Where MeasurementBlock[x] denotes a measurement of an element in the TCB. Measurements are concatenated in ascending order based on their measurement index as Table 42 — Measurement block format describes. When the requested Param2 = 0x1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0. If requested Param2 = 0xFF, this field shall be computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0], Measurement index range from 0x01 to 0xFE, concatenated in ascending index order. Indices with no associated measurements shall not be included in the hash calculation. See the Measurement index assignments clause. If the Responder supports both raw bit stream and digest representations for a given measurement index, then the Responder shall use the digest form. This field shall be in Hash byte order.
36 + 2H	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the <code>OpaqueData</code> field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be <code>0</code> if no <code>OpaqueData</code> is provided.
38 + 2H	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	The Responder can include Responder-specific information and/or information that its transport defines. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection .

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
38 + 2H + OpaqueDataLength	Signature	SigLen	SigLen is the size of the asymmetric-signing algorithm output that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester. The CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation and CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification clauses, respectively, define the signature generation and verification processes.

Table 35 — CHALLENGE_AUTH response attribute

Bit offset	Field	Description
[3:0]	SlotID	Shall contain the SlotID in the Param1 field of the corresponding CHALLENGE request. If the Responder's public key was provisioned to the Requester previously, this field shall be $@xF$. The Requester can use this value to check that the certificate matched what was requested.
[6:4]	Reserved	Reserved.
7	DEPRECATED: BasicMutAuthReq	DEPRECATED: When mutual authentication is supported by both Responder and Requester, the Responder shall set this bit to indicate the Responder wants to authenticate the identity of the Requester using the basic mutual authentication flow. The Requester shall not set this bit in a basic mutual authentication flow. See Basic mutual authentication flow. If mutual authentication is not supported, this bit shall be zero.

363 10.9.1 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation

- 364 To complete the CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation process, the Responder shall complete these steps:
 - The Responder shall construct M1 and the Requester shall construct M2 message transcripts. For Responder authentication, see the Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2 table. For Requester authentication in the mutual authentication scenario, see the Mutual authentication message transcript clause.
 - 366 where:
 - 367 Concatenate() is the standard concatenation function that is performed only after a successful completion response on the entire request and response contents.
 - 368 If a response contains ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady :
 - 369 Concatenation function is performed on the contents of both the original request and the successful response received during RESPOND_IF_READY. Neither the error response (ResponseNotReady) nor the RESPOND_IF_READY request shall be included in M1/M2.
 - 370 If a response contains an ErrorCode Other than ResponseNotReady :

- 371 No concatenation function is performed on the contents of both the original request and response.
- 372 2. The Responder shall generate:

Signature = SPDMsign(PrivKey, M1, "challenge_auth signing");


- 373 where:
 - SPDMsign is described in Signature generation.
 - PrivKey shall be the private key associated with the leaf certificate of the Responder in slot=Param1 of the CHALLENGE request message. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then PrivKey shall be the associated private key.

374 10.9.2 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification

- 375 Modifications to the previous request messages or the corresponding response messages by an active person-inthe-middle adversary or media error result in M2!=M1 and lead to verification failure.
- 376 To complete the CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification process, the Requester shall complete this step:
 - 377 1. The Requester shall perform:

result = SPDMsignatureVerify(PubKey, Signature, M2, "challenge_auth signing");

- 378 where:
 - SPDMsignatureVerify is described in Signature verification. When result is success, the verification was successful.
 - PubKey shall be the public key associated with the leaf certificate of the Responder with slot=Param1 of the CHALLENGE request message. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, PubKey is the provisioned public key.
- 379 Figure 10 Responder authentication: Runtime challenge-response flow shows the high-level request-response message flow and sequence for the authentication of the Responder for runtime challenge-response.
- 380 Figure 10 Responder authentication: Runtime challenge-response flow



382 10.9.2.1 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1 and M2

- 383 This clause applies to Responder-only authentication.
- 384 Table 36 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2 defines how the message transcript is constructed for M1 and M2, which are used in signature calculation and verification in the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message.
- 385 The possible request orderings leading up to and including CHALLENGE shall be:
 - GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS , GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE (A1, B1, C1)
 - GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, CHALLENGE (A1, B3, C1)
 - GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_CERTIFICATE, CHALLENGE (A1, B4, C1)
 - GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, CHALLENGE (A1, B2, C1)
 - GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE (A2, B1, C1)
 - GET_DIGESTS , CHALLENGE (A2, B3, C1)
 - GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE (A2, B4, C1)
 - CHALLENGE (A2, B2, C1)
- 386 Immediately after Reset, M1 and M2 shall be null.
- 387 After the Requester receives a successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response or the Requester sends a GET_MEASUREMENTS request, M1 and M2 shall be set to null. If a Negotiated State has been established, this will remain intact.
- 388 If a Requester sends a GET_VERSION message, the Requester and Responder shall set M1 and M2 to null, clear all Negotiated State and recommence construction of M1 and M2 starting with the new GET_VERSION message.
- 389 For additional rules, see General ordering rules.
- 390 Table 36 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2

Requests	Implementation conditions	M1/M2=Concatenate (A, B, C)
Initial value	N/A	M1/M2=null
GET_VERSION issued	Requester issues this request to allow the Requester and Responder to determine an agreed upon Negotiated State . Also issued if the Requester detects an out of sync condition, when the signature verification fails or when the Responder provides an unexpected error response.	M1/M2=null
GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS lssued	Requester shall always issue these requests in this order.	A1= VCA
GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS Skipped	Requester skipped issuing these requests after a Reset or a completed CHALLENGE_AUTH response, that caused M1/M2 to re-initialize to null , if the Responder has previously indicated CACHE_CAP=1 . In this case, the Requester and Responder shall proceed with the previously determined Negotiated State . These requests and responses are still required for M1/M2 construction.	A2= VCA
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE	Requester issued these requests in this order after NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request completion, or after a Reset or a completed CHALLENGE_AUTH response, that caused M1/M2 to re-initialize to null, if it chose to skip the previous three requests.	B1=Concatenate(GET_DIGESTS, DIGESTS, GET_CERTFICATE, CERTIFICATE)
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE skipped	Requester skipped both requests after a Reset or a completed CHALLENGE_AUTH response, that caused M1/M2 to re-initialize to null , because it could use previously cached certificate information.	B2=null
GET_DIGESTS issued, GET_CERTIFICATE skipped	Requester skipped GET_CERTIFICATE request after a Reset or a completed CHALLENGE_AUTH response, that caused M1/M2 to re-initialize to null because it could use the previously cached CERTIFICATE response.	B3=Concatenate(GET_DIGESTS, DIGESTS)
GET_DIGESTS Skipped, GET_CERTIFICATE issued	Requester skipped GET_DIGESTS request after a Reset or a completed CHALLENGE_AUTH response, that caused M1/M2 to re-initialize to null. The Requester uses the previously cached CERTIFICATE response for a byte-by-byte comparison.	B4=Concatenate(GET_CERTIFICATE, CERTIFICATE)
CHALLENGE issued	Requester issued this request to complete security verification of current requests and responses. The Signature bytes of CHALLENGE_AUTH shall not be included in C.	C1=Concatenate(CHALLENGE, CHALLENGE_AUTH(excluding Signature)) . See Table 33 — CHALLENGE request message format.


Requests	Implementation conditions	M1/M2=Concatenate (A, B, C)
CHALLENGE completion	Completion of <code>CHALLENGE</code> sets $M1/M2$ to <code>null</code> .	M1/M2=null
Other issued	If the Requester issued GET_MEASUREMENTS OR KEY_EXCHANGE OF FINISH OF PSK_EXCHANGE OF PSK_FINISH OF KEY_UPDATE OF HEARTBEAT OF GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST OF DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE OF END_SESSSION request(s) and skipped CHALLENGE completion, M1/ M2 are set to null.	M1/M2=null

391 The Basic mutual authentication flow is DEPRECATED. Implementations should use session-based mutual authentication as Figure 21 — Session-based mutual authentication example shows or optimized session-based mutual authentication as Figure 22 — Optimized session-based mutual authentication example shows.

392 DEPRECATED

393 10.9.3 Basic mutual authentication

- 394 Unless otherwise stated, if the Requester supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Responder in the CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages clause shall also apply to the Requester. Unless otherwise stated, if the Responder supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Requester in the CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages clause shall also apply to the Responder. These two statements essentially describe a role reversal, unless otherwise stated.
- 395 The basic mutual authentication flow shall start when the Requester successfully receives a CHALLENGE_AUTH with BasicMutAuthReq set. This flow shall utilize message encapsulation as described in GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages to retrieve request messages. The basic mutual authentication flow shall end when the encapsulated request flow ends.
- 396 This flow shall only allow GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE, CHALLENGE and their corresponding responses to be encapsulated. If other requests are encapsulated, the Requester can send an ERROR response with ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest and shall terminate the flow.
- 397 Figure 11 Mutual authentication basic flow illustrates, as an example, the basic mutual authentication flow.
- 398 Figure 11 Mutual authentication basic flow



400 10.9.3.1 Mutual authentication message transcript

401 This clause applies to the Responder authenticating the Requester in a basic mutual authentication scenario.

402 Table 37 — Basic mutual authentication message transcript defines how the message transcript is constructed for

M1 and M2, which are used in signature calculation and verification in the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message when the Responder authenticates the Requester.

- 403 The possible request orderings for the basic mutual authentication flow shall be one of the following (the Flow ID is in parenthesis):
 - GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE (BMAF0)
 - GET_DIGESTS , CHALLENGE (BMAF1)
 - GET_CERTIFICATE, CHALLENGE (BMAF2)
 - CHALLENGE (BMAF3)
- 404 When the basic mutual authentication flow starts, that is, when GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST is issued, M1 and M2 shall be set to null.
- 405 **Table 37 Basic mutual authentication message transcript**


Flow ID	M1/M2
BMAF0	Concatenate(vca , get_digests , digests , get_certificate , certificate , challenge , challenge_auth without the signature)
BMAF1	Concatenate(vca , get_digests , digests , challenge , challenge_auth without the signature)
BMAF2	Concatenate(vca , GET_CERTIFICATE , CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE , CHALLENGE_AUTH without the signature)
BMAF3	Concatenate(vca , CHALLENGE , CHALLENGE_AUTH without the signature)

- 406 For GET_CERTIFICATE and CERTIFICATE, these messages might need to be issued multiple times to retrieve the entire certificate chain. Thus, each instance of the request and response shall be part of M1/M2 in the order that they are issued.
- 407 DEPRECATED

⁴⁰⁸ **10.10** Firmware and other measurements

- 409 This clause describes request messages and response messages associated with endpoint measurement. All request messages in this clause shall be supported by an endpoint that returns MEAS_CAP=01b or MEAS_CAP=10b in CAPABILITIES response.
- 410 Figure 12 Measurement retrieval flow shows the high-level request-response flow and sequence for endpoint measurement. If MEAS_FRESH_CAP bit in the CAPABILITIES response message returns 0, and the Requester requires fresh measurements, the Responder shall be Reset before GET_MEASUREMENTS is resent. The mechanisms employed for Resetting the Responder are outside the scope of this specification.
- 411 Figure 12 Measurement retrieval flow





⁴¹³ 10.11 GET_MEASUREMENTS request and MEASUREMENTS response messages

- 414 Measurements in SPDM are represented in the form of measurement *blocks*. Measurement block defines the measurement block structure. A device can present measurements of different elements of its internal state, as well as metadata to assist in the attestation of its state via measurements, as separate blocks. The GET_MEASUREMENTS request message enables a Requester to query a Responder for the number of individual measurement blocks it supports, and request either specific blocks or all available blocks. The MEASUREMENTS response message returns the requested blocks. A collection of more than one measurement blocks is called a *measurement record*.
- 415 Because issuing GET_MEASUREMENTS clears the M1/M2 message transcript, it is recommended that a Requester does not send this message until it has received at least one successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message from the Responder. This ensures that the information in message pairs GET_DIGESTS / DIGESTS and GET_CERTIFICATE / CERTIFICATE has been authenticated at least once.
- 416 Table 38 GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format shows the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format.
- 417 Table 39 GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes shows the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message attributes.
- 418 Table 41 Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format shows the MEASUREMENTS response message format. The measurement blocks in MeasurementRecord shall be sorted in ascending order by index.
- 419 Table 38 GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xe0 = get_measurements . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	Param1	1	Request attributes. See Table 39 — GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes.
3	Param2	1	 Measurement operation. A value of ØxØ shall query the Responder for the total number of measurement blocks available. A value of ØxFF shall request all measurement blocks. A value between Øx1 and ØxFE, inclusively, shall request the measurement block at the index corresponding to that value.
4	Nonce	NL=32 OF NL=0	The Requester should choose a random value. This field is only present if Bit [0] of Param1 is 1. See Table 39 — GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes.
4 + NL	SlotIDParam	1	 This field is only present if Bit [0] of Param1 is 1. Bit [7:4]. Reserved. Bit [3:0]. SlotID. Slot number of the Responder certificate chain that shall be used for authenticating the measurement(s). If the Responder's public key was provisioned to the Requester previously, this field shall be ØxF. See Table 39 — GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes.

Table 39 — GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes

Bit offset	Field	Description
0	SignatureRequested	If the Responder can generate a signature (MEAS_CAP is 10b in the CAPABILITIES response and either BaseAsymSel or ExtAsymSelCount is non-zero) a value of 1 indicates that a signature on the measurement log (defined in MEASUREMENTS signature generation) is required. The Nonce field shall be present in the request when this bit is set. The Responder shall generate and send a signature in the response. A value of 0 indicates that the Requester does not require a signature. The Responder shall not generate a signature in the response. The Nonce field shall be absent in the request. For Responders that cannot generate a signature (MEAS_CAP is 01b in the CAPABILITIES response or both BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSelCount are zero) the Requester shall always use 0.

Bit offset	Field	Description
1	RawBitStreamRequested	This bit is applicable only if the measurement specification supports only two representations, raw bit stream and digest, such as when MeasurementSpecification of the Measurement block format is set to DMTF, as Table 42 — Measurement block format describes. If the measurement specification supports other representations, this bit is ignored. If the Responder can return either a raw bit stream or a hash for the requested measurement, value 1 shall request the Responder to return the raw bit stream version of such measurement. If the Responder cannot return raw bit stream for the measurement (for example, if the raw bit stream contains confidential data that the Responder cannot expose), it shall return the corresponding hash. Value @ shall request the Responder to return a hash version of the measurement. If the Responder cannot return hash of the measurement (for example, if the measurement represents a data structure where digest is not applicable), it shall return the corresponding raw bit stream.
[7:2]	Reserved	Reserved.

421 Measurement index assignments

This specification imposes no requirements on the scope, type or format of measurement a device associates with a particular measurement index in the range 0x1 to 0xEF. As a result, Responders can use the same index to report different types of measurements based on their implementation. If available, a Requester can use a measurement manifest to discover information about the specific measurement types available by a particular Responder and the indices to which they correspond. When measurements follow the DMTF measurement specification format that Table 43 — DMTF measurement specification format describes, a measurement with a DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[6:0] equal to 0x04 is the measurement manifest. If a Requester specifies a measurement index that a Responder does not support then the Responder shall respond with an ERROR message of ErrorCode=InvalidRequest .

423 To aid interoperability, this specification reserves indices @xF0 to @xFE inclusive for specific purposes. If a Responder supports a type of measurement that Table 40 — Measurement index assigned range defines, it shall always assign it to the corresponding index value. A Responder shall not assign indices @xF0 to @xFE to measurements of types other than those that Table 41 — Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format defines.

424 Table 40 — Measurement index assigned range

Measurement Index	Measurement type	Description
0xF0 - 0xFC	Reserved	Reserved.
ØxFD	Measurement manifest	Metadata on available measurements, as type DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[6:0] = 0x04 defines.

Measurement Index	Measurement type	Description
ØxFE	Device mode	Structured device mode information, as type
OXI E		DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[6:0] = 0x05 defines.

Table 41 — Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x60 = MEASUREMENTS . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	When Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this parameter shall return the total number of measurement indices on the device. Otherwise, this field is reserved.
3	Param2	1	 Bit [7:6]. Reserved. Bit [5:4]. content changed. If this message contains a signature, this field indicates if one or more MeasurementRecord fields of previous MEASUREMENTS responses in the same measurement log have changed. øøb : the Responder does not detect changes of MeasurementRecord fields of previous MEASUREMENTS responses in the same measurement log, or this message does not contain a signature. ø1b : the Responder detected that one or more MeasurementRecord fields of previous MEASUREMENTS responses in the measurement log being signed have changed. The Requester might consider issuing GET_MEASUREMENTS again to acquire latest measurements. 10b : the Responder detected no change in MeasurementRecord fields of previous MEASUREMENTS responses in the measurement log being signed. 11b : the Responder detected no change in MeasurementRecord fields of previous MEASUREMENTS responses in the measurement log being signed. 11b : the Responder detected no change in MeasurementRecord fields of previous MEASUREMENTS responses in the measurement log being signed. 11b : reserved. Bit [3:0]. SlotID . If this message contains a signature, this field contains the slot number of the certificate chain specified in the GET_MEASUREMENTS request, or ØxF if the Responder's public key was provisioned to the Requester previously. If this message does not contain a signature, this field shall be set to ØxØ .

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
4	NumberOfBlocks	1	Number of measurement blocks in the full MeasurementRecord . If Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this field shall be 0.
5	MeasurementRecordLength	3	Size of the full MeasurementRecord in bytes. If Param2 in the requested measurement operation is θ , this field shall be θ .
8	MeasurementRecordData	L= MeasurementRecordLength	Concatenation of all measurement blocks that correspond to the requested Measurement operation. Measurement block defines the measurement block structure.
8 + L	Nonce	32	The Responder should choose a random value. This field shall always be present.
40 + L	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be 0 if no OpaqueData is provided.
42 + L	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	The Responder can include Responder-specific information and/or information that its transport defines. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection .
42 + L + OpaqueDataLength	Signature	SigLen	Signature of the measurement log, excluding the Signature field and signed using the private key associated with the leaf certificate. The Responder shall use the asymmetric signing algorithm it selected during the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester, and SigLen is the size of that asymmetric signing algorithm output. This field is conditional and only present in the MEASUREMENTS response corresponding to a GET_MEASUREMENTS request with Param1[0] set to 1.

426 **10.11.1 Measurement block**

- 427 Each measurement block that the MEASUREMENTS response message defines shall contain a four-byte descriptor, offsets 0 through 3, followed by the measurement data that correspond to a particular measurement index and measurement type. The blocks are ordered by Index .
- 428 Table 42 Measurement block format shows the format for a measurement block:

429 Table 42 — Measurement block format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	Index	1	Index. When Param2 of GET_MEASUREMENTS request is between 0x1 and 0xFE, inclusive, this field shall match the request. Otherwise, this field shall represent the index of the measurement block, where the index starts at 1 and ends at the index of the last measurement block.
1	MeasurementSpecification	1	Bit mask. The value shall indicate the measurement specification that the requested Measurement follows and shall match the selected measurement specification in the ALGORITHMS message. See Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format. Only one bit shall be set. Bit 0: DMTF. If this bit is set, the format of data in the Measurement field is as specified in the DMTF measurement specification format that Table 43 — DMTF measurement specification format describes. All other bits are reserved.
2	MeasurementSize	2	Size of Measurement , in bytes.
4	Measurement	MeasurementSize	The MeasurementSpecification defines the format of this field.

430 10.11.1.1 DMTF specification for the Measurement field of a measurement block

- 431 The present clause is the specification for the format of the Measurement field in a measurement block when the MeasurementSpecification field's Bit 0 (DMTF) is set. Table 43 DMTF measurement specification format specifies this format.
- 432 The measurement manifest of DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType refers to a manifest that describes contents of other indexes. For example, the set of firmware modules running on the Responder can change at runtime. The measurement manifest tells the Requester which firmware modules' measurements are reported in this response and their indexes. The format of the measurement manifest is out of scope of this specification.

433 Table 43 — DMTF measurement specification format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType	1	 Composed of: Bit [7]. Indicates the representation in DMTFSpecMeasurementValue. Bit [6:0]. Indicates what is being measured by DMTFSpecMeasurementValue. These values are set independently and are interpreted as follows: [7]=0b. Digest. [7]=1b. Raw bit stream. The Responder should ensure the raw bit stream does not contain secrets. [6:0]=00h. Immutable ROM. [6:0]=00h. Mutable firmware. [6:0]=02h. Hardware configuration, such as straps. [6:0]=02h. Hardware configuration, such as configurable firmware policy. [6:0]=04h. Measurement manifest. When DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[6:0]=04h, the Responder should support setting DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7] to either 0b or 1b. [6:0]=05h. Structured representation of debug and device mode. See Device mode field of a measurement block. When DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[6:0]=05h, DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[6:0]=05h, DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7] shall be set to 1b. [6:0]=06h. Mutable firmware's version number. This specification does not mandate a format for firmware version number. When DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7] should be set to 1b. [6:0]=07h. Mutable firmware's security version number, which should be formatted as an 8-byte unsigned integer. When DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7] should be set to 1b. All other values reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
1	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize	2	Size of DMTFSpecMeasurementValue , in bytes. When DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7]=0b , the DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize shall be derived from the measurement hash algorithm that the ALGORITHM response message returns.
3	DMTFSpecMeasurementValue	MS	Cryptographic hash or raw bit stream, as indicated in DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7]. For cryptographic hashes or digests, this field shall be in Hash byte order. The vendor defines the byte order for raw bit streams.

434 10.11.1.2 Device mode field of a measurement block

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	OperationalModeCapabilities	4	 Fields with bits set to 1 indicate support for reporting the associated state in OperationalModeState. Bit [0]. Indicates support for reporting device in manufacturing mode. Bit [1]. Indicates support for reporting device in validation mode. Bit [2]. Indicates support for reporting device in normal operational mode. Bit [3]. Indicates support for reporting device in recovery mode. Bit [4]. Indicates support for reporting device in Return Merchandise Authorization (RMA) mode. Bit [5]. Indicates support for reporting device in Return Merchandise Authorization (RMA) mode. Bit [5]. Indicates support for reporting device in decommissioned mode.
4	OperationalModeState	4	 Fields with bits set to 1 indicate true for the reported state. Bit [0]. Indicates the device is in manufacturing mode. Bit [1]. Indicates the device is in validation mode. Bit [2]. Indicates the device is in normal operational mode. Bit [3]. Indicates the device is in recovery mode. Bit [4]. Indicates the device is in RMA mode. Bit [5]. Indicates the device is in decommissioned mode. All other values reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
8	DeviceModeCapabilities	4	 Fields with bits set to 1 indicate support for reporting the associated state in <u>DeviceModeState</u>. Bit [0]. Indicates support for reporting non-invasive debug mode is active. Bit [1]. Indicates support for reporting invasive debug mode is active. Bit [2]. Indicates support for reporting non-invasive debug mode has been active this Reset cycle. Bit [3]. Indicates support for reporting invasive debug mode has been active this Reset cycle. Bit [4]. Indicates support for reporting invasive debug mode has been active this Reset cycle. Bit [4]. Indicates support for reporting invasive debug mode has been active on this device at least once since exiting manufacturing mode. All other values reserved.
12	DeviceModeState	4	 Fields with bits set to 1 indicate true for the reported state. Bit [0]. Indicates non-invasive debug mode is active. Bit [1]. Indicates invasive debug mode is active. Bit [2]. Indicates non-invasive debug mode has been active this Reset cycle. Bit [3]. Indicates invasive debug mode has been active this Reset cycle. Bit [4]. Indicates invasive debug mode has been active this device at least once since exiting manufacturing mode. All other values reserved.

435 10.11.2 MEASUREMENTS signature generation

- 436 While a Requester can opt to require a signature in each of the request-response messages, it is advisable that the cost of the signature generation process is minimized by amortizing it over multiple request-response messages where applicable. In this scheme, the Requester issues a number of requests without requiring signatures followed by a final request requiring a signature over the entire set of request-response messages exchanged. The steps to complete this scheme are as follows:
 - 437 1. The Responder shall construct measurement log L1 and the Requester shall construct measurement log L2 over their observed messages:

L1/L2 = Concatenate(`VCA`, GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1, ..., GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1, GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn)

438 where:

- Concatenate is the standard concatenation function.
- GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1 is the entire first GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has not requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.
- MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1 is the entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1.
- GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1 is the entire last consecutive GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has not requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.
- MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1 is the entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1.
- GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn is the entire first GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request. *n* is a number greater than or equal to 1. When *n* equals 1, the Requester has not made any GET_MEASUREMENTS requests without signature prior to issuing a GET_MEASUREMENTS request with signature.
- MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEN is the entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTN .
- 439 Any communication between Requester and Responder other than a GET_MEASUREMENTS request or response re-initializes L1/L2 computation to null. The GET_MEASUREMENTS requests and MEASUREMENTS responses before the L1/L2 re-initialization will not be covered by the signature in the final MEASUREMENTS response. Consequently, it is recommended that the Requester not use the measurements before verifying the signature.
- 440 An error response with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady Or ErrorCode=LargeResponse shall not re-initialize L1/L2 - Requester and Responder shall continue to construct L1/L2 with GET_MEASUREMENTS and MEASUREMENTS . An error response with any error code other than ResponseNotReady Or LargeResponse shall re-initialize L1/L2 to null.
- 441 2. The Responder shall generate:

Signature = SPDMsign(PrivKey, L1, "measurements signing");

442 where:


- SPDMsign is described in Signature generation.
- PrivKey shall be the private key of the Responder associated with the leaf certificate stored in SlotID of SlotIDParam in GET_MEASUREMENTS. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then PrivKey shall be the associated private key.

443 **10.11.3 MEASUREMENTS signature verification**

- 444 To complete the MEASUREMENTS signature verification process, the Requester shall complete this step:
 - 445 1. The Requester shall perform:

result = SPDMsignatureVerify(PubKey, Signature, L2, "measurements signing")

- 446 where:
 - SPDMsignatureVerify is described in Signature verification. A successful verification is when result is success.
 - PubKey shall be the public key associated with the leaf certificate stored in SlotID of SlotIDParam in GET_MEASUREMENTS. PubKey is extracted from the CERTIFICATE response. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then PubKey shall be the provisioned public key.
- Figure 13 Measurement signature computation example shows an example of a typical Requester Responder protocol where the Requester issues 1 to *n*-1 GET_MEASUREMENTS requests without a signature, followed by a single GET_MEASUREMENTS request *n* with a signature.
- 448 Figure 13 Measurement signature computation example



⁴⁵⁰ **10.12 ERROR response message**

- 451 For an SPDM operation that results in an error, the Responder should send an **ERROR** response message to the Requester.
- 452 Table 44 ERROR response message format shows the ERROR response format.
- 453 Table 45 Error code and error data shows the detailed error code, error data, and extended error data.
- 454 Table 46 ResponseNotReady extended error data shows the ResponseNotReady extended error data.
- 455 Table 47 Registry or standards body ID shows the registry or standards body ID.
- 456 Table 48 ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message shows the ExtendedErrorData format definition for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message.
- 457 Table 44 ERROR response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as SPDM version describes.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x7F = ERROR . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	Param1	1	Error code. See Table 45 — Error code and error data.
3	Param2	1	Error data. See Table 45 — Error code and error data.
4	ExtendedErrorData	0-32	Optional extended data. See Table 45 — Error code and error data.

458 **Table 45 — Error code and error data**

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
Reserved	0x00	Reserved.	Reserved	Reserved
InvalidRequest	0x01	One or more request fields are invalid	0×00	No extended error data is provided.
Reserved	0x02	Reserved.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
Busy	0x03	The Responder received the request message and the Responder decided to ignore the request message, but the Responder might be able to process the request message if the request message is sent again in the future.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
UnexpectedRequest	0x04	The Responder received an unexpected request message. For example, CHALLENGE before NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS .	0×00	No extended error data is provided.
Unspecified	0x05	Unspecified error occurred.	0×00	No extended error data is provided.
DecryptError	0x06	The receiver cannot decrypt or verify data during the session.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
UnsupportedRequest	0x07	The RequestResponseCode in the request message is unsupported.	RequestResponseCode in the request message.	No extended error data is provided

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
RequestInFlight	0x08	The Responder has delivered an encapsulated request to which it is still waiting for the response.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
InvalidResponseCode	0x09	The Requester delivered an invalid response for an encapsulated response.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
SessionLimitExceeded	0x0A	Maximum number of concurrent sessions reached.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
SessionRequired	0x0B	The Request message received by the Responder is only allowed within a session.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
ResetRequired	0x0C	The device requires a reset to complete the requested operation. This ErrorCode can be sent in response to the GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , GET_CSR or SET_CERTIFICATE message.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
ResponseTooLarge	0x0D	 Used in the following scenarios. The response is greater than the MaxSPDMmsgSize of the requesting SPDM endpoint. The CHUNK_CAP of the requesting endpoint is 0 and the response is larger than the size of the transmit buffer of the responding SPDM endpoint The CHUNK_CAP of the requesting endpoint is 1, the CHUNK_CAP of the responding endpoint is 0, and the response is larger than the DataTransferSize of the requesting endpoint. 	Reserved	See Table 49 — ExtendedErrorData format for ResponseTooLarge.
RequestTooLarge	0x0E	The request is greater than the MaxSPDMmsgSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint.	Reserved	Reserved
LargeResponse	0x0F	The response is greater than DataTransferSize and less than or equal to MaxSPDMmsgSize of the requesting SPDM endpoint, or greater than the transmit buffer size of the responding SPDM endpoint.	Reserved	See Table 50 — ExtendedErrorData format for LargeResponse.

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
MessageLost	0x10	The SPDM message is lost. For example, this error code can be used to indicate a Large Request, Large Response or the request in a ResponseNotReady has been lost.	Reserved	Reserved
Reserved	0x11 - 0x40	Reserved.	Reserved	Reserved
VersionMismatch	0x41	Requested SPDM version is not supported or is a different version from the selected version.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
ResponseNotReady	0x42	See the RESPOND_IF_READY request message format.	0x00	See Table 46 — ResponseNotReady extended error data.
RequestResynch	0x43	Responder is requesting Requester to reissue GET_VERSION to re- synchronize. An example is following a firmware update.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Reserved	0x44 - 0xFE	Reserved.	Reserved	Reserved
Vendor or Standard Defined	0xFF	Vendor or standard defined	values in the ID	See Table 48 — ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message for format definition.

459 Table 46 — ResponseNotReady extended error data

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RDTExponent	1	Exponent expressed in logarithmic (base 2 scale) to calculate RDT time in µs after which the Responder can provide successful completion response. For example, the raw value 8 indicates that the Responder will be ready in 2 ⁸ =256 µs. Requester should use RDT to avoid continuous pinging and issue the RESPOND_IF_READY request message, as Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows, after RDT time. For timing requirement details, see Table 7 — Timing specification for SPDM messages.
1	RequestCode	1	The request code that triggered this response.
2	Token	1	The opaque handle that the Requester shall pass in with the RESPOND_IF_READY request message, as Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows. The Responder can use the value in this field to provide the correct response when the Requester issues a RESPOND_IF_READY request.
3	RDTM	1	Multiplier used to compute wT Max in µs to indicate that the response might be dropped after this delay. The multiplier shall always be greater than 1. The Responder might also stop processing the initial request if the same Requester issues a different request. For timing requirement details, see Table 7 — Timing specification for SPDM messages.

460 Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID

461 For algorithm encoding in extended algorithm fields, unless otherwise specified, consult the respective registry or standards body.

ID	Vendor ID length (bytes)	Registry or standards body name	Description
0x0	0	DMTF	DMTF does not have a Vendor ID registry.

ID	Vendor ID length (bytes)	Registry or standards body name	Description
0x1	2	TCG	VendorID is identified by using TCG Vendor ID Registry. For extended algorithms, see TCG Algorithm Registry.
0x2	2	USB	VendorID is identified by using the vendor ID assigned by USB.
0x3	2	PCI-SIG	VendorID is identified using PCI-SIG Vendor ID.
0x4	4	IANA	The Private Enterprise Number (PEN) assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) identifies the vendor.
0x5	4	HDBaseT	VendorID is identified by using HDBaseT HDCD entity.
0x6	2	MIPI	The Manufacturer ID assigned by MIPI identifies the vendor.
0x7	2	CXL	VendorID is identified by using CXL vendor ID.
0x8	2	JEDEC	VendorID is identified by using JEDEC vendor ID.
0x9	0	VESA	For fields and formats defined by the VESA standards body, there is no Vendor ID registry.

462 Table 48 — ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	Len	1	Length of the VendorID field. If the vendor defines the error, the value of this field shall equal the Vendor ID Len , as Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID describes, of the corresponding registry or standard body name. If a registry or a standard defines the error, this field shall be zero (0), which also indicates that the VendorID field is not present. The Error Data field in the ERROR message indicates the registry or standards body name (that is, Param2), and is one of the values in the ID column in Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID.
1	Vendor ID	Len	The value of this field shall indicate the Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID describes the length of this field. Shall be in little endian format. The registry or standards body name in the ERROR is indicated in the Error Data field (that is, Param2), and is one of the values in the ID column in Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID.
1 + Len	OpaqueErrorData	Variable	The vendor or standards define this value.

463 Table 49 — ExtendedErrorData format for ResponseTooLarge

Byte offset	Field	size (bytes)	Description
0	ActualSize	4	The size of the actual response.

464 Table 50 — ExtendedErrorData format for LargeResponse

0 Handle 1 Response and the same large The value of the monotonically decrease with expectation the maximum or	ique value that identifies the Large SPDM d shall be the same value for all chunks of ge SPDM message. this field should either entirely y increase or entirely monotonically h each large SPDM message and with the hat it will wrap around after reaching the minimum value, respectively, of this field. _GET request and CHUNK_RESPONSE

465 **10.12.1 Standard body or vendor-defined header**

466 This specification uses the format that Table 51 — Standard body or vendor-defined header (SVH) describes to help identify the entity that defines the format for a given payload. The clauses in the other parts of this specification indicate to which payload this header applies. Note, if the payload format in question is defined by a standards body, the SVH header does not require the use of the VendorID field. Instead, the ID field would be set to the ID of the standards body, VendorIDLen would be set to 0, and VendorID would be absent. A standards body, registry, or vendor that defines a payload format should also define the values to use in the SVH header.


467 Table 51 — Standard body or vendor-defined header (SVH)

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	ID	1	Shall be one of the values in the ID column of Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID.
1	VendorIDLen	1	Length in bytes of the VendorID field. If the format of the given payload is specified by a standards body or registry itself, this field shall be 0. Otherwise, if the format of the given payload is specified by an organization that is identified on the vendor ID list indicated in the ID field, this field shall be the length indicated in the "Vendor ID length" column of Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID for the respective ID.
2	VendorID	VendorIDLen	If VendorIDLen is greater than zero, this field shall be the ID of the vendor corresponding to the ID field. Otherwise, this field shall be absent.

⁴⁶⁸ **10.13 RESPOND_IF_READY request message format**

- 469 This request message shall ask for the response to the original request upon receipt of **ResponseNotReady** error code. If the response to the original request is ready, the Responder shall return that response message. If the response to the original request is not ready, the Responder shall return the **ERROR** response message, set **ErrorCode = ResponseNotReady** and return the same token as the previous **ResponseNotReady** response message.
- 470 Figure 14 RESPOND_IF_READY flow leading to completion shows the RESPOND_IF_READY flow:
- 471 **Figure 14 RESPOND_IF_READY flow leading to completion**

472



473 Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format shows the RESPOND_IF_READY request message format.

474 Table 52 — RESPOND_IF_READY request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	<pre>0xFF = RESPOND_IF_READY . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.</pre>
2	Param1	1	The original request code that triggered the ResponseNotReady error code response. Shall match the request code returned as part of the ResponseNotReady extended error data.
3	Param2	1	The token that was returned as part of the ResponseNotReady extended error data.

⁴⁷⁵ **10.14 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message**

- 476 A Requester intending to define a unique request to meet its need can use this request message. Table 53 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format defines the format.
- 477 The Requester should send this request message only after sending GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request sequence.
- 478 If the vendor intends that these messages are to be used before a session has been established, and the vendor

wishes to have the requests authenticated, then the vendor shall indicate how the transcript and/or message transcript are changed to add the vendor-defined commands.

479 Table 53 — VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format shows the VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format.

480 Table 53 — VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	ØxFE = VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	StandardID	2	Shall indicate the registry or standards body by using one of the values in the ID column in Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID.
6	Len	1	Length of the Vendor ID field. If the VendorDefinedRequest is standard defined, Len shall be 0. If the VendorDefinedRequest is vendor- defined, Len shall equal Vendor ID Len, as Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID describes.
7	VendorID	Len	Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Shall be in little endian format.
7 + Len	ReqLength	2	Length of the VendorDefinedReqPayload .
7 + Len + 2	VendorDefinedReqPayload	ReqLength	The standard or vendor shall use this field to send the request payload.

481 Other DMTF specifications may define VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST with StandardID set to 0. See VendorDefinedReqPayload and VendorDefinedRespPayload defined by DMTF specifications for more information.

⁴⁸² **10.15 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message**

483 A Responder can use this response message in response to VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST. Table 54 — VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format defines the format.

484 Table 54 — VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x7E = VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	StandardID	2	Shall indicate the registry or standard body using one of the values in the ID column in Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID.
6	Len	1	Length of the Vendor ID field. If the VendorDefinedRequest is standards-defined, length shall be 0. If the VendorDefinedRequest is vendor- defined, length shall equal Vendor ID Len, as Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID describes.
7	VendorID	Len	Shall indicate the Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Shall be in little endian format.
7 + Len	RespLength	2	Length of the VendorDefinedRespPayload
7 + Len + 2	VendorDefinedRespPayload	RespLength	Standard or vendor shall use this value to send the response payload.

⁴⁸⁵ 10.15.1 VendorDefinedReqPayload and VendorDefinedRespPayload defined by DMTF specifications

- 486 Other DMTF specifications may define VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST and VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE messages with StandardID set to 0 ("DMTF", as defined in Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID) and Len set to 0. In this case, VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST and VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE messages shall specify the underlying DMTF specification that defines them. A DMTF specification which defines the data model of VendorDefinedReqPayload for VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST and the data model of VendorDefinedRespPayload for VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE shall follow Table 55 — Format of VendorDefinedReqPayload and VendorDefinedRespPayload when StandardID is DMTF.
- 487 Table 55 Format of VendorDefinedReqPayload and VendorDefinedRespPayload when StandardID is DMTF

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	DSPNumber	2	Shall be the DMTF specification's DSP number in a 16-bit integer. For example, DSP0287 would use 0x011F.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	DSPVersion	2	Shall be the version number of the DMTF specification whose DSP number is populated in the DSPNumber field. The format of the version number shall follow Table 10 — VersionNumberEntry definition.
4	VendorPayload	Variable	Shall be the actual payload data defined by the DMTF specification whose DSP number is populated in the DSPNumber field.

⁴⁸⁸ **10.16 KEY_EXCHANGE request and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response** messages

- 489 This request message shall initiate a handshake between Requester and Responder intended to authenticate the Responder (or optionally both parties), negotiate cryptographic parameters (in addition to those negotiated in the last NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS / ALGORITHMS exchange), and establish shared keying material. Table 56 — KEY_EXCHANGE request message format shows the KEY_EXCHANGE request message format and Table 58 — Successful KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format shows the KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format. The handshake is completed by the successful exchange of the FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages, presented in the next clause, and depends on the tight coupling between the two request/response message pairs.
- 490 The Requester and Responder pair can support two modes of handshakes. If HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP is set in both the Requester and the Responder all SPDM messages exchanged during the Session Handshake Phase are sent in the clear (outside of a secure session). Otherwise both the Requester and the Responder use encryption and/ or message authentication during the Session Handshake Phase using the Handshake secret derived at the completion of KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP message for subsequent message communication until FINISH_RSP message completion.
- 491 Figure 15 Responder authentication key exchange example shows an example of a Responder authentication key exchange:
- 492 Figure 15 Responder authentication key exchange example





Figure 16 — Responder authentication multiple key exchange example shows an example of multiple sessions using two independent sets of root session keys that coexist at the same time. When HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP = 0 for both Requester and Responder, the specification does not require a specific temporal relationship between the second KEY_EXCHANGE request message and the first FINISH_RSP response message. However, to simplify implementation, a Responder might respond with an ERROR message of ErrorCode=Busy to the second KEY_EXCHANGE request message until the first FINISH_RSP response message is complete. If the handshake is performed in the clear (that is, if HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP = 1 for both Requester and Responder), a Requester shall not send a second KEY_EXCHANGE request message until the first FINISH_RSP response message is received. A Responder shall respond with an ERROR message of ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest if it receives a second KEY_EXCHANGE request message before the first FINISH request is received.



496



- 497 The handshake includes an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) key exchange in which the Requester and Responder each generate an ephemeral (that is, temporary) Diffie-Hellman key pair and exchange the public keys of those key pairs in the ExchangeData fields of the KEY_EXCHANGE request message and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message. The Responder generates a DHE secret by using the private key of the DHE key pair of the Responder and the public key of the DHE key pair of the Requester provided in the KEY_EXCHANGE request message. Similarly, the Requester generates a DHE secret by using the private key of the DHE key pair of the Requester and the public key of the DHE key pair of the Responder provided in the KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message. The DHE secrets are computed as specified in clause 7.4 of RFC8446. Assuming that the public keys were received correctly, both the Requester and Responder generate identical DHE secrets from which session secrets are generated.
- 498 Diffie-Hellman group parameters are determined by the DHE group in use, which is selected in the most recent ALGORITHMS response. The contents of the ExchangeData field are computed as specified in clause 4.2.8 of RFC8446. Specifically, if the DHE key exchange is based on finite-fields (FFDHE), the ExchangeData field in KEY_EXCHANGE and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP shall contain the computed public value (Y = g^X mod p) for the specified group (see Table 15 — DHE structure for group definitions) encoded as a big-endian integer and padded to the left

with zeros to the size of p in bytes. If the key exchange is based on elliptic curves (ECDHE), the ExchangeData field in KEY_EXCHANGE and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP shall contain the serialization of X and Y, which are the binary representations of the x and y values respectively in network byte order, padded on the left by zeros if necessary. The size of each number representation occupies as many octets as implied by the curve parameters selected. Specifically, X is [0: C - 1] and Y is [C : D - 1], where C and D are determined by the group (see Table 15 — DHE structure).

- 499 For SM2_P256 key exchange, an additional identifier, ID_A and ID_B, that the GB/T 32918.3-2016 specification defines, is needed to derive the shared secret. If this algorithm is selected, the ID for the Requester (that is, ID_A) shall be the concatenation of "Requester-KEP-dmtf-spdm-v" and SPDMversionString . Likewise, the ID for the Responder shall be the concatenation of "Responder-KEP-dmtf-spdm-v" and SPDMversionString .
- 500 A Requester should generate a fresh DHE key pair for each KEY_EXCHANGE request message that the Requester sends. A Responder should generate a fresh DHE key pair for each KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message that the Responder sends.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	ØxE4 = KEY_EXCHANGE . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	 Type of measurement summary hash requested: 0x0 : No measurement summary hash requested. 0x1 : TCB measurements only. 0xFF : All measurements. All other values reserved. If a Responder does not support measurements (MEAS_CAP=00b in CAPABILITIES response), the Requester shall set this value to 0x0.
3	Param2	1	SlotID . Slot number of the Responder certificate chain that shall be used for authentication. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive. It shall be $ ext{exc}$ if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester previously.
4	ReqSessionID	2	Two-byte Requester contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).

501 **Table 56 — KEY_EXCHANGE request message format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
6	SessionPolicy	1	See Table 57 — Session policy.
7	Reserved	1	Reserved.
8	RandomData	32	Requester-provided random data.
40	ExchangeData	D	DHE public information generated by the Requester. If the DHE group selected in the most recent ALGORITHMS response is finite-field-based (FFDHE), the ExchangeData represents the computed public value. If the selected DHE group is elliptic curve- based (ECDHE), the ExchangeData represents the X and Y values in network byte order. Specifically, X is [0: C - 1] and Y is [C : D – 1]. In both cases the size of D (and C for ECDHE) is derived from the selected DHE group.
40 + D	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be 0 if no OpaqueData is provided.
42 + D	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	If present, OpaqueData sent by the Requester. Used to indicate any parameters that Requester wishes to pass to the Responder as part of key exchange. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection.

502

Table 57 — Session policy

Bit offset	Field	Description
0	TerminationPolicy	This field specifies the behavior of the Responder when the Responder completes a runtime code or configuration update which affects the hardware or firmware measurement of the Responder. The Requester selects the value. If not set, the Responder shall terminate the session when the runtime update has taken effect. If set, the Responder shall decide whether to terminate or continue with the session based on its own policy. A policy example is one where the Responder terminates the session whenever an update to configuration or runtime code changes the security version of the firmware that manages SPDM sessions. The policy of the Responder is outside the scope of this specification. To terminate a session, the Responder shall respond with ErrorCode=RequestResynch to any SPDM request received within the session, or silently discard any request received within the session, until a GET_VERSION request is received.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved

503 Table 58 — Successful KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x64 = KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	HeartbeatPeriod The value of this field shall be zero if Heartbeat is not supported by one of the endpoints. Otherwise, the value shall be in units of seconds. Zero is a legal value if Heartbeat is supported, but means that a heartbeat is not desired on this session.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RspSessionID	2	Two-byte Responder contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	MutAuthRequested	1	 Bit 0 - If set, the Responder is requesting to authenticate the Requester (Session-based mutual authentication) without using the encapsulated request flow. Bit 1 - If set, Responder is requesting Session-based mutual authentication with the encapsulated request flow. Bit 2 - If set, Responder is requesting Session-based mutual authentication with the encapsulated request flow. Bit 2 - If set, Responder is requesting Session-based mutual authentication with an implicit GET_DIGESTS request. The Responder and Requester shall follow the optimized encapsulated request flow. Bit [7:3] - Reserved. At most one bit of Bit 0, Bit 1, or Bit 2 shall be set. For encapsulated request flow and the optimized encapsulated request flow details, see the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages clause.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
7	SlotIDParam	1	Bit [7:4]. Reserved. Bit [3:0]. SlotID . Slot number of the Requester certificate chain that shall be used for mutual authentication, if MutAuthRequested Bit 0 is set. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive, or ØxF if the public key of the Requester was provisioned to the Responder through other means. All other values Reserved. For any other value of MutAuthRequested this field shall be set to Ø and ignored by the Requester.
8	RandomData	32	Responder-provided random data.
40	ExchangeData	D	DHE public information generated by the Responder. If the DHE group selected in the most recent ALGORITHMS response is finite-field-based (FFDHE), the ExchangeData represents the computed public value. If the selected DHE group is elliptic curve- based (ECDHE), the ExchangeData represents the X and Y values in network byte order. Specifically, X is [0: C - 1] and Y is $[C : D - 1]$. In both cases the size of D (and C for ECDHE) is derived from the selected DHE group.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
40 + D	MeasurementSummaryHash	H	If the Responder does not support measurements (MEAS_CAP=00b in CAPABILITIES response) or requested Param1 = 0x0, this field shall be absent. If the requested Param1 = 0x1, this field shall be the combined hash of measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response, computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],)) where MeasurementBlock[x] denotes a measurement of an element in the TCB. Measurements are concatenated in ascending order based on their measurement index as Table 42 — Measurement block format describes. When the requested Param1 = 0x1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0. If requested Param1 = 0xFF, this field shall be computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0]) of all supported measurements available in the measurement index range 0x01 - 0xFE, concatenated in ascending index order. Indices with no associated measurements shall not be included in the hash calculation. See the Measurement index assignments clause. If the Responder supports both raw bit stream and digest representations for a given measurement index, then the Responder shall use the digest form. This field shall be in Hash byte order.
40 + D + H	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the <code>OpaqueData</code> field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be <code>0</code> if no <code>OpaqueData</code> is provided.
42 + D + H	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	If present, opaqueData sent by the Responder. Used to indicate any parameters that the Responder wishes to pass to the Requester as part of key exchange. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection .

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
42 + D + H + OpaqueDataLength	Signature	SigLen	Signature over the transcript. SigLen is the size of the asymmetric signing algorithm output the Responder selected via the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester. The Transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature defines the construction of the transcript.
42 + D + H + OpaqueDataLength + SigLen	ResponderVerifyData	Н	Conditional field. If the Session Handshake Phase is encrypted and/or message authenticated, then this field shall be of length H and it shall equal the HMAC of the transcript hash, using finished_key as the secret key and using the negotiated hash algorithm as the hash function. The transcript hash shall be the hash of the transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC as Transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC shows. The finished_key shall be derived from the Response Direction Handshake Secret and is described in the finished_key derivation clause. HMAC is described in RFC2104. If both the Requester and Responder set HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP to 1, then this field shall be absent.

504 10.16.1 Session-based mutual authentication

- 505 Mutual authentication for KEY_EXCHANGE occurs in the session handshake phase of a session.
- 506 To perform authentication of a Requester, the Responder sets the appropriate bit in the MutAuthRequested field of the KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP message. When either Bit 1 or Bit 2 of MutAuthRequested are set, the encapsulated request flow or the optimized encapsulated request flow shall be used accordingly to enable the Responder to obtain the certificate chains and certificate chain digests of the Requester. For flow details and illustrations, see GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages.
- 507 When either bit 1 or bit 2 of MutAuthRequested are set, the only allowed messages in this phase of the session shall be GET_DIGESTS, DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE, CERTIFICATE and ERROR. If the Requester receives other requests during this flow, the Requester can respond with an ERROR message using ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest and shall terminate the session.
- 508 If Bit 0 of MutAuthRequested is set, then mutual authentication shall be performed without exchanging any messages between KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP and FINISH request. This is useful for Responders that have obtained a Requester's certificate chains in a previous interaction.

509 10.16.1.1 Specify Requester certificate for session-based mutual authentication

- 510 The SPDM key exchange protocol is optimized to perform key exchange with the least number of messages exchanged. When Responder-only authentication, or mutual authentication where the Responder has obtained the certificate chains of the Requester in a previous interaction is performed, key exchange is carried out with two request/response message pairs (KEY_EXCHANGE, KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP, FINISH and FINISH_RSP). In other cases where mutual authentication is desired, additional encapsulated messages are exchanged between KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP and FINISH to enable the Responder to obtain the certificate chains and certificate chain digests of the Requester. However, in all cases the certificate chain (or raw public key) the Requester should authenticate against is specified by the Responder via the SlotID field in KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP, which precedes the aforementioned encapsulated messages. This means that a Responder authenticating a Requester whose certificates it has not obtained in a previous interaction, using a slot other than the default (Slot 0), has no way of knowing in advance which SlotID value to use.
- 511 To address this case, the Responder explicitly designates the certificate chain to be used via the final ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK request issued inside the encapsulated request flow. Specifically, if either Bit 1 or 2 in MutAuthRequested is set to 1, the Responder shall use a ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK request with Param2 = 0x02 and an 1-byte long Encapsulated Request field containing the SlotID value. The Requester shall use the certificate chain corresponding to the slot specified in the Encapsulated Request field.
- 512 If Bit 0 of MutAuthRequested is set, then no encapsulated messages are exchanged after KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP and the certificate chain of the Requester is determined by the value of SlotIDParam in KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP.

⁵¹³ **10.17 FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages**

514 This request message shall complete the handshake between Requester and Responder initiated by a KEY_EXCHANGE request. The purpose of the FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages is to provide key confirmation, bind the identity of each party to the exchanged keys and protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker. Table 59 — FINISH request message format shows the FINISH request message format and Table 60 — Successful FINISH_RSP response message format shows the FINISH_RSP response message format.

515 Table 59 — FINISH request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE5 = FINISH . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Bit 0 – If set, the Signature field is included. This bit shall be set when Session-based mutual authentication occurs. All other bits reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	Param2	1	SlotID . Only valid if Param1 = 0×01 , otherwise reserved. Slot number of the Requester certificate chain that shall be authenticated in Signature field. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive. It shall be $0 \times FF$ if the public key of the Requester was provisioned to the Responder through other means.
4	Signature	SigLen	Signature over the transcript. SigLen is the size of the asymmetric signing algorithm (ReqBaseAsymAlg) output the Responder selected via the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester. If Param1 = 0x00, SigLen is zero and this field shall not be present. Transcript for FINISH signature, mutual authentication defines the construction of the transcript, signature generation, and verification.
4+ SigLen	RequesterVerifyData	Н	Shall be an HMAC of the transcript hash using the finished_key as the secret key and using the negotiated hash algorithm as the hash function. For mutual authentication, the transcript hash shall be the hash of the transcript for FINISH HMAC, mutual authentication as Transcript for FINISH HMAC, mutual authentication shows. Otherwise, it shall be the hash of the transcript for FINISH HMAC, Responder-only authentication as Transcript for FINISH HMAC, Responder-only authentication shows. The finished_key shall be derived from Request Direction Handshake Secret and is described in the finished_key derivation clauses. HMAC is described in RFC2104.

- 516 The following clause applies when the handshake is performed in the clear, that is, when both Requester and Responder have set HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP to 1:
- 517 If KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP.MutAuthRequested equals either 0x02 or 0x04, upon receiving FINISH the Responder shall confirm that the value in FINISH.Param2 matches the value that the Responder specified in the final ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK.EncapsulatedRequest .

518 Table 60 — Successful FINISH_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x65 = FINISH_RSP . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	ResponderVerifyData	Н	Conditional field. If the Session Handshake Phase is encrypted and/or message authenticated (that is, if either the Requester or the Responder set HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP to 0), this field shall be absent. If both the Requester and Responder support HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP field, this field shall be of length H and it shall equal the HMAC of the transcript hash using finished_key as the secret key and using the negotiated hash algorithm as the hash function. For Session-based mutual authentication, the transcript hash shall be the hash of the transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, mutual authentication as Transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, mutual authentication shows. Otherwise, the transcript hash shall be the hash of the transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, Responder-only authentication as Transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, Responder- only authentication shows. The finished_key shall be derived from Response Direction Handshake Secret and is described in the finished_key derivation clause. HMAC is described in RFC2104.

⁵¹⁹ 10.17.1 Transcript and transcript hash calculation rules

- 520 The transcript is a concatenation of the prescribed full messages or message fields in order. In the case where a message is transferred in chunks, only the complete message that is built by the concatenation of chunk payloads shall be added to the transcript. Consequently, the transcript hash is the hash of the transcript using the negotiated hash algorithm (that is, BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel of ALGORITHMS). In general, the transcript is used in signature fields and the transcript hash is used in calculating the HMAC in KEY_EXCHANGE, FINISH and their corresponding responses. For messages that are encrypted, the plaintext messages are used in the transcript. Where this clause indicates that the hash of the specified certificate chain is used, the hash of the certificate chain is calculated over the specified certificate chain, as Table 26 Certificate chain format describes.
- 521 The notation [\${message_name}] . \${field_name} is used, where:
 - \${message_name} is the name of the request or response message.
 - \${field_name} is the name of the field in the request or response message. The asterisk (*) means all fields in that message, except from any conditional fields that are empty (for example KEY_EXCHANGE. OpaqueData).
- 522 Transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature shows the transcript for the KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature:

523 Transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . * except the Signature and ResponderVerifyData fields.
- 524 The Responder shall generate the KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature from:

SPDMsign(PrivKey, transcript, "key_exchange_rsp signing")

525 where

- SPDMsign is described by the Signature generation clause.
- PrivKey shall be the private key of the leaf certificate of the Responder.
- transcript shall be the concatenation of the messages for a KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature.
- 526 The leaf certificate of the Responder shall be the one indicated by SlotID in Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE request.
- 527 Likewise, the Requester shall verify the KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature using SPDMsignatureVerify(PubKey, signature, transcript, "key_exchange_rsp signing") where transcript is the concatenation of the messages for a KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature, and the PubKey is the public key of the leaf certificate of the Responder. The leaf certificate of the Responder shall be the one indicated by SlotID in Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE request. SPDMsignatureVerify is described in Signature verification. A successful verification shall be when SPDMsignatureVerify returns success.
- 528 Transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC shows the transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC:

529 Transcript for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . * except the ResponderVerifyData field.
- 530 Transcript for FINISH signature, mutual authentication shows the transcript for the FINISH signature with mutual authentication:

531 Transcript for FINISH signature, mutual authentication

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
- 5. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of FINISH) or hash of the public

key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.

- 6. [FINISH] . SPDM Header Fields
- 532 The Requester shall generate the FINISH signature from SPDMsign(PrivKey, transcript, "finish signing") where transcript is the concatenation of the messages for FINISH signature, and the PrivKey is the private key of the leaf certificate of the Requester. The leaf certificate of the Requester shall be the one indicated in SlotID in Param2 of FINISH request. SPDMsign is described in Signature generation.
- 533 Likewise, the Responder shall verify the FINISH signature using SPDMsignatureVerify(PubKey, signature, transcript, "finish signing") where transcript is the concatenation of the messages for a FINISH signature, and the PubKey is the public key of the leaf certificate of the Requester. The leaf certificate of the Requester shall be the one indicated in SlotID in Param2 of FINISH request. SPDMsignatureVerify is described in Signature verification. A successful verification is when SPDMsignatureVerify returns success.
- 534 Transcript for FINISH HMAC, Responder-only authentication shows the transcript for FINISH HMAC with Responder-only authentication:

535 Transcript for FINISH HMAC, Responder-only authentication

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
- 5. [FINISH] . SPDM Header Fields
- 536 Transcript for FINISH HMAC, mutual authentication shows the transcript for FINISH HMAC with mutual authentication:

537 Transcript for FINISH HMAC, mutual authentication

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
- 5. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of FINISH) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- 6. [FINISH] . SPDM Header Fields
- 7. [FINISH]. Signature
- 538 Transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, Responder-only authentication shows the transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC with Responder-only authentication:

539 Transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, Responder-only authentication

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the

public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.

- 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
- 5. [FINISH].*
- 6. [FINISH_RSP]. SPDM Header fields
- 540 Transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, mutual authentication shows the transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC with mutual authentication:

541 Transcript for FINISH_RSP HMAC, mutual authentication

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
- 5. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of FINISH) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
- 6. [FINISH].*
- 7. [FINISH_RSP] . SPDM Header fields
- 542 When multiple session keys are being established between the same Requester and Responder pair, Signature over the transcript during FINISH request is computed using only the corresponding KEY_EXCHANGE, KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP and FINISH request parameters.
- 543 For additional rules, see General ordering rules.

⁵⁴⁴ 10.18 PSK_EXCHANGE request and PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages


- 545 The Pre-Shared Key (PSK) key exchange scheme provides an option for a Requester and a Responder to perform session key establishment with symmetric-key cryptography. This option is especially useful for endpoints that do not support asymmetric-key cryptography or certificate processing. This option can also be leveraged to expedite the session key establishment, even if asymmetric-key cryptography is supported.
- 546 This option requires the Requester and the Responder to have prior knowledge of a common PSK before the handshake. Essentially, the PSK serves as a mutual authentication credential and the base of the session key establishment. As such, only the two endpoints and potentially a trusted third party that provisions the PSK to the two endpoints know the value of the PSK. For these same reasons, the HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP is not applicable in a PSK key exchange. Thus, for PSK-based session establishment both the Responder and the Requester shall ignore the HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP bit.
- 547 A Requester can be paired with multiple Responders. Likewise, a Responder can be paired with multiple Requesters. A Requester and Responder pair can be provisioned with one or more PSKs. An endpoint can act as a Requester to one device and simultaneously a Responder to another device. If both endpoints can act as Requester or

Responder, then the endpoints shall use different PSKs for each role. It is the responsibility of the transport layer to identify the peer and establish communication between the two endpoints, before the PSK-based session key exchange starts.

- 548 The PSK can be provisioned in a trusted environment, for example, during the secure manufacturing process. In an untrusted environment, the PSK can be agreed upon between the two endpoints using a secure protocol. The mechanism for PSK provisioning is out of scope of this specification. The size of the provisioned PSK is determined by the requirement of security strength of the application, but should be at least 128 bits and recommended to be 256 bits or larger, to resist dictionary attacks especially when the Requester and Responder cannot both contribute sufficient entropy during the exchange.
- 549 Two message pairs are defined for this option:
 - PSK_EXCHANGE / PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP
 - PSK_FINISH / PSK_FINISH_RSP
- 550 The PSK_EXCHANGE message carries three responsibilities:
 - 1. Prompts the Responder to retrieve the specific PSK.
 - 2. Exchanges contextual information between the Requester and the Responder.
 - 3. Proves to the Requester that the Responder knows the correct PSK and has derived the correct session keys.
- 551 Figure 17 PSK_EXCHANGE: Example shows an example of the PSK_EXCHANGE message:

552 Figure 17 — PSK_EXCHANGE: Example

553



554 **Table 61 — PSK_EXCHANGE request message format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE6 = PSK_EXCHANGE . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
			Type of measurement summary hash requested:
			0x0 : No measurement summary hash requested.
			0x1 : TCB measurements only.
2	Param1	1	ØxFF : All measurements.
			All other values reserved.
			If a Responder does not support measurements (MEAS_CAP=00b in CAPABILITIES response), the Requester shall set this value to 0x0.
3	Param2	1	Session policy. See Table 57 — Session policy.
4	ReqSessionID	2	Two-byte Requester contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	Р	2	Length of PSKHint in bytes.
8	R	2	Length of RequesterContext in bytes.
10	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be 0 if no OpaqueData is provided.
12	PSKHint	Ρ	Information required by the Responder to retrieve the PSK. Optional.
12 + p	RequesterContext	R	The context of the Requester. Shall include a nonce (random number or monotonic counter) of at least 32 bytes and optionally relevant information contributed by the Requester.
12 + p + r	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	Optional. If present, the OpaqueData sent by the Requester is used to indicate any parameters that Requester wishes to pass to the Responder as part of PSK-based key exchange. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection.

555

The field PSKHint is optional. It is absent if P is set to 0. It is introduced to address two scenarios:

- The Responder is provisioned with multiple PSKs and stores them in secure storage. The Requester uses PSKHint as an identifier to specify which PSK will be used in this particular session.
- The Responder does not store the actual value of the PSK, but can derive the PSK using PSKHint. For example, if the Responder has an immutable UDS (Unique Device Secret) in fuses, then during provisioning, a

PSK can be derived from the UDS or a derivative value and a non-secret salt known by the Requester. During session key establishment, the salt value is sent to the Responder in PSKHint of PSK_EXCHANGE. This mechanism allows the Responder to support any number of PSKs, without consuming secure storage.

- 556 The RequesterContext is the contribution of the Requester to session key derivation. It shall contain a nonce (random number or monotonic counter) to ensure that the derived session keys are ephemeral to mitigate against replay attacks. If a monotonic counter is used as the nonce, the monotonic counter shall not be reset for the lifetime of the device. The RequesterContext can also contain other information from the Requester.
- 557 Upon receiving a PSK_EXCHANGE request, the Responder:
 - 1. Generates PSK from PSKHint , if necessary.
 - 2. Generates ResponderContext , if supported.
 - 3. Derives the finished_key of the Responder by following Key schedule.
 - 4. Constructs PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response message and sends to the Requester.

558 Table 62 — PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x66 = PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	HeartbeatPeriod The value of this field shall be zero if Heartbeat is not supported by one of the endpoints. Otherwise, the value shall be in units of seconds. Zero is a legal value if Heartbeat is supported, but means that a heartbeat is not desired on this session.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RspSessionID	2	Two-byte Responder contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	Q	2	Length of ResponderContext in bytes.
10	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be 0 if no OpaqueData is provided.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
12	MeasurementSummaryHash	Н	If the Responder does not support measurements (MEAS_CAP=00b in CAPABILITIES response) or requested Param1 = 0x0, this field shall be absent. If the requested Param1 = 0x1, this field shall be the combined hash of measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response, computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],)) where MeasurementBlock[x] denotes a measurement of an element in the TCB. Measurements are concatenated in ascending order based on their measurement index as Table 42 — Measurement block format describes. When the requested Param1 = 0x1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0. If requested Param1 = 0xFF, this field shall be computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementBlock[1],, MeasurementBlock[0], MeasurementIndex range 0x01 - 0xFE, concatenated in ascending index order. Indices with no associated measurements shall not be included in the hash calculation. See the Measurement index assignments clause. If the Responder supports both raw bit stream and digest representations for a given measurement index, then the Responder shall use the digest form. This field shall be in Hash byte order.
12 + н	ResponderContext	Q	Context of the Responder. Optional. If present, shall include a nonce and/or information contributed by the Responder.
12 + н + о	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	Optional. If present, the OpaqueData sent by the Responder is used to indicate any parameters that Responder wishes to pass to the Requester as part of PSK-based key exchange. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection.
12+н+Q+ OpaqueDataLength	ResponderVerifyData	н	Data to be verified by the Requester using the finished_key of the Responder.

- 559 The ResponderContext is the contribution of the Responder to session key derivation. It should contain a nonce (random number or monotonic counter) and other information of the Responder. If a monotonic counter is used as the nonce, the monotonic counter shall not be reset for the lifetime of the device. Because the Responder can be a constrained device that cannot generate a nonce, ResponderContext is optional. However, the Responder is required to use ResponderContext if it can generate a nonce.
- 560 It should be noted that the nonce in ResponderContext is critical for anti-replay. If a nonce is not present in ResponderContext, then the Responder is not challenging the Requester for real-time knowledge of the PSK. Such a session is subject to replay attacks - a man-in-the-middle attacker could record and replay prior PSK_EXCHANGE and PSK_FINISH messages and set up a session with the Responder. But the bogus session would not leak secrets, so long as the PSK or session keys of the prior replayed session are not compromised.
- 561 If ResponderContext is absent, such as when PSK_CAP in the CAPABILITIES of the Responder is 01b, the Requester shall not send PSK_FINISH, because the session keys are solely determined by the Requester and the Session immediately enters the Application Phase. If and only if the ResponderContext is present in the response, such as when PSK_CAP in the CAPABILITIES of the Responder is 10b, the Requester shall send PSK_FINISH with RequesterVerifyData to prove that it has derived correct session keys.
- 562 To calculate ResponderVerifyData, the Responder calculates an HMAC. The HMAC key is the finished_key of the Responder. The data is the hash of the concatenation of all messages sent up to this point between the Requester and the Responder. For messages that are encrypted, the plaintext messages are used in calculating the hash.
 - [GET_VERSION].*
 [VERSION].*
 [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
 [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
 [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
 [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
 [PSK_EXCHANGE].*
 [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP].* except the ResponderVerifyData field
- 563 Note that, even if CERTIFICATE, CHALLENGE_AUTH, and/or MEASUREMENTS were issued, these messages would not be included in the data for calculating ResponderVerifyData. In other words, the identity of the signer of CHALLENGE_AUTH and/or MEASUREMENTS is not bound to identity of the sender of PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP. Therefore, to mitigate Responder identity impersonation, the Requester should not issue PSK_EXCHANGE if it has received CHALLENGE_AUTH and/or MEASUREMENTS with a signature from the Responder.
- 564 Upon receiving PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP, the Requester:
 - 1. Derives the finished_key of the Responder by following Key schedule.
 - 2. Verify ResponderVerifyData by calculating the HMAC in the same manner as the Responder. If verification fails, the Requester terminates the session.
 - 3. If the Responder contributes to session key derivation, such as when PSK_CAP in the CAPABILITIES of the Responder is 10b, construct PSK_FINISH request and send to the Responder.

⁵⁶⁵ 10.19 PSK_FINISH request and PSK_FINISH_RSP response messages

- 566 The PSK_FINISH request proves to the Responder that the Requester knows the PSK and has derived the correct session keys. This is achieved by an HMAC value calculated with the finished_key of the Requester and messages of this session. The Requester shall send PSK_FINISH only if ResponderContext is present in PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP.
- 567 Table 63 PSK_FINISH request message format describes the PSK_FINISH request message format:

568 **Table 63 — PSK_FINISH request message format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE7 = PSK_FINISH . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RequesterVerifyData	Н	Data to be verified by the Responder by using the finished_key of the Requester.

569

To calculate RequesterVerifyData, the Requester calculates an HMAC. The key is the finished_key of the Requester, as described in Key schedule. The data is the hash of the concatenation of all messages sent so far between the Requester and the Responder. For messages that are encrypted, the plaintext messages are used in calculating the hash.

[GET_VERSION].*
 [VERSION].*
 [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
 [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
 [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
 [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
 [PSK_EXCHANGE].*
 [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
 [PSK_FINISH].* except the RequesterVerifyData field

- 570 For additional rules, see General ordering rules.
- 571 Upon receiving PSK_FINISH request, the Responder derives the finished_key of the Requester and calculates the HMAC independently in the same manner and verifies the result matches RequesterVerifyData. If verified, the Responder constructs PSK_FINISH_RSP response and sends to the Requester. Otherwise, the Responder sends ERROR response with error code InvalidRequest to the Requester.
- 572 Table 64 Successful PSK_FINISH_RSP response message format describes the successful PSK_FINISH_RSP response message format:

573 Table 64 — Successful PSK_FINISH_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x67 = PSK_FINISH_RSP . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

⁵⁷⁴ **10.20 HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response messages**

- 575 This request shall keep a session alive if HEARTBEAT is supported by both the Requester and Responder. The HEARTBEAT request shall be sent periodically as indicated in HeartbeatPeriod in either KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP or PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages if no other messages are received in this secure session in the HeartbeatPeriod. The Responder shall terminate the session if session traffic is not received in twice HeartbeatPeriod. Likewise, the Requester shall terminate the session if session traffic, including ERROR response, is not received in twice HeartbeatPeriod. Session traffic includes encrypted data at the transport layer. How SPDM is informed of encrypted data at the transport layer is outside the scope of this specification. The Requester can retry HEARTBEAT requests.
- 576 The timer for the Heartbeat period shall start at the transmission, for Responders, or reception, for Requester, of the appropriate FINISH_RSP, PSK_FINISH_RSP (PSK_CAP of Responder is 10b), or PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP (PSK_CAP of Responder is 01b) response messages. When determining the value of HeartbeatPeriod, the Responder should ensure this value is sufficiently greater than T1.
- 577 Each secure session shall track the heartbeat period independently of other sessions within the same SPDM Connection.
- 578 For session termination details, see Session termination phase.
- 579 Table 65 HEARTBEAT request message format describes the message format.

580 **Table 65 — HEARTBEAT request message format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE8 = HEARTBEAT request. See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

581 Table 66 — HEARTBEAT_ACK response message format describes the format for the Heartbeat Response.

582 Table 66 — HEARTBEAT_ACK response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x68 = HEARTBEAT_ACK response. See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

583 10.20.1 Heartbeat additional information

584 The transport layer might allow the HEARTBEAT request to be sent from the Responder to the Requester. This is recommended for transports capable of asynchronous bidirectional communication.

⁵⁸⁵ **10.21 KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages**

- To update session keys, this request shall be used. There are many reasons for doing this but an important one is when the per-record nonce will soon reach its maximum value and rollover. The KEY_UPDATE request can be issued by the Responder as well using the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST mechanism. A KEY_UPDATE request shall perform the operation given in Param1 and defined in Table 69 — KEY_UPDATE operations. Because the Responder can also send this request, it is possible that two simultaneous key updates, one for each direction, can occur. However, only one KEY_UPDATE request for a single direction shall occur. Until the session key update synchronization successfully completes, subsequent KEY_UPDATE requests for the same direction shall be considered a retry of the original KEY_UPDATE request.
- 587 Table 67 KEY_UPDATE request message format describes the KEY_UPDATE request message format:

588 Table 67 — KEY_UPDATE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE9 = KEY_UPDATE Request. See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Key operation. See Table 69 — KEY_UPDATE operations.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	Param2	1	Tag. This field shall contain a unique number to aid the Responder in differentiating between the original and retry request. A retry request shall contain the same tag number as the original.

589 Table 68 — KEY_UPDATE_ACK response message format describes the KEY_UPDATE_ACK response message format:

590 Table 68 — KEY_UPDATE_ACK response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x69 = KEY_UPDATE_ACK response. See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Key Operation. This field shall reflect the Key Operation field of the request. See Table 69 — KEY_UPDATE operations
3	Param2	1	Tag. This field shall reflect the Tag number in the KEY_UPDATE request.

591

1 Table 69 — KEY_UPDATE operations describes the KEY_UPDATE operations:


592 **Table 69 — KEY_UPDATE operations**

Value	Operation	Description
0	Reserved	Reserved.
1	UpdateKey	Shall update only the single-direction key associated with the direction of the request.
2	UpdateAllKeys	Shall update keys for both directions.
3	VerifyNewKey	Ensure the key update is successful and the old keys can be safely discarded.
4 - 255	Reserved	Reserved.

593 10.21.1 Session key update synchronization


594 For clarity, in the key update process, the term, sender, means the SPDM endpoint that issued the KEY_UPDATE request and the term, receiver, means the SPDM endpoint that received the KEY_UPDATE request. To ensure the key update process is seamless while still allowing the transmission and reception of records, both sender and receiver shall follow the prescribed method described in this clause.

- 595 The data transport layer shall ensure that data transfer during key updates is managed in such a way that the correct keys are used before, during, and after the key update operation. How this is accomplished by the data transport layer is outside the scope of this specification.
- 596 Both the sender and the receiver shall derive the new keys as detailed in Major secrets update.
- 597 The sender shall not use the new transmit key until after reception of the KEY_UPDATE_ACK response.
- 598 The sender and receiver shall use the new key on the KEY_UPDATE request with VerifyNewKey command and all subsequent commands until another key update is performed.
- 599 In the case of KEY_UPDATE request with UpdateAllKeys, the receiver shall use the new transmit key for the KEY_UPDATE_ACK response. The KEY_UPDATE request with UpdateAllKeys should only be used with physical transports that are single master to ensure that simultaneous UpdateAllKeys requests do not occur.
- 600 If the sender has not received KEY_UPDATE_ACK, the sender can retry or end the session. The sender shall not proceed to the next step until successfully receiving the corresponding KEY_UPDATE_ACK.
- 601 Upon the successful reception of the KEY_UPDATE_ACK, the sender shall transmit a KEY_UPDATE request with VerifyNewKey operation using the new session keys. The sender can retry until the corresponding KEY_UPDATE_ACK response is received. However, the sender shall be prohibited, at this point, from restarting this process or going back to a previous step. Its only recourse in error handling is either to retry the same request or to terminate the session.
- 602 For UpdateKey, upon successful reception and verification of the KEY_UPDATE with VerifyNewKey operation, the receiver can discard the old session keys. For UpdateAllKeys, upon successful reception and verification of the KEY_UPDATE_ACK with UpdateAllKeys operation, the sender can discard the old session keys that protect receiver-sent messages. Upon successful reception and verification of the KEY_UPDATE with VerifyNewKey operation, the receiver can discard the old session keys that protect sender-sent messages.
- 603 In certain scenarios, the receiver might need additional time to process the KEY_UPDATE request such as processing data already in its buffer. Thus, the receiver can reply with an ERROR message with ErrorCode=Busy. The sender should retry the request after a reasonable period of time with a reasonable amount of retries to prevent premature session termination.
- 604 Finally, it bears repeating that a key update in one direction can happen simultaneously with a key update in the opposite direction. Still, the aforementioned synchronization process occurs independently but simultaneously for each direction.
- 605 Figure 18 KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow illustrates a typical key update initiated by the Requester to update its secret. In this example, the Responder and Requester are both capable of message authentication and encryption.
- 606 Figure 18 KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow



608 Figure 19 — KEY_UPDATE protocol change all keys example flow illustrates a typical key update initiated by the Requester to update all secrets. In this example, the Responder and Requester are both capable of message authentication and encryption.

609 Figure 19 — KEY_UPDATE protocol change all keys example flow




611 **10.21.2 KEY_UPDATE transport allowances**

612 On some transports, bidirectional communication can occur asynchronously. On such transports, the transport can allow or disallow the KEY_UPDATE to be sent asynchronously without using the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST mechanism. The transport should define the actual method to use. That definition is outside the scope of this specification.

613 Figure 20 — KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow 2 illustrates a key update over a physical transport that has a limitation whereby only a single device (often called the master) is allowed to initiate all transactions on that bus. This physical transport specifies that a Responder shall alert the Requester through a side-band mechanism and to utilize the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST mechanism to fulfill SPDM-related requirements. Also, in this same example, the Requester and Responder are both capable of encryption and message authentication.

614 Figure 20 — KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow 2



⁶¹⁶ 10.22 GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages

- 617 In certain use cases, such as mutual authentication, the Responder needs the ability to issue its own SPDM request messages to the Requester. Certain transports prohibit the Responder from asynchronously sending out data on that transport. Cases like these are addressed through message encapsulation, which preserves the roles of Requester and Responder as far as the transport is concerned, but enables the Responder to issue its own requests to the Requester. Message encapsulation is only allowed in certain scenarios. Figure 21 — Session-based mutual authentication example and Figure 22 — Optimized session-based mutual authentication example illustrate the use of this scheme.
- 618 A Requester issues a GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request message to retrieve an encapsulated SPDM request message from the Responder. The response to this message (ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST) encapsulates the SPDM request message as if the Responder was acting as a Requester. Table 70 — GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request message format describes the request message format. The Responder shall use the same SPDM version the Requester used.

619 10.22.1 Encapsulated request flow

- 620 The encapsulated request flow starts with the Requester sending a GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST message and ends with an ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK that carries no more encapsulated requests. The GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST shall only be issued once with the exception of retries. This is also illustrated in Figure 21 Session-based mutual authentication example.
- 621 When the Requester issues a GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST, the encapsulated request flow shall start. Upon the successful reception of the ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and when the encapsulated response is ready, the Requester shall continue the flow by issuing the DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE. During this period, with the exception of GET_VERSION, RESPOND_IF_READY and DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, the Requester shall not issue any other message. If a Responder receives a request other than DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, RESPOND_IF_READY or GET_VERSION, the Responder should respond with ErrorCode=RequestInFlight.


622 10.22.2 Optimized encapsulated request flow

- 623 The optimized encapsulated request flow is similar to the encapsulated request flow but without the need of GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST. This is because the encapsulated request accompanies one of the Session-Secrets-Exchange responses; thereby, removing the necessity on the Requester from issuing a GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST. When the Responder includes an encapsulated requests with a Session-Secrets-Exchange response, the optimized encapsulated request flow shall start. See Figure 22 — Optimized session-based mutual authentication example.
- 624 When the Requester successfully receives a Session-Secrets-Exchange response with an included encapsulated request, the Requester shall send a DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE after processing the encapsulated request. The Requester shall not issue any other requests except for DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, RESPOND_IF_READY and

GET_VERSION . If a Responder receives a request other than DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE , RESPOND_IF_READY OR GET_VERSION , then the Responder should respond with ErrorCode=RequestInFlight .

- 625 Figure 21 Session-based mutual authentication example shows an example of session-based mutual authentication:
- 626 Figure 21 Session-based mutual authentication example






628 Figure 22 — Optimized session-based mutual authentication example shows an example of optimized session-based mutual authentication:

629 Figure 22 — Optimized session-based mutual authentication example

630



631 Table 70 — GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xEA = GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

632 Table 71 — ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response message format describes the format this response.

633 Table 71 — ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6A = ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response. See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Request ID. This field should be unique to help the Responder match response to request.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	EncapsulatedRequest	Variable	SPDM Request Message. The value of this field shall represent a valid SPDM request message. The length of this field is dependent on the SPDM Request message. The field shall start with the SPDMversion field. The SPDMversion field of the Encapsulated Request shall be the same as SPDMversion of the ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response. Both GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE shall be invalid requests and the Requester should respond with ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest if these requests are encapsulated.

634 **10.22.3 Triggering** GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST

635 Once a session has been established, the Responder might wish to send a request asynchronously, such as a KEY_UPDATE request but cannot due to the limitations of the physical bus or transport protocol. In such a scenario, the transport and/or physical layer is responsible for defining an alerting mechanism for the Requester. Upon receiving the alert, the Requester shall issue a GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST to the Responder.

636 **10.22.4 Additional constraints**

637 The GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST messages shall only be allowed to encapsulate certain requests in certain scenarios. For constraint details, see the Session, Basic mutual authentication, and KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages clauses.

⁶³⁸ 10.23 DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response messages

- As a Requester processes an encapsulated request, it needs a mechanism to deliver back the corresponding response. That mechanism shall be the DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK messages. The DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, which is an SPDM request, encapsulates the response and delivers it to the Responder. The ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK, which is an SPDM response, acknowledges the reception of the encapsulated response.
- 640 Furthermore, if there are additional requests from the Responder, the Responder shall provide the next request in the ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message.
- 641 In an encapsulated request flow and after the successful reception of the first encapsulated request, the Requester shall not send any other requests with the exception of DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, RESPOND_IF_READY and GET_VERSION. After the successful reception of the first DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE and if a Responder receives a request other than DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE, RESPOND_IF_READY or GET_VERSION, the Responder should respond with ErrorCode=RequestInFlight.
- 642 If Param2 of ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK is set to 0x00 or 0x02 then this shall be the final encapsulated flow message that the Responder shall issue and the encapsulated flow shall be completed.
- 643 The timing parameters for the response shall depend on the encapsulated request. This enables the Responder to process the response before delivering the next request. See Additional information.
- 644 Table 72 DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request message format describes the request message format.

645 Table 72 — DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xEB = DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE Request. See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	Param1	1	Request ID. The Requester shall use the same Request ID (that is, Param1), as provided by the Responder in the corresponding of either ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST or ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK . If the value is not provided by the Responder (for example, the first message in an optimized encapsulated request flow), then Requester ID shall be 0.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	EncapsulatedResponse	Variable	SPDM Response Message. The value of this field shall represent a valid SPDM response message. The length of this field is dependent on the SPDM Response message. The field shall start with the SPDMVersion field. The SPDMVersion field of the Encapsulated Response shall be the same as SPDMVersion of the DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request. Both ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK shall be invalid responses and the Responder should respond with ErrorCode=InvalidResponseCode if these responses are encapsulated.

646 Table 73 — ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message format describes the response message format.

647 Table 73 — ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6B = ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Request ID. If EncapsulatedRequest is present and Param2 = 0x01 , then this field should contain a unique, non-zero number to help the Responder match response to request. Otherwise, this field shall be 0x00 .

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	Param2	1	Payload Type. If set to 0x00 no request message is encapsulated and the EncapsulatedRequest field is absent. If set to 0x01 the EncapsulatedRequest field follows. If set to 0x02 a 1-byte EncapsulatedRequest field follows containing the SlotID of the Requester's certificate chain used for mutual authentication. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive. All other values Reserved.
4	AckRequestID	1	Shall be the same as Param1 of the DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request message. The purpose of this field is to help the Requester distinguish between new requests and a retry.
5	Reserved	3	Reserved.
8	EncapsulatedRequest	Variable	If Param2 = 0x01, the value of this field shall represent a valid SPDM request message. The length of this field is dependent on the SPDM Request message. The field shall start with the SPDMVersion field. The SPDMVersion field of the EncapsulatedRequest shall be the same as SPDMVersion of the ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response. Both GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST shall be invalid requests and the Requester shall respond with ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest if these requests are encapsulated. If Param2 = 0x02, the value of this field shall contain the SlotID corresponding to the certificate chain the Requester shall use for mutual authentication. The field size shall be 1 byte. If Param2 = 0x00, this field shall be absent.

648 10.23.1 Additional information

649 Using a unique request ID is highly recommended to aid the Responder in avoiding confusion between a retry and a new DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE message. For example, if the Responder sent the ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK with a new encapsulated request and that failed in transmission over the wire, the Requester would send a retry but that retry would still contain the response to the previous encapsulated request. Without a different request ID, the Responder might mistake the retried DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE for a new request when, in fact, it was a retry. This mistake might cause additional mistakes to occur.

- 650 In general, the response timing for ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK shall be subject to the same timing constraints as the encapsulated request. For example, if the encapsulated request was CHALLENGE_AUTH, the Responder, too, would adhere to CT timing rules when it has a subsequent request. The Requester can return ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady.
- 651 The DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK messages shall only be allowed to encapsulate certain requests in certain scenarios. For constraint details, see Session, Basic mutual authentication, and KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages clauses.

652 10.23.2 Allowance for encapsulated requests

- 653 Only certain requests can be encapsulated in any encapsulated request flow. Their corresponding response, including ERROR, can be encapsulated too. Additionally, these requests are only allowed in certain flows, such as Basic Mutual Authentication, and are described in various parts of this specification. The consolidated list of requests allowed to be encapsulated shall be these requests:
 - CHALLENGE
 - GET_CERTIFICATE
 - GET_DIGESTS
 - KEY_UPDATE
- 654 If a request is not in the list, then the request and its corresponding response shall be prohibited from being encapsulated.

655 10.23.3 Certain error handling in encapsulated flows

656 These clauses describe special error scenarios and their handling requirements.

657 10.23.3.1 Response not ready

- In an encapsulated request flow, a Responder can issue an encapsulated request that can take up to CT time to fulfill. When the Requester delivers an ERROR message with a ResponseNotReady error code, the Responder shall not encapsulate another request by setting Param2 in ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK to a value of zero. This effectively and naturally terminates the encapsulated request flow.
- 659 The Responder should wait the amount of time indicated in the ERROR message for this particular error code.
- 660 When the timeout is near expiration, the Responder should perform the following:
 - 1. Trigger its transport-defined alert mechanism to initiate the Encapsulated request flow.
 - 2. When the Requester issues a GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST , the Responder should encapsulate the RESPOND_IF_READY request populated with the information from the previous ERROR with ResponseNotReady message.
 - If the Responder does not, the Requester can drop the original response.

661 10.23.3.2 Timeouts

- 662 If the Responder is not receiving a response to its encapsulated request, the Responder can trigger its transportdefined alert mechanism. When this occurs, if the Requester is in the middle of an existing encapsulated request flow with the same Responder, then the existing flow shall terminate and the Requester shall restart the encapsulated request flow.
- Both Responder and Request should comply with the timing requirements laid forth in Timing requirements.

⁶⁶⁴ **10.24 END_SESSION request and END_SESSION_ACK response messages**

- 665 This request shall terminate a session. See the Session termination phase clause.
- 666 Table 74 END_SESSION request message format and Table 75 End session request attributes describe this format.

667 **Table 74 — END_SESSION request message format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xEC = END_SESSION . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	See Table 75 — End session request attributes.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

668 **Table 75 — End session request attributes**

Bit offset	Value	Field	Description
0	0	Negotiated State Clearing Indicator	If the Responder supports Negotiated State caching (CACHE_CAP=1), the Responder shall preserve the cached Negotiated State. Otherwise, this field shall be ignored.
0	1	Negotiated State Clearing Indicator	If the Responder supports Negotiated State caching (CACHE_CAP=1), the Responder shall also clear the cached Negotiated State as part of session termination. If there is no cached Negotiated State to be cleared due to a previous END_SESSION request message with this field set to 1, this field shall be ignored. If the Responder does not support Negotiated State caching (CACHE_CAP=0), this field shall be ignored.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved.

669 Table 76 — END_SESSION_ACK response message format describes the response message.


670 Table 76 — END_SESSION_ACK response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6c = END_SESSION_ACK . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

671 Figure 23 — END SESSION protocol flow shows the END_SESSION protocol flow:

672 Figure 23 — END_SESSION protocol flow

673



674 **10.25 Certificate provisioning**

675 These clauses describe the request and response messages used for provisioning a device with certificate chains. Provisioning of Slot 0 should be only done in a trusted environment (such as a secure manufacturing environment).

676 **10.25.1 GET_CSR request and CSR response messages**

- 677 The GET_CSR request message shall retrieve a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) from the Responder.
- A Responder shall only process a GET_CSR request if it already possesses an appropriate asymmetric key pair for each of the signature suites (algorithms and associated parameters) it supports. If more than one signature suite is supported, selection of the appropriate signature suite (and thus key pair) shall be determined via the most recent ALGORITHMS response. Upon receiving a GET_CSR request, a Responder shall generate and sign a CSR for the corresponding public key. The CSR shall be populated with a combination of attributes provided by the Requester via the RequesterInfo field, and others contributed by the Responder itself. RequesterInfo format shall comply to the PKCS #10 specification in RFC2986, specifically the CertificationRequestInfo format. Vendor-defined extensions shall be encoded using the Attributes type. The Responder may alter the value of requested CertificationRequestInfo fields in RequesterInfo when generating CSRdata . The Responder shall return an ERROR message with error code InvalidRequest if it cannot support a field included in the RequesterInfo, or if the value of a requested field is not supported and the Responder cannot alter the value of the field. If the Responder receives a GET_CSR request while another GET_CSR request is outstanding, the Responder shall overwrite the existing request and process the new GET_CSR request.
- 679 If the device requires a reset to complete the GET_CSR request, then the device shall respond with an ErrorCode=ResetRequired response. If the device requires a reset to complete the GET_CSR request, the device shall persist information through the reset to allow it to identify whether a GET_CSR received after the reset matches the one from before the reset. After the Responder has processed the reset, the Requester sends the same GET_CSR request that was sent before the reset, which signals to the Responder to send the CSR response. If the Requester sends a different GET_CSR request than the request that was sent before the reset, then the Responder shall treat it as a new request or reject the different GET_CSR request with an ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest response. On receipt of a new GET_CSR request, the Responder can discard any existing CSR responses.
- 680 The attributes of the resulting CSR and their values shall comply with the clauses presented in the SPDM certificate requirements and recommendations section. If the device conforms to the DeviceCert model (ALIAS_CERT_CAP=0b in CAPABILITIES response), the resulting CSR shall be for a Device Certificate. If the device conforms to the AliasCert model (ALIAS_CERT_CAP=1b in CAPABILITIES response), the resulting CSR shall be for a Device Certificate CA. See Identity provisioning for more details.
- 681 Table 77 GET_CSR request message format shows the GET_CSR request message format.
- 682 Table 78 CSR response message format shows the CSR response message format.
- 683 Fields from the resulting CSR contained in a successful CSR response will have to be assembled into a certificate and signed by an appropriate Certificate Authority. The details of the Public Key Infrastructure used to verify and sign the CSR, and make the final certificate available for provisioning are outside the scope of this specification.

684 Table 77 — GET_CSR request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
1	RequestResponseCode	1	<pre>øxED = GET_CSR . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.</pre>
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RequesterInfoLength	2	Length of RequesterInfo field in bytes provided by the Requester. This field can be 0.
6	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field that follows in bytes. The value should not be greater than 1024 bytes. Shall be 0 if no OpaqueData is provided.
8	RequesterInfo	RequesterInfoLength	Optional information provided by the Requester. This field shall be DER-encoded.
8+ RequesterInfoLength	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	The Requester can include vendor-specific information for the Responder to generate the CSR. This field is optional. If present, this field shall conform to the selected opaque data format in OtherParamsSelection .

685

Table 78 — CSR response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6D = CSR . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	CSRLength	2	Length of the CSRdata in bytes.
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	CSRdata	CSRLength	Requested contents of the CSR. This field shall be DER-encoded.

686 The CSRdata format shall comply to the PKCS #10 specification in RFC2986, specifically the CertificationRequest format.

687 10.25.2 SET_CERTIFICATE request and SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response messages

688 For Slot 0 provisioning, the Requester should issue SET_CERTIFICATE only in a trusted environment (such as a secure manufacturing environment). For slots 1-7, if the provisioning happens in a trusted environment, the

Requester should issue SET_CERTIFICATE inside a secure session. If the provisioning is done outside of a trusted environment for slots 1-7, the Requester shall issue SET_CERTIFICATE inside a secure session. Mutual authentication and/or other means for authorizing the Requester that issues the SET_CERTIFICATE request should be performed. Requester authorization is outside the scope of this specification. The device might require a reset to complete the SET_CERTIFICATE request, potentially so that the device can generate AliasCert certificates using lower firmware layers. If the device requires a reset to complete the SET_CERTIFICATE request, then the device shall respond with an ErrorCode=ResetRequired response. When ResetRequired is pending and the device receives a new SET_CERTIFICATE request for the same slot number, the device shall overwrite the existing CertChain and process the new SET_CERTIFICATE request. If the device temporarily cannot write to a slot, including in a case when it receives overlapping SET_CERTIFICATE requests from different Requesters, then the device shall respond with an ErrorCode=Busy response.

- 689 When a reset is required for a pending previous SET_CERTIFICATE request and the device receives a GET_CERTIFICATE request for a pending slot or a GET_DIGESTS request, the device shall respond with an ErrorCode=ResetRequired response.
- 690 Table 79 SET_CERTIFICATE request message format shows the SET_CERTIFICATE request message format.
- 691 Table 80 Successful SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response message format shows the SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response message format.

692 Table 79 — SET_CERTIFICATE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	ØxEE = SET_CERTIFICATE . See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Bit [7:4]. Reserved. Bit [3:0]. SlotID where the new certificate is written. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	CertChain	Variable	Shall be the contents of the target certificate chain as specified in Certificates and certificate chains with the additional requirement that it include the root certificate. If the Responder uses the AliasCert model (ALIAS_CERT_CAP=1b in CAPABILITIES response), this field shall contain a partial certificate chain from the root CA to the Device Certificate CA.

693

Table 80 — Successful SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6E = SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP . See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Bit [7:4]. Reserved. Bit [3:0]. SlotID where the new certificate is written. The value in this field shall be the same as SlotID in corresponding SET_CERTIFICATE Request. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

⁶⁹⁴ **10.26 Large SPDM message transfer mechanism**

- A large SPDM message is an SPDM message whose size is greater than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint or greater than the transmit buffer size of the sending SPDM endpoint. These clauses provide a transport agnostic mechanism to transfer large SPDM messages. This mechanism will be used only when the size of an SPDM message exceeds the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint or the transmit buffer size of the sending SPDM endpoint. Additionally, the transport may provide an alternative method to transfer large SPDM messages. For SPDM messages that are less than or equal to both the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint and the transmit buffer size of the sending SPDM endpoint, the sending SPDM endpoint shall not utilize this transfer mechanism.
- 696 This transfer mechanism divides a large SPDM message into smaller fragments called chunks. The chunks shall be numbered and shall transfer in sequence. The chunks and transfer sequence are as such:
 - The first chunk shall be assigned a numeric value of 0, the second chunk shall be assigned a numeric value of 1, the third chunk shall be assigned a numeric value of 2 and this pattern shall continue until the last chunk. These numeric values are called a chunk sequence number.
 - The first chunk shall contain the first set of bytes of the large SPDM message, the second chunk shall contain the second set of bytes, the third chunk shall contain the third set of bytes and this pattern shall continue until the last chunk.
 - · All chunks shall represent all bytes of the large SPDM message without altering the message in any way.
 - The sequence of transfer shall start with chunk sequence number 0 and shall continue in a monotonically increasing chunk sequence number until the last chunk.
 - The chunked transfer shall not be interrupted by any commands that are not part of the chunk transfer sequence, with the exception of GET_VERSION. The Responder shall return the error
 ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest if an unexpected command is received during the chunked transfer. If CHUNK_GET is invalid or corrupted, the Requester may receive corresponding error codes (ErrorCode=InvalidRequest , ErrorCode=VersionMismatch , etc.). These error codes shall not interrupt the chunk transfer sequence, with exception of the error code ErrorCode=DecryptError .

- CHUNK_SEND, CHUNK_GET and their corresponding Responses shall be used to transfer these chunks.
- 697 The ChunkSeqNo fields indicate the chunk sequence number for a given chunk.
- 698 The requests and responses, which these clauses define, handle the transfer of each chunk.

699 10.26.1 CHUNK_SEND request and CHUNK_SEND_ACK response message

- 700 CHUNK_SEND request and CHUNK_SEND_ACK response shall be used to send a request to an SPDM endpoint when the size of the request is greater than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint or the transmit buffer size of the sending SPDM endpoint.
- 701 Table 81 CHUNK_SEND request format table describes the format for the request.
- 702 Table 82 Chunk sender attributes describes the chunk sender attributes:

703 Table 81 — CHUNK_SEND request format table

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x85 = CHUNK_SEND request. See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.
2	Param1	1	Request Attributes. See Table 82 — Chunk sender attributes.
3	Param2	1	Handle. This field should uniquely identify the transfer of a large SPDM message. The value of this field shall be the same for all chunks of the same large SPDM message. The value of this field should either entirely monotonically increase or entirely monotonically decrease with each large SPDM message and with the expectation that it will wrap around after reaching the maximum or minimum value, respectively, of this field.
4	ChunkSeqNo	2	Shall identify the chunk number associated with SPDMChunk .
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	ChunkSize	4	Shall indicate the size of SPDMchunk . See Additional chunk transfer requirements.
12	LargeMessageSize	L0 = 0 or 4	Shall indicate the size of the large SPDM message being transferred. This field shall only be present when ChunkSeqNo is zero and shall have a non-zero value. The value of this field shall be greater than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
12 + L0	SPDMchunk	Variable	Shall contain the chunk of the large SPDM request message associated with ChunkSeqNo .

704 **Table 82 — Chunk sender attributes**

Bit offset	Field	Description
0	LastChunk	If set, the chunk, indicated by ChunkSeqNo , shall represent the last chunk of the large SPDM message.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved.

Table 83 — CHUNK_SEND_ACK response message format describes the format for the response.

706 Table 83 — CHUNK_SEND_ACK response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x05 = CHUNK_SEND_ACK response. See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Response attributes. See Table 84 — Chunk receiver attributes.
3	Param2	1	Handle. This field should uniquely identify the transfer of a large SPDM message. The value of this field shall be the same for all chunks of the same SPDM message.
4	ChunkSeqNo	2	Shall be the same as ChunkSeqNo in the corresponding request.
6	ResponseToLargeRequest	Variable	Shall be present on the last chunk (that is when LastChunk is set), or when the EarlyErrorDetected bit in Param1 is set. This field shall contain the response to the large SPDM request message. When the EarlyErrorDetected bit in Param1 is set, this field shall contain an ERROR message.


707 Table 84 — Chunk receiver attributes describes the chunk receiver attributes:

708 **Table 84 — Chunk receiver attributes**

Bit offset	Field	Description
0	EarlyErrorDetected	If set, the receiver of a large SPDM request message detected an error in the Request before the last chunk was received. If set, the sender of the large SPDM request message shall terminate the transfer of any remaining chunks. After addressing the issue, the sender of the failed large SPDM request message can transfer the fixed large SPDM request message as a new transfer.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved.

Table 83 — CHUNK_SEND_ACK response message format describes the format for the response.

- 710 Upon reception of the last chunk, the receiving SPDM endpoint shall respond with the response corresponding to the large SPDM request message in ResponseToLargeRequest . If placing the response in ResponseToLargeRequest causes the size of the CHUNK_SEND_ACK to exceed DataTransferSize , the receiving end point shall, instead, respond to CHUNK_SEND with an ERROR message using ErrorCode=LargeResponse . An ERROR message with an ErrorCode=LargeResponse shall not be allowed in ResponseToLargeRequest . An ERROR messages with other ErrorCodes can be placed in ResponseToLargeRequest to distinguish between an ERROR message to the CHUNK_SEND request and an ERROR message that is a response to the large SPDM request message.
- 711 In the case where the size of the CHUNK_SEND_ACK message is greater than DataTransferSize but the size of ResponseToLargeRequest is less than DataTransferSize the Responder will chunk a message whose size is less than DataTransferSize .
- 712 Figure 24 Large SET_CERTIFICATE example illustrates the sending of a large SPDM request message to a Responder.
- 713 Figure 24 Large SET_CERTIFICATE example



715 **10.26.2 CHUNK_GET request and CHUNK_RESPONSE response message**

- 716 CHUNK_GET request and CHUNK_RESPONSE response shall be used to retrieve a Large SPDM Response from an SPDM endpoint when the size of the Response is greater than the DataTransferSize of the SPDM endpoint receiving the Response or the transmit buffer size of the SPDM endpoint sending the Response.
- 717 When responding to a Request of any size, if the corresponding response will be a Large SPDM Response, the responding SPDM endpoint shall respond with an ERROR message using ErrorCode=LargeResponse. This ERROR message contains a handle to uniquely identify the given Large SPDM Response. The handle shall be used for all CHUNK_GET Requests retrieving the same large SPDM message. The value of the handle is indicated in the Handle field of the ERROR message with ErrorCode=LargeResponse .
- 718 Table 85 CHUNK_GET request format describes the format for the request.

719 **Table 85 — CHUNK_GET request format**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x86 = CHUNK_GET request. See Table 4 — SPDM request codes.

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Handle. This field shall be the same value as given in the Handle field of the ERROR message with ErrorCode = LargeResponse .
4	ChunkSeqNo	2	Shall indicate the desired chunk sequence number of the Large SPDM Response to retrieve.

Table 86 — CHUNK_RESPONSE response format describes the format for the response.

720


721

Table 86 — CHUNK	_RESPONSE	response fe	ormat

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	Shall be the SPDMVersion as described in SPDM version.
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x06 = CHUNK_RESPONSE response. See Table 5 — SPDM response codes.
2	Param1	1	Response attributes. See Table 82 — Chunk sender attributes.
3	Param2	1	Handle. This field shall be the same for all chunks of the same Large SPDM Response. The value of this field shall be the same value as in Param2 field of CHUNK_GET .
4	ChunkSeqNo	2	Shall identify the chunk sequence number associated with SPDMChunk . The value of this field shall be the same value as ChunkSeqNo in the CHUNK_GET .
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	ChunkSize	4	Shall indicate the size of SPDMchunk . See Additional chunk transfer requirements.
12	LargeMessageSize	L0 = 0 or 4	Shall indicate the size of the large SPDM message being transferred. Shall only be present when ChunkSeqNo is zero and shall have a non-zero value. The value of this field should be greater than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint.
12 + L0	SPDMchunk	Variable	Shall contain the chunk of the large SPDM request message associated with ChunkSeqNo .

722 Figure 25 — Large MEASUREMENT example illustrates the sending and retrieval of a Large SPDM Response to a Requester that issued a GET_MEASUREMENT request.

723 Figure 25 — Large MEASUREMENT example



725 **10.26.3 Additional chunk transfer requirements**

726 When transferring a large SPDM message, an SPDM endpoint shall be prohibited from transferring a chunk sequence number (that is, ChunkSeqNo) less than the current chunk sequence number. In other words, an SPDM endpoint cannot go backwards in the transfer or re-send or re-retrieve a chunk sequence number less than the current one in the transfer. However, due to retries, an SPDM endpoint might re-send or re-retrieve the current chunk number in the transfer. Additionally, if the receiving SPDM endpoint receives an out-of-order chunk sequence number, the receiving SPDM endpoint shall silently discard the request or respond with an ERROR message with ErrorCode = InvalidRequest.

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
- 727 In general, the value of ChunkSize fields shall be one that ensures the total size of CHUNK_SEND or CHUNK_RESPONSE does not exceed the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint. For all chunks that are not the last chunk, ChunkSize shall be a value where the total size of CHUNK_SEND or CHUNK_RESPONSE shall be between MinDataTransferSize and the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint. For the last chunk, ChunkSize shall be a value where the total size of CHUNK_SEND or CHUNK_RESPONSE shall be equal to or less than the DataTransferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint.
- 728 While this transfer mechanism can carry any Request or Response, this transfer mechanism shall prohibit CHUNK_SEND, CHUNK_GET and their corresponding responses to be transferred as chunks themselves. Additionally to ensure reliability of this transfer mechanism and general interoperability, these messages shall be prohibited from being transferred in chunks using this transfer mechanism:
 - GET_VERSION
 - VERSION
 - GET_CAPABILITIES
 - CAPABILITIES
 - ERROR
 - An ERROR message with ErrorCodes other than LargeResponse can be placed in ResponseToLargeRequest of CHUNK_SEND_ACK response.
- 729 This transfer mechanism can carry Requests and Responses that are involved in signature generation or verification and other cryptographic computations. However, this transfer mechanism is not part of any signature generation or verification or cryptographic computation. In other words, CHUNK_SEND, CHUNK_GET and their corresponding responses shall not become part of any data or bit stream, such as message transcript, transcript, and so on, that are used to verify or generate a signature or other cryptographic information. Signature generation, signature verification and other cryptographic computation operate on the large SPDM messages, themselves, which other parts of this specification define.
- 730 The response to a CHUNK_SEND OF CHUNK_GET request, themselves, shall not be ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady . However, the ResponseToLargeRequest can contain an ERROR message with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady .
- 731 While a large SPDM message is being transferred in chunks, the large SPDM message is not considered a complete SPDM message until the last chunk is received. Therefore, as soon as the CHUNK_SEND request begins transmission, the large SPDM request message is considered to be outstanding.


⁷³² **11 Session**

733 Sessions enable a Requester and Responder to have multiple channels of communication. More importantly, it enables a Requester and Responder to build a secure communication channel with cryptographic information that is bound ephemerally. Specifically, an SPDM session provides either or both of encryption or message authentication.

A session has three phases, as Figure 26 — Session phases shows:

- The handshake
- The application
- Termination





⁷³⁷ 11.1 Session handshake phase

- 738 The session handshake phase begins with either KEY_EXCHANGE or PSK_EXCHANGE. This phase also allows for authentication of the Requester if the Responder indicated that earlier in ALGORITHMS response. Furthermore, this phase of the session uses the handshake secrets to secure the communication as described in the Key schedule.
- 739 The purpose of this phase is to build trust between the Responder and Requester, first, before either side can send

application data. Additionally, it also ensures the integrity of the handshake and to a certain degree, synchronicity with the derived handshake secrets.

- 740 In this phase of the session, GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST and DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE shall be used to obtain requests from the Responder to complete the authentication of the Requester, if the Responder indicated this in ALGORITHMS message. During this phase, the Responder shall not asynchronously send requests to the Requester. The only requests allowed to be encapsulated shall be GET_DIGESTS and GET_CERTIFICATE. The Requester shall provide a signature in the FINISH request, as the FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages clause describes.
- 741 If an error occurs in this phase with ErrorCode = DecryptError, the session shall immediately terminate and proceed to session termination.
- A successful handshake ends with either FINISH_RSP or PSK_FINISH_RSP and the application phase begins.

⁷⁴³ **11.2 Application phase**

- 744 Once the handshake completes and all validation passes, the session reaches the application phase where either the Responder and Requester can send application data.
- 745 During this phase, a Requester can send SPDM messages such as GET_MEASUREMENT. These messages might involve transcript calculations and if such calculations are required, they shall be calculated on a per session basis. Once a session has been established, subsequent messages sent outside of a session shall not contribute to the transcript within a session.
- 746 The application phase ends when either the HEARTBEAT requirements fail, END_SESSION or an ERROR message with ErrorCode = DecryptError. The next phase is the session termination phase.

⁷⁴⁷ **11.3 Session termination phase**

- 748 This phase signals the end of the application phase and the enactment of internal clean-up procedures by the endpoints. Requesters and Responders can have various reasons for terminating a session, outside the scope of this specification.
- 749 SPDM provides the END_SESSION / END_SESSION_ACK message pair to explicitly trigger the session termination phase if needed, but depending on the transport, it might simply be an internal phase with no explicit SPDM messages sent or received.
- 750 When a session terminates, both Requester and Responder shall destroy or clean up all session secrets such as derived major secrets, DHE secrets and encryption keys. Endpoints might have other internal data associated with a session that they should also clean up.

⁷⁵¹ 11.4 Simultaneous active sessions

752 At least one session per connection shall be supported if both Requester and Responder advertise KEY_EXCHANGE or

PSK_EXCHANGE capabilities in this connection. If the KEY_EXCHANGE or PSK_EXCHANGE request will exceed the maximum number of simultaneous active sessions of the Responder, the Responder shall respond with an Errorcode = SessionLimitExceeded .

753 This specification does not prohibit concurrent sessions in which the same Requester and Responder reverses role. For example, SPDM endpoint ABC, acting as a Requester, can establish a session to SPDM endpoint XYZ, which is acting as a Responder. At the same time, SPDM endpoint XYZ, now acting as a Requester, can establish a session to SPDM endpoint ABC, now acting as a Responder. Because these two sessions are distinct and separate, the two endpoints would ensure they do not mix sessions. To ensure proper session handling, each endpoint would ensure their portion of the session IDs are unique at time of Session-Secrets-Exchange. This would form a final unique session ID for that new session. Additionally, the endpoints can use information at the transport layer to further ensure proper handling of sessions.

⁷⁵⁴ **11.5 Records and session ID**

- 755 When the session starts, the communication of secured data is done using records. A record represents a chunk or unit of data that is either or both encrypted or authenticated. This data can be either an SPDM message or application data. Usually, the record contains the session ID resulting from one of the Session-Secrets-Exchange messages to aid both the Responder and Requester in binding the record to the respective derived session secrets.
- 756 The actual format and other details of a record is outside the scope of this specification. It is generally assumed that the transport protocol will define the format and other details of the record.

⁷⁵⁷ **12 Key schedule**

758 A key schedule describes how the various keys such as encryption keys used by a session are derived, and when each key is used. The default SPDM key schedule makes heavy use of HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand, which RFC5869 describes. SPDM defines the following additional functions:

BinConcat(Length, Version, Label, Context)

759 where

• BinConcat shall be the concatenation of binary data, in the order that Table 87 — BinConcat details shows:

760 Table 87 — BinConcat details

Order	Data	Туре	Endianness	Size
1	Length	Binary	Little	16 bits
2	Version	Text	Text	8 bytes
3	Label	Text	Text	Variable
4	Context	Binary	Hash byte order	Hash.Length

- 761 If Context is null, BinConcat is the concatenation of the first three components only.
- 762 Table 88 Value of Version Text shows values of the 8-byte version text for different SPDM versions. Hexadecimal equivalents are shown in parentheses for clarity.

763 Table 88 — Value of Version Text

SPDM version	byte 0	byte 1	byte 2	byte 3	byte 4	byte 5	byte 6	byte 7
SPDM 1.1	's' (0x73)	'p' (0x70)	'd' (0x64)	'm' (0x6D)	'1' (0x31)	(0x2E)	'1' (0x31)	space (0x20)
SPDM 1.2	's'	'p'	'd'	'm'	'1'	''	'2'	space
	(0x73)	(0x70)	(0x64)	(Øx6D)	(0x31)	(0x2E)	(0x32)	(0x20)
SPDM 1.3	's'	'p'	'd'	'm'	'1'	''	'3'	space
	(0x73)	(0x70)	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x31)	(0x2E)	(0x33)	(0x20)

Note that the eighth byte of the version text is a space (0x20).


The HKDF-Expand function prototype, as used by the default SPDM key schedule, is as follows:

HKDF-Expand(secret, context, Hash.Length)

766 The HKDF-Extract function prototype is described as follows:

```
HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM);
```

- 767 where
 - IKM is the Input Keying Material.
- For HKDF-Expand and HKDF-Extract, the hash function shall be the selected hash function in ALGORITHMS response. Hash.Length shall be the length of the output of the hash function selected by the ALGORITHMS response.
- 769 Both Responder and Requester shall use the key schedule that Figure 27 Key schedule shows.
- 770 Figure 27 Key schedule



- 772 In the figure, arrows going out of the box are outputs of that box. Arrows going into the box are inputs into the box and point to the specific input parameter they are used in. All boxes represent a single function producing a single output and are given a name for clarity.
- 773 Table 89 Key schedule accompanies the figure to complete the Key Schedule. The Responder and Requester shall also adhere to the definition of this table.

774 Table 89 — H	Key schedule
------------------	--------------

Variable	Definition
Salt_0	A zero-filled array of Hash.Length length.
0_filled	A zero-filled array of Hash.Length length.
bin_str0	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "derived", NULL)
bin_str1	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "req hs data", TH1)

Variable	Definition
bin_str2	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "rsp hs data", TH1)
bin_str3	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "req app data", TH2)
bin_str4	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "rsp app data", TH2)
DHE Secret	This shall be the secret derived from KEY_EXCHANGE/KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP
Pre-shared Key	PSK

⁷⁷⁵ Note: With common hash functions, any label longer than 12 characters requires an additional iteration of the hash function to compute. As in RFC8446, the previously defined labels have all been chosen to fit within this limit.

⁷⁷⁶ **12.1 DHE secret computation**

- 777 The DHE secret is a shared secret and its computation is different per algorithm or algorithm class. These clauses define the format and computation for DHE algorithms.
- For ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, the format and computation of the DHE secret shall be the shared secret, which section 7.4 of RFC8446 defines.
- For SM2_P256, the parameters of this curve are defined in the TCG Algorithm Registry. The DHE secret shall be K_A and K_B as defined in GB/T 32918.3-2016. The Requester shall compute K_A and the Responder shall compute K_B to arrive to the same secret value. K_A and K_B are the results of a KDF. This specification shall use the KDF as defined by the GB/T 32918.3-2016. The size of the DHE secret, referred to as klen in the KDF of GB/T 32918.3 specification, shall be the key size of the selected AEAD algorithm in RespAlgStruct. Lastly, GB/T 32918.3 allows for a flexible hash algorithm. The hash algorithm shall be the selected hash algorithm in BashHashSel or ExtHashSel.

⁷⁸⁰ 12.2 Transcript hash in key derivation

- 781 The key schedule uses two transcript hashes:
 - TH1
 - TH2

⁷⁸² **12.3 TH1 definition**

783 If the Requester and Responder used KEY_EXCHANGE / KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP to exchange initial keying information, then **TH1** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:

- 1. VCA
- 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.

- 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
- 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . * except the ResponderVerifyData field
- 784 If the Requester and Responder used PSK_EXCHANGE / PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP to exchange initial keying information, then **TH1** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:
 - 1. VCA
 - 2. [PSK_EXCHANGE] . *
 - 3. [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP] . * except the ResponderVerifyData field

⁷⁸⁵ 12.4 TH2 definition

- 786 If the Requester and Responder used KEY_EXCHANGE / KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP to exchange initial keying information, then **TH2** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:
 - 1. VCA
 - 2. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of KEY_EXCHANGE) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used.
 - 3. [KEY_EXCHANGE] . *
 - 4. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
 - 5. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (that is, Param2 of FINISH) or hash of the public key in its provisioned format, if a certificate is not used. (Valid only in mutual authentication)
 - 6. [FINISH].*
 - 7. [FINISH_RSP].*
- 787 If the Requester and Responder used PSK_EXCHANGE / PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP to exchange initial keying information, then **TH2** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:
 - 1. VCA
 - 2. [PSK_EXCHANGE] . *
 - 3. [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP] . *
 - 4. [PSK_FINISH] . * (if issued)
 - 5. [PSK_FINISH_RSP] . * (if issued)

⁷⁸⁸ 12.5 Key schedule major secrets

- 789 The key schedule produces four major secrets:
 - Request-direction handshake secret (S₀)
 - Response-direction handshake secret (S1)
 - Request-direction data secret (S₂)
 - Response-direction data secret (S₃)

790 Each secret applies in a certain direction of transmission and only valid during a certain time frame. These four major secrets, each, will be used to derive their respective encryption key and IV to be used in the AEAD function as selected in the ALGORITHMS response.

791 12.5.1 Request-direction handshake secret

792 This secret shall only be used during the session handshake phase and shall be applied to all requests after KEY_EXCHANGE or PSK_EXCHANGE up to and including FINISH or PSK_FINISH.

793 12.5.2 Response-direction handshake secret


This secret shall only be used during the session handshake phase and shall be applied to all responses after KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP or PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP up to and including FINISH_RSP or PSK_FINISH_RSP.

795 12.5.3 Request-direction data secret

796 This secret shall be used for any data transmitted during the application phase of the session. This secret shall only be applied for all data traveling from the Requester to the Responder.

797 12.5.4 Response-direction data secret

- 798 This secret shall be used for any data transmitted during the application phase of the session. This secret shall only be applied for all data traveling from the Responder to the Requester.
- 799 Figure 28 Secrets usage illustrates where each of the major secrets are used, as described previously.
- 800 Figure 28 Secrets usage



⁸⁰² **12.6 Encryption key and IV derivation**

803 For each key schedule major secret, the following function shall be applied to obtain the encryption key and IV value.

EncryptionKey = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str5, key_length); IV = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str6, iv_length); bin_str5 = BinConcat(key_length, Version, "key", NULL);

bin_str6 = BinConcat(iv_length, Version, "iv", NULL);

804 Both key_length and iv_length shall be the lengths associated with the selected AEAD algorithm in ALGORITHMS message.

⁸⁰⁵ 12.7 finished_key derivation

806 This key shall be used to compute the RequesterVerifyData and ResponderVerifyData fields used in various SPDM messages. The key, finished_key is defined as follows:

```
finished_key = HKDF-Expand(handshake-secret, bin_str7, Hash.Length);
bin_str7 = BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "finished", NULL);
```

807 The handshake-secret shall either be request-direction handshake secret or response-direction handshake secret.

⁸⁰⁸ 12.8 Deriving additional keys from the Export Master Secret

809 After a successful SPDM key exchange, additional keys can be derived from the Export Master Secret. How keys are derived is outside the scope of this specification.

```
Export Master Secret = HKDF-Expand(Master-Secret, bin_str8, Hash.Length);
bin_str8 = BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "exp master", TH2);
```

⁸¹⁰ 12.9 Major secrets update

- 811 The major secrets can be updated during an active session to avoid the overhead of closing down a session and recreating the session. This is achieved by issuing the KEY_UPDATE request.
- 812 The major secrets are re-keyed as a result of this. To compute the new secret for each new major data secret, the following algorithm shall be applied.

```
new_secret = HKDF-Expand(current_secret, bin_str9, Hash.Length);
bin_str9 = BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "traffic upd", NULL);
```

813 In computing the new secret, current_secret shall either be the current Request-Direction Data Secret or Response-Direction Data Secret. As a consequence of updating these secrets, new encryption keys and salts shall be derived from the new secrets and used immediately.

⁸¹⁴ **13 Application data**

- 815 SPDM utilizes authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher algorithms in much the same way that TLS 1.3 does to protect both the confidentiality and integrity of data that shall remain secret, as well as the integrity of data that need to be transmitted in the clear, such as protocol headers, but shall be protected from manipulation. AEAD algorithms provide both encryption and message authentication. Each algorithm specifies the details such as the size of the nonce, the position and length of the MAC and many other factors to ensure a strong cryptographic algorithm.
- 816 AEAD functions shall provide the following functions and comply with the requirements defined in RFC5116:

AEAD_Encrypt(encryption_key, nonce, associated_data, plaintext); AEAD_Decrypt(encryption_key, nonce, associated_data, ciphertext);

817 where

- AEAD_Encrypt is the function that fully encrypts the plaintext, computes the MAC across both the associated_data and plaintext, and produces the ciphertext, which includes the MAC.
- AEAD_Decrypt is the function that verifies the MAC and if validation is successful, fully decrypts the ciphertext and produces the original plaintext .
- encryption_key is the derived encryption key for the respective direction. See the Key schedule clause.
- nonce is the nonce computation. See the Nonce derivation clause.
- associated_data is the associated data.
- plaintext is the data to encrypt.
- ciphertext is the data to decrypt.

⁸¹⁸ 13.1 Nonce derivation

819 Certain AEAD ciphers have specific requirements on nonce construction because their security properties can be compromised by the accidental reuse of a nonce value. Implementations should follow the requirements, such as those provided in RFC5116 for nonce derivation.

⁸²⁰ 14 General opaque data format

- 821 The general opaque data format allows for a mixture of vendors, standard organizations or transport-specific data to accompany an SPDM message without namespace collisions.
- 822 If the OpaqueDataFmt1 bit is selected in OtherParamsSelection of ALGORITHMS, then all opaque data fields in SPDM messages shall use the format that Table 90 General opaque data format defines.

823 Table 90 — General opaque data format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	TotalElements	1	Shall be the total number of elements in $\ensuremath{\mbox{\tiny OpaqueList}}$.
1	Reserved	3	Reserved.
4	OpaqueList	Variable	Shall be a list of opaque elements. See Table 91 — Opaque element.

824 Table 91 — Opaque element defines the format for each element in OpaqueList .

825 **Table 91 — Opaque element**

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	ID	1	Shall be one of the values in the ID column of Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID.
1	VendorIDLen	1	Length in bytes of the VendorID field. If the data in OpaqueElementData belongs to a standards body, this field shall be 0. Otherwise, the data in OpaqueElementData belongs to the vendor and therefore, this field shall be the length indicated in the Vendor ID column of Table 47 — Registry or standards body ID for the respective ID .
2	VendorID	VendorIDLen	If VendorIDLen is greater than zero, this field shall be the ID of the vendor corresponding to the ID field. Otherwise, this field shall be absent.
2 + VendorIDLen	OpaqueElementDataLen	2	Shall be the length of OpaqueElementData .

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
4 + VendorIDLen	OpaqueElementData	OpaqueElementDataLen	Shall be the data defined by the vendor or standards body.
4 + VendorIDLen + OpaqueElementDataLen	AlignPadding	AlignPaddingSize = 0, 1, 2, or 3	If 4 + VendorIDLen + OpaqueElementDataLen does not fall on a 4-byte boundary, this field shall be present and of the correct length to ensure 4 + VendorIDLen + OpaqueElementDataLen + AlignPaddingSize is a multiple of 4. The value of this field shall be all zeros and the size of this field shall be 0, 1, 2 or 3.

⁸²⁶ **15 Signature generation**

- 827 The **SPDMsign** function, used in various part of this specification, defines the signature generation algorithm while accounting for the differences in the various supported cryptographic signing algorithms in **ALGORITHMS** message.
- 828 The signature generation function takes this form:

```
signature = SPDMsign(PrivKey, data_to_be_signed, context);
```

- 829 The SPDMsign function shall take these input parameters:
 - Privkey : a secret key
 - data_to_be_signed : a bit stream of the data that will be signed
 - context : a string
- 830 The function shall output a signature using PrivKey and a selected cryptographic signing algorithm.
- 831 The signing function shall follow these steps to create spdm_prefix and spdm_context (See Text or string encoding for encoding rules):
 - 1. Create spdm_prefix. The spdm_prefix shall be the repetition, four times, of the concatenation of "dmtf-spdm-v", SPDMversionString, and ".*". This will form a 64-character string.
 - 2. Create spdm_context. If the Requester is generating the signature, then spdm_context shall be the concatenation of "requester-" and context . If the Responder is generating the signature, the spdm_context shall be the concatenation of "responder-" and context .
- Here is an example, named Example 1:
- 833 If the version of this specification is 1.4.3, the Responder is generating a signature and context is "my example context". The sdpm_prefix is "dmtf-spdm-v1.4.*dmtf-spdm-v1.4.*dmtf-spdm-v1.4.*dmtf-spdm-v1.4.*". The spdm_context is "responder-my example context".
- 834 Next, form combined_spdm_prefix . The combined_spdm_prefix shall be the concatenation of spdm_prefix , a byte with a value of zero, zero_pad , and spdm_context . The size of zero_pad shall be the number of bytes needed to ensure the length of combined_spdm_prefix is 100 bytes. The size of zero_pad can be zero. The value of zero_pad shall be zero.
- 835 Continuing Example 1, Table 92 Combined SPDM prefix shows the combined_spdm_prefix with offsets. Offsets increase from left to right and top to bottom. As shown, the length of combined_spdm_prefix is 100 bytes. Hexadecimal equivalents are shown in parentheses for clarity. See Text or string encoding for encoding rules.
- 836 Table 92 Combined SPDM prefix

Offset	0x0	0x1	0x2	0x3	0x4	0x5	0x6	0x7	0x8	0x9	0xA	0xB	0xC	0xD	0xE	0xF
0	'd'	'm'	't'	'f'	'_'	's'	'p'	'd'	'm'	'_'	'V'	'1'	'.'	'4'	'.'	'*'
	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x74)	(0x66)	(0x2D)	(0x73)	(0x70)	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x2D)	(0x76)	(0x31)	(0x2E)	(0x34)	(0x2E)	(0x2A)
0x10	'd'	'm'	't'	'f'	' <u>-</u> '	's'	'p'	'd'	'm'	' <u>-</u> '	'V'	'1'	'.'	'4'	':'	'*'
	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x74)	(0x66)	(0x2D)	(0x73)	(0x70)	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x2D)	(0x76)	(0x31)	(0x2E)	(0x34)	(0x2E)	(0x2A)
0x20	'd'	'm'	't'	'f'	' <u>-</u> '	's'	'p'	'd'	'm'	' <u>-</u> '	'V'	'1'	'.'	'4'	':'	'*'
	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x74)	(0x66)	(0x2D)	(0x73)	(0x70)	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x2D)	(0x76)	(0x31)	(0x2E)	(0x34)	(0x2E)	(0x2A)
0x30	'd'	'm'	't'	'f'	' <u>-</u> '	's'	'p'	'd'	'm'	' <u>-</u> '	'V'	'1'	'.'	'4'	':'	'*'
	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x74)	(0x66)	(0x2D)	(0x73)	(0x70)	(0x64)	(0x6D)	(0x2D)	(0x76)	(0x31)	(0x2E)	(0x34)	(0x2E)	(0x2A)
0x40	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	0x0	'r' (0x72)	'e' (0x65)	's' (0x73)	'p' (0x70)	'0' (0x6F)	'n' (0x6E)	'd' (0x64)	'e' (0x65)
0x50	'r'	' <u>'</u> '	'm'	'y'	space	'e'	'X'	'a'	'm'	'p'	'l'	'e'	space	'c'	'O'	'n'
	(0x72)	(0x2D)	(0x6D)	(0x79)	(0x20)	(0x65)	(0x78)	(0x61)	(0x6D)	(0x70)	(0x6C)	(0x65)	(0x20)	(0x63)	(0x6F)	(0x6E)
0x60	'ť' (0x74)	'e' (0x65)	'X' (0x78)	't' (0x74)												

- 837 The next step is to form the message_hash . The message_hash shall be the hash of data_to_be_signed using the selected hash function in either BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel . Many hash algorithms allow implementations to compute an intermediate hash, sometimes called a running hash. An intermediate hash allows for the updating of the hash as each byte of the ordered data of the message becomes known. Consequently, the ability to compute an intermediate hash allows for memory utilization optimizations where an SPDM endpoint can discard bytes of the message that are already covered by the intermediate hash while waiting for more bytes of the message to be received.
- 838 If the Responder is generating the signature, the selected cryptographic signing algorithm is indicated in exactly one of BaseAsymSel or ExtAsymSel in ALGORITHMS message. If the Requester is generating the signature, the selected cryptographic signing algorithm is indicated in ReqBaseAsymAlg of RespAlgStruct in ALGORITHMS message.
- 839 Because each cryptographic signing algorithm is vastly different, these clauses define the binding of SPDMsign to those algorithms.

⁸⁴⁰ **15.1 Signing algorithms in extensions**

841 If an algorithm is selected in either the ExtAsymSel or AlgExternal of ReqBaseAsymAlg of RespAlgStruct in ALGORITHMS response, its binding is out of scope of this specification.

⁸⁴² 15.2 RSA and ECDSA signing algorithms

All RSA and ECDSA specifications do not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the hash function selected by the Responder in BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel.

- 844 The private key, defined by the specification for these algorithms, shall be PrivKey.
- 845 In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message to be signed. M shall be the concatenation of combined_spdm_prefix and message_hash.
- 846 RSA and ECDSA algorithms are described in Signature algorithm references.

⁸⁴⁷ 15.3 EdDSA signing algorithms

- 848 These algorithms are described in RFC8032.
- 849 The private key, defined by RFC8032, shall be PrivKey.
- 850 In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message to be signed.

851 **15.3.1 Ed25519 sign**

- 852 This specification only defines Ed25519 usage and not its variants.
- 853 $\,$ M shall be the concatenation of <code>combined_spdm_prefix</code> and <code>message_hash</code> .

854 15.3.2 Ed448 sign

- 855 This specification only defines Ed448 usage and not its variants.
- 856 M shall be the concatenation of combined_spdm_prefix and message_hash .
- 857 Ed448 defines a context string, c . c shall be the spdm_context .

⁸⁵⁸ **15.4 SM2 signing algorithm**

- 859 This algorithm is described in GB/T 32918.2-2016. GB/T 32918.2-2016 also defines the variable M and IDA.
- 860 The private key, defined by GB/T 32918.2-2016, shall be PrivKey.
- 861 In the specification for SM2, the letter M denotes the message to be signed. M shall be the concatenation of combined_spdm_prefix and message_hash.
- 862 The SM2 specification does not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the hash function selected by the Responder in BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel.
- Lastly, SM2 expects a distinguishing identifier, which identifies the signer, and is indicated by the variable ID_A. If this algorithm is selected, the ID shall be an empty string of size 0.

⁸⁶⁴ 15.5 Signature algorithm references

865 These clauses provide basic information about each asymmetric algorithms SPDM supports as Table 93 — SPDM

Asymmetric Signature Reference Information shows. SPDM endpoints shall use the references in the **References** column for signature related operations and the key size as indicated in the **Key Size** columns for the respective algorithm. The byte order for a signature when placing it into an SPDM signature field shall be the Signature byte order.

866

Table 93 — SPDM Asymmetric Signature Reference Information

Algorithm Name	Key Size (bits)	References
TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048	2048	Section 8.2 of IETF RFC 8017
TPM_ALG_RSASSA_3072	3072	Section 8.2 of IETF RFC 8017
TPM_ALG_RSASSA_4096	4096	Section 8.2 of IETF RFC 8017
TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048	2048	Section 8.1 of IETF RFC 8017
TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072	3072	Section 8.1 of IETF RFC 8017
TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096	4096	Section 8.1 of IETF RFC 8017
TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256	256	Section 6 of FIPS PUB 186-4 using TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 curve parameters as TCG Algorithm Registry defines.
TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384	384	Section 6 of FIPS PUB 186-4 using TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 curve parameters as TCG Algorithm Registry defines.
TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521	521	Section 6 of FIPS PUB 186-4 using TPM_ECC_NIST_P521 curve parameters as TCG Algorithm Registry defines.
TPM_ALG_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256	256	Section 6 of GB/T 32918.2-2016 using TPM_ECC_SM2_P256 curve parameters as defined in TCG Algorithm Registry.
EdDSA ed25519	256	IETF RFC8032
EdDSA ed448	456	IETF RFC8032

⁸⁶⁷ **16 Signature verification**

- 868 The SPDMsignatureVerify function, used in various part of this specification, defines the signature verification algorithm while accounting for the differences in the various supported cryptographic signing algorithms in ALGORITHMS message.
- 869 The signature verification function takes this form:

```
SPDMsignatureVerify(PubKey, signature, unverified_data, context);
```

- 870 The SPDMsignatureVerify function shall take these input parameters:
 - PubKey : the public key
 - signature : a digital signature
 - unverified_data : a bit stream of data that needs to be verified
 - context : a string
- 871 The function shall verify the unverified_data using signature, PubKey, and a selected cryptographic signing algorithm. SPDMsignatureVerify shall return success if the signature verifies correctly and failure otherwise. Each cryptographic signing algorithm states the verification steps or criteria for successful verification.
- 872 The verifier of the signature shall create spdm_prefix, spdm_context and combined_spdm_context as described in Signature generation.
- 873 The next step is to form the unverified_message_hash . The unverified_message_hash shall be the hash of unverified_data using the selected hash function in either BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel .
- 874 If the Responder generated the signature, the selected cryptographic signature verification algorithm is indicated in exactly one of BaseAsymSel or ExtAsymSel in ALGORITHMS message. If the Requester generated the signature, the selected cryptographic signature verification algorithm is indicated in ReqBaseAsymAlg of RespAlgStruct in ALGORITHMS message.
- 875 Because each cryptographic signature verification algorithm is vastly different, these clauses define the binding of SPDMsignatureVerify to those algorithms.

⁸⁷⁶ **16.1 Signature verification algorithms in extensions**

877 If an algorithm is selected in either the ExtAsymSel or AlgExternal of ReqBaseAsymAlg of RespAlgStruct in ALGORITHMS response, its binding is out of scope of this specification.

⁸⁷⁸ 16.2 RSA and ECDSA signature verification algorithms

- 879 All RSA and ECDSA specifications do not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the hash function selected by the Responder in BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel.
- 880 The public key, defined in the specification for these algorithms, shall be PubKey.
- 881 In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message that is signed. M shall be concatenation of the combined_spdm_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- 882 For RSA algorithms, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return success when the output of the signature verification operation, as defined in the RSA specification, is "valid signature". Otherwise, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return a failure.
- 883 For ECDSA algorithms, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return success when the output of "Verification with the Public Key" as defined in ANSI X9.62-2005 is "valid". Otherwise, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return failure.
- 884 RSA and ECDSA algorithms are described in Signature algorithm references.

⁸⁸⁵ 16.3 EdDSA signature verification algorithms

- 886 RFC8032 describes these algorithms. RFC8032, also, defines the M, PH, and c variables.
- The public key, also defined in RFC8032, shall be PubKey .
- 888 In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message to be signed.

889 16.3.1 Ed25519 verify

- 890 M shall be the concatenation of combined_spdm_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- 891 SPDMsignatureVerify shall return success when step 1 does not result in an invalid signature and the constraints of the group equation in step 3 are met as described in RFC8032 section 5.1.7. Otherwise, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return failure.

892 **16.3.2 Ed448 verify**

- 893 M shall be the concatenation of combined_spdm_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- 894 Ed448 defines a context string, c . c shall be the spdm_context .
- 895 SPDMsignatureVerify shall return success when step 1 does not result in an invalid signature and the constraints of the group equation in step 3 are met as described in RFC8032 section 5.2.7. Otherwise, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return failure.

⁸⁹⁶ **16.4 SM2 signature verification algorithm**

- 897 This algorithm is described in GB/T 32918.2-2016, which also defines the variable M and IDA.
- 898 The public key, also defined in GB/T 32918.2-2016, shall be PubKey .
- 899 In the specification for SM2, the variable M' is used to denote the message that is signed. M' shall be the concatenation of combined_spdm_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- 900 The SM2 specification does not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the hash function selected by the Responder in BaseHashSel or ExtHashSel.
- 901 Lastly, SM2 expects a distinguishing identifier, which identifies the signer, and is indicated by the variable ID_A. See SM2 signing algorithm to create the value for ID_A.
- 902 SPDMsignatureVerify shall return success when the Digital signature verification algorithm, as described in GB/T 32918.2-2016, outputs an "accept". Otherwise, SPDMsignatureVerify shall return failure.

⁹⁰³ **17 General ordering rules**

- 904 These general ordering rules apply to SPDM messages that form a transcript that eventually gets signed.
- 905 When requests are received out of order, the Responder can silently discard all requests or return an ERROR message with ErrorCode=RequestResynch (with the exception of GET_VERSION) until the Requester issues a GET_VERSION. Out of order requests shall nullify the transcript.
- 906 A Requester can retry messages. The retries shall be identical to the first, excluding transport variances. However, if the Responder sees two or more non-identical GET_CAPABILITIES or NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, the Responder shall return an ERROR message with ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest or silently discard non-identical GET_CAPABILITIES or NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS requests. Because a retried message is identical to the first, a retried message shall not be used in transcript hash calculations.
- 907 For CHALLENGE and Session-Secrets-Exchange, the Responder should ensure it can distinguish between the respective retry and the respective original message. Failure to distinguish correctly might lead to an authentication failure, session handshake failures, and other failures. The response to a retried request should be identical to the original response.

⁹⁰⁸ 18 ANNEX A (informative) TLS 1.3

- 909 This specification heavily models TLS 1.3. TLS 1.3 and consequently this specification assumes the transport layers provide these capabilities or attributes:
 - Reliability in transmission and reception of data.
 - Transmission of data is either in order or the order of data can be reconstructed at reception.
- 910 While not all transports are created equal, if a transport cannot meet these capabilities, adoption of SPDM is still possible. In these transports, this specification recommends The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3, which at the time of this specification is still a draft.

⁹¹¹ **19 ANNEX B (informative) Device certificate example**

912 Device certificate example shows an example device certificate:

913 Device certificate example

```
----
Certificate:
   Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number: 8 (0x8)
        Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
        Issuer: C = CA, ST = NC, L = city, O = ACME, OU = ACME Devices, CN = CA
        Validity
            Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
            Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
        Subject: C = US, ST = NC, O = ACME Widget Manufacturing, OU = ACME Widget Manufacturing Unit, CN
= w0123456789
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:ba:67:47:72:78:da:28:81:d9:81:9b:db:88:03:
                    e1:10:a4:91:b8:48:ed:6b:70:3c:ec:a2:68:a9:3b:
                    5f:78:fc:ae:4a:d1:1c:63:76:54:a8:40:31:26:7f:
                    ff:3e:e0:bf:95:5c:4a:b4:6f:11:56:ca:c8:11:53:
                    23:e1:1d:a2:7a:a5:f0:22:d8:b2:fb:43:da:dd:bd:
                    52:6b:e6:a5:3f:0f:3b:60:b8:74:db:56:08:d9:ee:
                    a0:30:4a:03:21:1e:ee:60:ad:e4:00:7a:6e:6b:32:
                    1c:28:7e:9c:e8:c3:54:db:63:fd:1f:d1:46:20:9e:
                    ef:80:88:00:5f:25:db:cf:43:46:c6:1f:50:19:7f:
                    98:23:84:38:88:47:5d:51:8e:11:62:6f:0f:28:77:
                    a7:20:0e:f3:74:27:82:70:a7:96:5b:1b:bb:10:e7:
                    95:62:f5:37:4b:ba:20:4e:3c:c9:18:b2:cd:4b:58:
                    70:ab:a2:bc:f6:2f:ed:2f:48:92:be:5a:cc:5c:5e:
                    a8:ea:9d:60:e8:f8:85:7d:c0:0d:2f:6a:08:74:d1:
                    2f:e8:5e:3d:b7:35:a6:1d:d2:a6:04:99:d3:90:43:
                    66:35:e1:74:10:a8:97:3b:49:05:51:61:07:c6:08:
                    01:1c:dc:a8:5f:9e:30:97:a8:18:6c:f9:b1:2c:56:
                    e8:67
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                CA: FALSE
            X509v3 Key Usage:
                Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment
            X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.412.274.1::ACME:WIDGET:0123456789
    Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
```

Signature Value:

30:45:02:20:1e:5a:a6:ed:5c:b6:2b:f5:9e:22:28:9c:ef:c7: aa:db:1c:87:83:48:c1:50:cb:25:04:ab:c9:6e:7c:f5:6b:01: 02:21:00:da:48:d4:49:a5:65:5c:2c:83:fc:05:00:66:48:98: f8:f0:cb:63:b7:2e:87:db:c8:63:58:6c:21:91:7a:68:95

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIC4jCCAoigAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBcMQswCQYDVQQGEwJDQTELMAkG A1UECAwCTkMxDTALBgNVBAcMBGNpdHkxDTALBgNVBAoMBEFDTUUxFTATBgNVBAsM DEFDTUUgRGV2aWN1czELMAkGA1UEAwwCQ0EwIBcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPOTk5 OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMH0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJ0QzEiMCAGA1UE CgwZQUNNRSBXaWRnZXQgTWFudWZhY3R1cmluZzEnMCUGA1UECwweQUNNRSBXaWRn ZXQgTWFudWZhY3R1cmluZyBVbml0MRQwEgYDVQQDDAt3MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTCCASIw DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALpnR3J42iiB2YGb24gD4RCkkbhI 7WtwPOyiaKk7X3j8rkrRHGN2VKhAMSZ//z7gv5VcSrRvEVbKyBFTI+Edonq18CLY svtD2t29UmvmpT8PO2C4dNtWCNnuoDBKAyEe7mCt5AB6bmsyHCh+nOjDVNtj/R/R RiCe74CIAF81289DRsYfUB1/mCOE0IhHXVG0EWJvDyh3pyA083QngnCnllsbuxDn lWL1N0u6IE48yRiyzUtYcKuivPYv7S9Ikr5azFxeqOqdY0j4hX3ADS9qCHTRL+he Pbc1ph3SpgSZ05BDZjXhdBColztJBVFhB8YIARzcqF+eMJeoGGz5sSxW6GcCAwEA ${\tt AaNNMEswCQYDVR0TBAIwADALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBeAwMQYDVR0RBCowKKAmBgorBgEE}$ AYMcghIBoBgMFkFDTUU6V0lER0VU0jAxMjM0NTY30DkwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw RQIgHlqm7Vy2K/WeIiic78eq2xyHg0jBUMs1BKvJbnz1awECIQDaSNRJpWVcLIP8 BQBmSJj48Mtjty6H28hjWGwhkXpolQ==

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

⁹¹⁴ **20 ANNEX C (informative) OID reference**

915 Table 94 — Object identifiers (OIDs) lists all object identifiers (OIDs) that this specification defines:

916 Table 94 — Object identifiers (OIDs)

OID	Identifier	Definition	Use
{ 1 3 6 1 4 1 412 }	id-DMTF	DMTF OID	Enterprise ID for DMTF
{ id-DMTF 274 }	id-DMTF-spdm	SPDM OID	Base OID for all SPDM OIDs
{ id-DMTF-spdm 1 }	id-DMTF-device-info	SPDM certificate requirements and recommendations	Certificate device information.
{ id-DMTF-spdm 2 }	id-DMTF-hardware-identity	Identity provisioning	Hardware certificate identifier.
{ id-DMTF-spdm 3 }	id-DMTF-eku-responder-auth	Extended Key Usage authentication OIDs	Certificate Extended Key Usage - SPDM Responder Authentication.
{ id-DMTF-spdm 4 }	id-DMTF-eku-requester-auth	Extended Key Usage authentication OIDs	Certificate Extended Key Usage - SPDM Requester Authentication.
{ id-DMTF-spdm 5 }	id-DMTF-mutable-certificate	Identity provisioning	Mutable certificate identifier.
{ id-DMTF-spdm 6 }	id-DMTF-SPDM-extension	SPDM Non-Critical Certificate OID	To contain other OIDs in a certificate extension.

⁹¹⁷ 21 ANNEX D (informative) variable name reference

918 Throughout this document, various sizes and offsets are referred to by a variable. Table 95 — Variables lists variables used in this document, the definition of the variable, and the location in this document that shows how the variable is set.

919 Table 95 — Variables

Symbol	Definition	Set location
A	Number of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms.	Table 13 — NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format
A'	Number of extended asymmetric key signature algorithms selected by the Requester.	Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format
D	The size of D (and C for ECDHE) is derived from the selected DHE group.	See the KEY_EXCHANGE request message format in Table 56 — KEY_EXCHANGE request message format.
E	Number of Requester-supported extended hashing algorithms.	Table 13 — NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format
E'	The number of extended hashing algorithms selected requested by the Requester.	Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format
н	The output size, in bytes, of the hash algorithm agreed upon in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS .	Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format
MS	The length of the cryptographic hash or raw bit stream, as indicated in DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7] .	Table 43 — DMTF measurement specification format
NL	The length of the Nonce field in the GET_MEASUREMENTS request and the MEASUREMENTS response.	GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes
n	Number of version entries in the VERSION response message.	Table 9 — Successful VERSION response message format
Q	Length of the ResponderContext.	Table 62 — PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format
Р	Length of the PSKHint .	Table 61 — PSK_EXCHANGE request message format
R	Length of the RequesterContext .	Table 61 — PSK_EXCHANGE request message format
SigLen	The size of the asymmetric-signing algorithm output, in bytes, that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message.	Table 19 — Successful ALGORITHMS response message format

⁹²⁰ 22 ANNEX E (informative) change log

⁹²¹ 22.1 Version 1.0.0 (2019-10-16)

Initial Release

⁹²² 22.2 Version 1.1.0 (2020-07-15)

- · Minor typographical fixes
- USB Authentication Specification 1.0 link updated
- · Tables are no longer numbered. They are now named.
- · Fix internal document links in SPDM response codes table.
- · Added sentence to paragraph 97 to clarify on the potential to skip messages after a reset.
- Removed text at paragraph 181.
- Subject Alternative Name otherName field in Optional fields references DMTF OID section.
- DMTF0therName definition changed to properly meet ASN.1 syntax.
- Text in figures are now searchable.
- · Corrected example of a leaf certificate in Annex A.
- · Minor edits to figures for clarity.
- Clarified that transcript hash could include hash of the raw public key if a certificate is not used.
- New:
 - Added Session support.
 - Added SPDM request and response messages to support initiating, maintaining and terminating a secure session.
 - Added Key schedule for session secrets derivation.
 - Added Application Data to provide overview of how data is encrypted and authenticated in a session.
 - Introduce new terms and definitions.
 - Added Measurement Manifest to DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType .
 - Added mutual authentication.
 - Added Encapsulated request flow to support master-slave types of transports.

⁹²³ 22.3 Version 1.2.0 (2021-11-01)

- Clarified SPDM version selection after receiving VERSION Response with error handling for certain scenarios.
- Fix improper reference in DMTFSpecMeasurementValue field in "Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF" table.

- Certificate digests in **DIGESTS** calculation clarified.
- Format of certificate in CertChain parameter of CERTIFICATE message clarified.
- Validity period of X.509 v3 certificate clarified in Required Fields
- Remove InvalidSession error code.
- Clarified transport responsibilities in PSK_EXCHANGE and PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP.
- Clarified the usage of MutAuthRequested field in KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP .
- Added recommendation of PSK usage when an SPDM endpoint can be a Requester and Responder.
- Added recommendation for usage of RequesterContext in PSK scenarios.
- Clarified capabilities for Requester and Responder in GET_CAPABILITIES and CAPABILITIES messages.
- Clarified timing requirements for encapsulated requests.
- · Clarified out of order and retries
- · Clarified error-handling actions when unexpected requests occurs during various mutual authentication flows.
- Refer to slot number fields as SlotID and normalize SlotID fields to 4 bits where possible.
- Changed PSK_FINISH and FINISH changes in Table 6 SPDM request and response messages validity.
- Clarified HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP usage in PSK_EXCHANGE .
- Change SPDMVersion field in every request and response message, except GET_VERSION / VERSION messages, to point to a central location in this specification where it explains the appropriate value to populate for this field.
- Clarified use case for Token field in ResponseNotReady .
- Clarified the format of the of the certificate chain used in the Transcript hash calculation in Transcript hash calculation rules.
- Renamed Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF table to Table 43 DMTF measurement specification format.
- Clarified the ENCAP_CAP field in the capabilities of the Requester and Responder.
- Renamed Mutual Authentication in KEY_EXCHANGE to Session-based mutual authentication.
- ERROR responses are no longer required in most error scenarios.
- · Clarify the definition of backwards compatible changes in Version encoding.
- Enhanced requirements for when a firmware update occurred on a Responder in GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages.
- Clarified error code ResponseNotReady for M1/M2 and L1/L2 computation.
- Clarified byte order for ASN.1 encoded data, hashes and digests.
- Requester should not use PSK_EXCHANGE if CHALLENGE_AUTH and/or MEASUREMENTS with signature was received from Responder.
- Required GET_VERSION, VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, and ALGORITHMS in transcript even if negotiated state is supported.
- · Enhanced signature generation and verification with a prefix to mitigate signature misuse attacks.
- Clarified behavior of END_SESSION with respect to Negotiated State when there are multiple active sessions.
- Added new defined term Reset to mean device reset. Updated use of the word reset for M1/M2, L1/L2.
- Clarified that a Measurement Manifest should support both hash and raw bit stream formats.

- · Clarified Measurement Summary Hash construction rules.
- Clarified minimum timing for HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response messages to be sufficiently greater than T1. Removed command specific guidance on retry timing.
- Table codification changed to be consistent with DMTF template.
- New:
 - Added support for AliasCert S.
 - Compliant Requesters must support a Responder that uses either DeviceCerts Or AliasCert s.
 - Added Certain error handling in encapsulated flows
 - Added Slot 0 certificate provisioning methodology.
 - Added Allowance for encapsulated requests.
 - Allowed GET_CERTIFICATE followed by CHALLENGE flow after a reset in M1 and M2 message transcript.
 - Added new features for GET_MEASUREMENTS and MEASUREMENTS :
 - More measurement value types.
 - Allow Requester to request hash or raw bit stream for measurement from the Responder.
 - Added Advice.
 - Added structured representation of device mode Device mode field of a measurement block.
 - Added Text or string encoding.
 - Signature Clarification:
 - Added Signature generation and Signature verification for clarity and interoperability.
 - Change Sign and Verify abstract function to SPDMsign and SPDMsignatureVerify respectively.
 - Added General ordering rules and references to it, to describe additional requirements for the various transcript and message transcripts.
 - Added additional clause for checking FINISH.Param2 if handshake is in the clear.
 - Added OIDs to represent:
 - Hardware certificate identifier (Identity provisioning)
 - Certificate Extended Key Usage SPDM Responder Authentication (Extended Key Usage authentication OIDs)
 - Certificate Extended Key Usage SPDM Requester Authentication (Extended Key Usage authentication OIDs)
 - Mutable certificate identifier (Identity provisioning)
 - Added SM2 to Base Asymmetric Algorithms and Key Exchange Protocols.
 - Added SM3 to Base Hash Algorithms and Measurement Hash Algorithms.
 - Added SM4 to AEAD Algorithms.
 - · Changed symbol "S" denoting signature size to "SigLen" throughout document.
 - Removed potentially confusing mention of "mutual authentication" in PSK_EXCHANGE section.
 - Add method to transfer large SPDM messages. See Large SPDM message transfer mechanism.
 - · Changed Measurement Summary Hash concatenation function inputs.
 - · Clarified requirements for compliant certificate chains.
 - · Tables and figures are now numbered. Though these numbers might change in future versions of

specification, the titles will remain the same.

 Allowed Requester to specify session termination policy when Responder completes firmware or configuration update.

⁹²⁴ 22.4 Version 1.2.1 (2022-05-11)

- Fix minor typographical errors.
- Correct indication that Identity Provisioning OIDs are in the certificate Extended Key Usage, and add SPDM Non-Critical Certificate Extension OID to Table 32 — Optional fields.
- Added Signature Algorithm References clauses to clarify basic information about asymmetric algorithms.
- Added recommended ErrorCode for the case when the Responder detects overlapping SET_CERTIFICATE commands.
- Clarified rules around when the old key can be discarded during KEY_UPDATE .
- Clarified Offset and Length fields in GET_CERTIFICATE message.
- Clarified DataTransferSize and MaxSPDMmsgSize in GET_CAPABILITIES and CAPABILITIES messages.
- Clarified that ENCRYPT_CAP and MAC_CAP apply to all phases of a secure session.
- Clarified the relationship between MAC_CAP and ResponderVerifyData or RequesterVerifyData in Session-Secret-Exchange and Session-Secret-Finish messages.
- Provide more description for HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP in GET_CAPABILITIES and CAPABILITIES messages.
- · Clarified measurement specification related fields in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS and ALGORITHMS .
- Allow the sender to utilize the Large SPDM message transfer mechanism when the transmit buffer size of the sender that is less than the DataBufferSize of the receiving SPDM endpoint.
- · Clarified measurement method for various timing parameters in Timing specification table.
- · Clarified the definition of Session-Secret-Exchange and removed the duplicate definition of it.
- Clarified that VERSION is not to be chunked.
- Edit Figure 22 so that a Secure Session does not encompass Session-Secrets-Exchange.
- Clarified retries from the perspective Responder and Requester in Timing requirements.
- · Clarified effects on out of order message on the transcript and other clarifications in General ordering rules.
- · Added Signature byte order and Octet string byte order clauses.
- Clarified the use of 'OtherParamsSelection'.
- Clarified that CSRdata references RFC2986 CertificationRequest .
- Clarified DER encoding for RequesterInfo
- Clarified the use of OtherParamsSelection .
- Clarified conditions for LargeResponse error.
- Added set_cert_cap, csr_cap and cert_install_reset_cap capabilities bits.
- Clarified measurement signing capabilities in SignatureRequested field of GET_MEASUREMENTS .
- Clarify that Responder Timing measurements are measured under the assumption that the Responder can access the bus.

- Clarified that AlgCount field in Algorithm request and response structures shall be a value of 2.
- Clarified the process to handle a GET_CSR request after a reset.
- Added SET_CERTIFICATE to the list of commands in Table 7 Timing specification for SPDM messages that include a cryptographic operation.
- · Clarify how retried messages affect transcript hash in General ordering rules.
- Required root certificate to always be included in SET_CERTIFICATE.
- Correct Figure 1 SPDM certificate chain models to show AliasCert model.
- Clarify that if a GET_CSR interrupts processing of another GET_CSR, then the existing request is dropped and the new request is processed.
- Clarified updating keys in KEY_UPDATE .
- Clarified that extended algorithms are external to this specification.
- Allowed GET_DIGESTS and GET_CERTIFICATE in session. Updated Table 6.
- · Changed instances of "secure environment" to "trusted environment".
- Clarified (A1, B4, C1) message flow is permitted.
- Added Table 93 SPDM Asymmetric Signature Reference Information
- Added definition of opaque data.
- Changed "cancel" to "invalidate state and data associated with" in GET_VERSION and VERSION response messages.
- Fixed typo in the ExchangeData field of table "Successful KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format".
- Clarified the Request ID for the first message in an optimized encapsulated request flow.
- · Clarified Session-Secrets-Exchange in Optimized encapsulated request flow
- Fixed typo in Table 77.
- Fixed OID value for id-DMTF-device-info to match previous releases.
- Fixed typos and removed redundant grammar in Table 41.
- Updated BinConcat Version to 1.2 in Table 90.
- Clarified definition of DecryptError.
- Renamed "VendorLen" to "VendorIDLen".
- Punctuation and grammar changes as needed.
- Clarified slots 1-7 certificate provisioning.
- Clarified exclusion of signature in CHALLENGE_AUTH and usage of concatenation in Table 36
- Corrected the signing algorithm in the FINISH request's Signature field.
- · Changed ANNEX B from "normative" to "informative".
- Clarified restrictions on Bit 0 through 2 of the MutAuthRequested field of KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP .
- Removed potentially confusing statements on Slot provisioning for GET_CSR.
- Fixed typo in Table 79.

⁹²⁵ 22.5 Version 1.2.2 (2023-10-08)

- Correct values in Field and Size columns of Table 51.
- Update Table 7 Timing specification for SPDM messages to clarify that Responders can exceed ST1 and CT using ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady.
- Make the layout of tables 52 and 53 match the layout of the other table in the specification.
- Clarified the presence of the SlotIDParam field in GET_MEASUREMENTS .
- Clarified that if endpoint does not support chunking then it must set MaxSPDMmsgSize equal to DataTransferSize .
- Replaced wording of "internal buffer" in GET_CERTIFICATE with DataTransferSize and "transmit buffer".
- Added LargeResponse error to description of chunking certificates.
- Clarified requirements for chunking the CERTIFICATE response.
- · Clarified vcA for the case where capabilities and algorithms were provisioned alongside PSK.
- Removed normative error statement from the BasicMutAuthReq field of CHALLENGE_AUTH .
- · Added the VESA standards body to Registry or standards body ID.
- Replaced links to ITU-T X.509 with RFC5280 and removed ITU-T X.509 from the Normative references section.
- Removed "after Reset" from M1/M2 ordering.
- · Changed "or" to "and" in Large SPDM message transfer mechanism section.
- Added size of the transmit buffer as a condition for CHUNK_SEND .
- · Renamed instances of OEM to vendor-defined.
- · Removed normative text that prohibited reuse of session IDs.
- Deprecated the CHAL_CAP capability of the Requester.
- Specified Responder's response to invalid measurement index.
- Changed endianness of the Context field of BinConcat from little to hash byte order.
- Renamed the HMAC-Hash to HKDF-Extract .
- Expanded ResponseTooLarge to include the transmit buffer size and DataTransferSize.
- Clarified that size of ResponseToLargeRequest may be smaller than DataTransferSize .
- · Added clause that sizes and lengths are in units of bytes.
- Added evaluation of the Responder's transmit buffer size to LargeResponse .
- · Clarified that the Negotiated State Preservation Indicator applies to the cached Negotiated State.
- Clarified that LargeResponse shall not re-initialize L1/L2 to null.
- · Changed statement about graceful error handling during chunking from normative to non-normative.
- Clarified that SPDM messages sent outside of a session do not contribute to in-session transcripts.
- Added missing MaxSPDMmsgSize to GET_CAPABILITIES request and CAPABILITIES response messages.
- Clarified that Responders can alter requested CSR fields.
- Changed "should" to "shall" in the LargeMessageSize field of CHUNK_SEND .
- Clarified that KEY_EX_CAP only applies to Requester's request message and Responder's response message.
- Changed instances of "Requester-direction" to "Request-direction" and instances of "Responder-direction" to

"Response-direction".

- Removed encapsulation requirements from MUT_AUTH_CAP definition.
- Clarified that start of the Heartbeat timer can include PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP .
- Clarified that Device Certificate CA keys need to be the same for a Responder that supports ALIAS_CERT_CAP and CSR_CAP.
- · Removed deprecation status from ENCAP_CAP.
- Clarified that WT_{Max} includes the wait time from the most recently received ResponseNotReady .
- Clarified that if either Requester or Responder do not support Heartbeat then the value of HeartbeatPeriod would be 0.
- · Removed informative statement that chunks are equal in size.
- Clarified that non-encapsulated requests are prohibited during the session handshake phase.
- Clarified the assumption that version entries are not duplicated when calculating MinDataTransferSize .
- Clarified that MeasurementHashAlgo should be zero if MeasurementSpecificationSel is zero.
- Clarified runtime measurement change detection (Param2 of Table 43).
- Clarified that some devices may need to persist GET_CSR related information across resets.
- Corrected PK to PubKey in CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification.
- Removed the restriction to set Length to be 0xFFFF in GET_CERTIFICATE if both endpoints support the large SPDM message transfer mechanism.
- Clarified RequesterContext in PSK_EXCHANGE.
- Clarify the definition of errata versions and that they may contain behavioral changes to fix security issues or defects.
- · Figures in SPDM bits-to-bytes-mapping updated.
- Clarified that ERROR is only allowed in response to GET_VERSION in cases explicitly defined in this specification.
- The Responder shall return error ResponseTooLarge and shall not discard the request that caused this error.
- Add missing ffdhe3072 in DHE secret computation section.
- Clarify allowed session phases for GET_CSR, SET_CERTIFICATE, GET_DIGESTS, and GET_CERTIFICATE in Table 6 — SPDM request and response messages validity.
- Clarified Table 51 Standard body or vendor-defined header (SVH) when the payload is standards body or registry organization defined.
- Move statement that DMTF does not define extended algorithms to Table 25 Extended Algorithm field format.
- Added normative information in Table 11 Flag fields definitions for the Requester and Table 12 Flag fields definitions for the Responder.
- Clarify the device behavior when a reset is required for a pending previous SET_CERTIFICATE request.
- Clarified in Table 47 Registry or standards body ID that the registry specifies the value used for the VendorID field.
- Renamed "Negotiated State Preservation Indicator" field of END_SESSION request to "Negotiated State Clearing Indicator"
- Clarified sessions can be established one at a time when HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP is set.
- · Clarify that CERTIFICATE response shall not return a partial certificate chain in case of chunking enabled and the

Requester asking for a complete certificate chain.

- New:
 - Added custom environments clauses.
 - Added VendorDefinedReqPayload and VendorDefinedRespPayload defined by DMTF specifications clauses.
- Remove text that ENCRYPT_CAP and MAC_CAP apply to all phases of a secure session.
- Clarified that the minimum number of supported sessions shall be one per connection.
- Clarified the chunked transfer including transcript update and interruption of the chunk transfer sequence.
- Removed text that prohibited error response codes for GET_CAPABILIITES and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS .
- Added explanation as to how the RDT value is measured at the Responder.
- Clarified the definition of RDT as the additional time needed by the responder and not as a delay.
- Clarified Responder's support for retry.
- Clarified that SlotID field value in <u>SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP</u> Response shall be the same as <u>SlotID</u> value in <u>SET_CERTIFICATE</u> Request.
- · Stated that all figures are informative unless otherwise specified explicitly.

⁹²⁶ 22.6 Version 1.2.3 (2024-08-19)

- Clarified that HEARTBEAT shall be sent if no other messages within the session were sent/received within HeartbeatPeriod
- Correct ReqLength to RespLength in Table 54 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format.
- Clarified that HeartbeatPeriod for each secure session is tracked independently
- Clarify the value of version text in Key Schedule.

⁹²⁷ 23 Bibliography

928 DMTF DSP4014, *DMTF Process for Working Bodies 2.6.*